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Cover
Original caption: “Vice Admiral Friedrick
Ruge, Inspector of the Federal German
Navy (left) receives the Legion of Merit
(Degree of Commander) from Chief of
U.S. Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh
A. Burke, USN (right). The award was
presented to Admiral Ruge on February
21, 1961.” Burke and Ruge established
a relationship of friendship and trust
as they worked together to integrate the
German navy rebuilt after World War
II into the Western alliance system. In
“German Navies from 1848 to 2016:
Their Development and Courses from
Confrontation to Cooperation,” author
Werner Rahn recounts the arc of the
history of German navies.
Credit: Official U.S. Navy photo. The Citadel Archives and Museum, Charleston,
South Carolina, Ruge Collection
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FROM THE EDITORS
For a nation to come to grips in a serious way with its own military history is
never easy, particularly after a disastrous defeat (although victory is not without
its own challenges). It is all the more impressive, then, that the modern German
navy has institutionalized the study of its own history in a manner that bears
testimony to the best traditions of German scholarship. In “German Navies from
1848 to 2016: Their Development and Courses from Confrontation to Cooperation,” Werner Rahn provides an authoritative overview of the German navy, from
its rise in imperial times, through its role in the two world wars of the last century,
to its reconstitution after the defeat of Hitler and the establishment of the Federal
Republic of Germany. In a period when major-power naval conflict once again
has become thinkable, it is well to be reminded of the strategic importance of
naval power—and of the gross blunders nations can make in wielding it. Perhaps
the most telling insight he offers from the German experience is the navy’s failure
to take sufficient account of the severe geographical limitations it faced. In this, as
in other respects, there may be lessons here for a rising maritime China. Werner
Rahn, a retired captain in the German navy and former director of the German
Armed Forces Military History Research Office, was awarded the Hattendorf
Prize for Distinguished Original Research in Maritime History by the Naval War
College in 2016.
In the contemporary strategic environment, the most urgent challenge is not
so much the threat of traditional major-power war as it is the aggressive use of
nontraditional measures short of war by revisionist powers such as China and
Russia. In “The New Time and Space: Dimensions of a Maritime Defense Strategy,” Tomohisa Takei argues that status quo powers such as Japan and the United
States must be resolute in resisting these measures, stressing the importance of
concerted multinational responses. Admiral Tomohisa Takei (Ret.), a former
chief of staff of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, is currently a professor
and distinguished international fellow at the Naval War College.
In “Rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy,” Deborah Sanders reviews the challenges
facing Ukraine in reconstituting its naval forces following the devastating losses
Russia inflicted on them in the course of its occupation of Crimea in 2014. She
does so in the context of Russia’s ongoing proxy war in Ukraine’s eastern prov
inces, and notes in particular the threat this poses to the important port of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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Mariupol’. She argues that, given the desperate condition of the Ukrainian economy, for the foreseeable future the rebuilding effort should be limited to creating
a “mosquito fleet” for coastal defense. Deborah Sanders is a reader in defense and
security studies at King’s College London.
Perhaps in part because it had no very clear winner or loser, the War of 1812
has received relatively little attention in either British or American military historiography, particularly at the operational or campaign level. Kevin D. McCranie,
in “Confronting Uncertainty with Decentralized Command: British Naval Decision Making at the Outbreak of the War of 1812,” makes the case that this neglect
is unwarranted. At first sight, this history seems to lack contemporary relevance,
given the poor communications available to maritime forces during that early period; but this assumes that today’s instantaneous electronic communications will
not be subject to serious degradation at the outset of hostilities between major
powers. Kevin McCranie is a professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at
the Naval War College.
In “Money, Motivation, and Terrorism: Rewards-for-Information Programs,”
Christopher M. Ford addresses the neglected subject of the efficacy of the longstanding U.S. government programs that generate information on terrorist
activities by offering monetary rewards, using as a historical case study the very
successful program the British instituted during the Malayan Emergency. He
argues that much more attention needs to be given to the impact of such rewards
on the particular situation and expectations of the recipients. Lieutenant Colonel
Christopher Ford, USA, is currently a military professor at the Stockton Center
for the Study of International Law at the Naval War College.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309).
For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236).
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is responsible for educating future leaders, developing their
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and enhancing their capability to advise senior leaders and
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer
whose sea-duty assignments have included command
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minnesota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political
science, and received master of arts degrees from the
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

On Internationalization

as President of the Naval War
College last year, I identified four broad elements of a vision
for the institution. We will operationalize, navalize, futurize, and internationalize
the College’s education and research efforts, with an overall goal of contributing
to the professionalism and capabilities of the nation’s future leaders. Previously
I laid out an overview in the Naval War College Review’s Autumn 2016 edition
and addressed aspects of the vision’s operationalization component in the Winter
2017 issue, navalization in the Spring 2017 issue, and futurization in the Summer
2017 issue. I would like to round out the discussion of our vision by reviewing our
ongoing efforts in the areas of international education and engagement.
Accelerating a process begun sixty-one years ago when the Naval Command College was established, and forty-eight years after the first International
Seapower Symposium (ISS) was convened in Newport, the College will strive to
internationalize itself further so that it becomes the veritable locus of international maritime cooperation. Over the past six decades, the participation of topflight
international officers in the classroom greatly broadened and enhanced the educational experience of the College’s U.S. alumni. But that was never the sole nor
the overriding reason it first opened its doors to the international community;
educating international officers always has been a goal in itself. On any given
day, the College’s international alumni command about 40 percent of the world’s
navies and coast guards. That these leaders possess a sophisticated understanding of international politics, a thorough familiarity with the United States and its
military forces, and a shared appreciation for the profession’s norms of behavior is
of inestimable value to both the United States and the international community.
The bonds of understanding, friendship, and trust forged in Newport have made
AFTER I ASSUMED MY POSITION
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the College “neutral ground,” where the personnel of navies from around the
world not only feel welcome but are inspired to work together.
Through a series of initiatives undertaken in the spirit of this internationalization, the College seeks to promote ever-greater levels of cooperation and
interoperability among the world’s navies and coast guards. Key steps include
the following:

• Expand the Presidential Fellows Program to include four former heads of
navy. We are incredibly blessed to have Admiral Guillermo Barrera, former
head of the Colombian navy; Admiral Nirmal Verma, former head of the
Indian navy; and Admiral Tomohisa Takei, recently retired head of the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force, currently aboard. Rear Admiral Lars Saunes,
former head of the Royal Norwegian Navy, will join us in the fall of 2017. In
addition to writing, teaching, and mentoring students, they will advise the
President of the College and, in coordination with the dean of International
Programs, will develop and execute a plan that maintains policy momentum
between the regularly scheduled International Seapower Symposia. Admiral Barrera notes: “When I give lectures for the College of Naval Warfare
and the College of Naval Command and Staff, I stress the usefulness of the
themes and tools that the NWC [Naval War College] uses and teaches, as
well as the contributions of the theorists in helping to understand the finer
points of maritime strategy and operations. I illustrate this by citing successes and failures that have occurred in real life. I also love supporting other
areas of education at the College, such as the Combined Forces Maritime
Component Commander course and the regional alumni symposia. These
two initiatives are a significant part of the education of both the U.S. personnel and their global partners.”
• Bring the International Maritime Staff Operators Course (I-MSOC) to full
output by 2020. This spring, fifteen officers from thirteen countries attended
a “beta test” for the twelve-week course. Students were taught the fundamental concepts and processes necessary to support a coalition or combined
maritime component commander, with emphasis on the U.S. Navy Planning
Process and the organization and functions of a U.S. maritime operations
center. Graduates of I-MSOC will serve as catalysts for greater interoperability of coalition forces brought together to meet the challenges of the next
maritime crisis. The course will be held three times a year, for an annual
throughput of seventy-five students.
• Increase the frequency of the College’s regional alumni symposia (RASs) from
one to two annually. These symposia are international academic conferences
premised on the belief that military education is not solely the product of a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
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schoolhouse, but rather a lifelong attempt to acquire knowledge about the
profession of arms. RASs also foster professional interaction among up-andcoming military leaders within a region. This network promotes professional linkages among military officers at a crucial juncture in their careers when
international contacts prove invaluable. Usually cohosted with a war college
from another country, RASs offer an excellent opportunity to interact with
and influence a wide range of naval professionals around the world—like a
“mini-ISS.”
• Institutionalize student military-to-military exchange efforts with China and
other nations. Building understanding, friendship, and trust is a slow, laborious process that begins with small steps—particularly with countries that
harbor deep suspicions of the United States. Midlevel student exchanges are
an ideal means to that end.
• Increase the capacity of the College to conduct sustained, purposeful engagement with our international partners, particularly its war college counterparts.
The cost-effective means of influencing future generations of naval officers
is through their professional military education. By adding a small cadre of
active and retired foreign area officers, the College aims to expand its contacts
abroad and facilitate faculty exchanges, curriculum development, and war
gaming.
The return on investment of these small yet critical initiatives can be significant. The Naval War College will continue to seek ways to enhance its internationalization mission. It has been said that, while the sleek, gray hulls wrought by
the skilled hands of patriotic shipwrights are important, we also must be vigilant
in our efforts to build friend-ships, relation-ships, and partner-ships!
As noted in the opening paragraph of this President’s Forum, the College is
moving out smartly to execute a four-part vision for the institution to make it
more supportive of the needs of the operating forces; more attentive to the unique
challenges and opportunities represented by our naval heritage and focus; more
cognizant of and attuned to the impact that technological change will have on our
maritime and joint forces; and more assiduous in its efforts to enhance maritime
cooperation and friendship around the globe. I can assure you that all hands are
“turning to” to make this vision a reality.

JEFFREY A. HARLEY

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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Werner Rahn is a retired captain in the German
navy, a leading German naval historian, and the
former director of the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office. He received his PhD
from the University of Hamburg in 1974. Among his
critically acclaimed works is the sixty-eight-volume,
annotated, facsimile edition of the War Diary of the
German Naval Staff, 1939–45 (Mittler, 1988–97, in
German), which has been called the single most important resource for understanding the decisions of
the German naval high command during World War
II. In addition, Rahn contributed the major naval
sections to the monumental, multivolume series produced by the German Armed Forces Military History
Research Office, Germany and the Second World
War, published in English (Clarendon, 1990–) and
German. In 2016, the Naval War College awarded
Rahn the Hattendorf Prize for Distinguished Original Research in Maritime History. This article expands on his Hattendorf Prize lecture.
© 2017 by Werner Rahn
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2017, Vol. 70, No. 4
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GERMAN NAVIES FROM 1848 TO 2016
Their Development and Courses from Confrontation
to Cooperation
Werner Rahn

M

ilitary history deals with the evolution and structure of armed forces and
their position in state and society. In this sense, naval history is taken
to mean that part of military history that concentrates its studies on the navy.
However, when dealing with fields of research, one sphere provides the greatest
challenge for military and naval historians: warfare in the widest sense.1
In his book The Face of Battle, British historian John Keegan points out that many
historians are shy about exploring the profundities and realities of war.2 Generally
speaking, we can expect naval or other military historians to have a certain affinity for the subject of their research. They should have a basic knowledge about the
military, in the same way that we expect an economic historian to have a sound
basic knowledge of economic theory. But Keegan is justified in demanding that
the military historian spend as much time as possible among military personnel,
“because the quite chance observation of trivial incidents may illuminate his . . .
understanding of all sorts of problems from the past which will otherwise almost
certainly remain obscured.”3 Like any historian, the naval historian bears a great
responsibility in his striving after historical truth, if he wants to be taken seriously. The uncritical patriotic history that used to glorify naval actions should be
a thing of the past.
Today, some historians tend to judge personalities, events, and structures according to today’s moral categories. They end up “putting the past on trial, and
since the critical historian, armed with his generation’s self-confidence or with
his progressive concept of the future, knows everything better, in this trial he will
be prosecutor, judge, and legislator all in one.”4
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In 1957, the German navy began to develop a new approach to studying its
own history. That year, the first fleet commander in chief, Rear Admiral Rolf
Johannesson (1900–89), organized the Historical-Tactical Conference. Since
then it has been held every year, and is now a standard element of the naval officer’s historical education. Johannesson’s aim was to distance his service from
subjective naval history about World War I.5 He hoped that a critical discussion of
the past would teach his officers truth, loyalty, and moral courage, and that they
would determine their own position more solidly by recourse to history and the
federal constitution. Through 2016, fifty-six conferences have been held, covering
a wide variety of subjects.6 Papers usually are presented by junior officers from
the fleet, assisted by naval historians. The presentation of the papers and the candid discussion of subjects relevant to the business of the day usually provide testimony to the intellectual talents among the navy’s officer corps. Many an admiralto-be made a mark when as a lieutenant he presented some critical theory about
history—provoking the older generation’s opposition.
It is a perennial challenge to historians even to come close to historical truth.
The commercial success of popular publications, as well as the large number
of visitors attracted to museums, indicates how many people have historical
interests. Such continuing interest is a stimulating challenge for professional
historians. We should continue to try to present our findings about background
information and structures from the past in such a way that the message gets
across—meaning that historical knowledge and historical sensitivity become
factors serving to help stabilize a liberal society.
THE BIRTH OF A GERMAN NAVY
The first German navy worthy to bear such designation was established in 1848,
when a conflict over the duchy of Schleswig resulted in a war with Denmark.7 At
that time, Germany could do nothing against the Danes’ efficient blockade; ocean
trade came to a standstill. This dilemma resulted in a rather emotional movement
that advocated building up a fleet. The issue soon captivated the members of the
national assembly that had convened at Frankfurt’s Saint Paul’s Cathedral only a
short time before. On June 14, 1848, by an overwhelming majority, the first German parliament voted a large appropriation to build a fleet.8
Prince Adalbert of Prussia (1811–73), who had concerned himself with
maritime problems rather early, played an important part in those first maritime
plans. In May 1848, he published a memorandum on the buildup of a German
fleet that became, so to speak, the Magna Carta of the German navy. By analyzing the maritime-strategic situation of Prussia and Germany and having taken
into consideration already the imminent technical revolution, it formed the first
theoretical basis for a German naval concept. The memorandum included three
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models on which Germany might establish a navy: (1) providing mere coastal
defense; (2) defending sea lines of communication (SLOCs); or (3) building up
an independent sea power. Prince Adalbert, however, clearly emphasized that
even steps leading toward the buildup of an independent sea power would involve many risks, and that once this option had been chosen there could be no
stopping halfway.9
During the preparations for the buildup of a fleet, it soon became clear that
almost all requirements—in personnel, matériel, and organization—could not be
met. It was, therefore, only natural to ask for foreign assistance. Arnold Duckwitz
(1802–81), the first German secretary of the navy, in October 1848 forwarded an
official request to the American government for assistance in building up, with
regard to personnel and matériel, a German fleet. In the United States, the German liberal revolution had been observed with interest and with an open mind.
Thus, the German requests met with a positive response within both private and
official circles. First contacts were established by the frigate USS St. Lawrence,
commanded by Captain Hiram Paulding (1797–1878), which was visiting
Bremerhaven in the fall of 1848. The ship and crew were received enthusiastically as envoys of a hoped-for ally. The U.S. Navy immediately began personnelsupport activities by rendering assistance with training: the frigate took aboard
four Prussian sea cadets for practical exposure. Captain Paulding, as an adviser,
was for weeks the center of attention during all discussions on the fleet buildup,
which were held in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Hannover. The matériel support concentrated on providing a modern frigate, which was equipped at the New York
Naval Yard and transferred to Europe in the summer of 1849.10
Even though the duration and the scope of this first American military aid to
Germany were limited, that assistance provided early evidence of an American
policy of being ready and able to support, across the Atlantic, the principles of
democracy and liberalism. On both sides of that ocean, common goals and mutual sympathy for the liberal-democratic forces resulted in the first steps toward
cooperation. How close these idealistic ties actually were became evident after
the Frankfurt National Assembly failed, when high emigration rates resulted
from disappointed democrats finding their spiritual home in the United States.
One example was Carl Schurz (1829–1906), who later became Secretary of the
Interior. Such a “brain drain” strengthened the hand of conservative forces in
Germany—the consequences of which are well known.
The German navy remained in existence even after the dream of a united
Reich had long gone and the reality of particularism governed German politics. However, in 1853 the fleet was disbanded and its few ships were sold or
scrapped.11 Only Prussia, with its relatively longer coastline, still had available a
limited number of naval forces, proudly named the Royal Prussian Navy.
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Yet the idea of the navy as an instrument of national unification stayed alive
even after 1848. After the foundation of the Reich in 1871, the navy’s function
as a symbol of German unity was stressed officially, in contrast to the army’s
organization by individual states. The very term Imperial Navy emphasized that
this instrument of power was subject directly to the Reich. The personnel of the
Imperial German Navy (IGN) came from all parts of Germany, and the fleet became, as Tirpitz (see below) once put it, a “melting pot of teutonicism.”12
However, until 1897 the navy’s development was overshadowed by that of the
army. The navy’s contributions to the wars against Denmark in 1864, Austria in
1866, and France in 1870–71 seemingly were of no importance. Strategically, the
IGN concentrated on providing a forward coastal defense.13
STRATEGIC ROOTS OF BUILDING A GERMAN BATTLE FLEET
In 1894, spurred by the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), the
German naval high command prepared a strategic concept for the buildup of a
battle fleet.14 Captain Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), then chief of staff of the
naval high command, seems to have taken the initiative to formulate the famous
Dienstschrift (Service Memorandum) No. IX, under the misleading title “General Lessons Learned from the Fleet Autumn Exercise.”15
In this memorandum, Tirpitz resolutely pleads that strategic offensive actions should be considered “normal tasks of a fleet.”16 Such actions should aim
at bringing about “the earliest possible initiation of a battle,” a battle that would
reach the “main decision” of naval warfare. That decision could not be reached by
a cruiser war, such as was prescribed under the tenets of the French Jeune École
school of thought, but “only by permanent naval supremacy and lasting pressure
on the enemy.”17
Owing to Germany’s position in the heart of Central Europe, its long coasts
on the North and Baltic Seas, and its borders with eight neighboring nations, any
strategy of the Reich that did not rely on strong alliance partners required it to
decide whether a threat should be neutralized defensively or eliminated offensively. As long as Germany considered only France as a potential enemy (and later
Russia as well), the offensive strategic concept for naval operations that Tirpitz
laid down in Service Memorandum No. IX seemed appropriate.
In June 1897, Tirpitz was appointed state secretary in the Reichsmarineamt
(Imperial Naval Office).18 Not least because of his influence, the politics of the
Reich gradually expanded to consider the risks involved in confronting Britain.
For Tirpitz, England was, from the beginning, “the most dangerous naval enemy,”
against which Germany “most urgently required a certain measure of naval force
as a political power factor.” Since Tirpitz considered cruiser warfare a lost cause,
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owing to Germany’s lack of naval bases, he asked for the buildup of a fleet that
“can unfold its greatest military potential between Heligoland and the Thames.”19
Elsewhere within the IGN there were well-founded doubts regarding this
conceptualization. Captain Curt Freiherr von Maltzahn (1849–1930), who at
that time taught tactics and naval history at the German naval academy, warned
as early as 1898 that reaching “Seeherrschaft” (sea control) by means of a battle
would not suffice by itself to impose peace on the opponent, for such sea control
would have to be maintained and exploited. This would require a surplus of
strength. As long as neither party achieved sea control, the weaker party would be
confined to fighting against the achievement of sea control by its enemy, forgoing
victory as the goal of its own combat actions. It would be important to maintain a
national seaborne trade “corresponding in strength to the means deployed for defense.”20 Maltzahn considered a combination of squadron operations and cruiser
war to be the most suitable naval strategy. “Squadron operations are indispensable in this type of warfare, but they are only a means and not an end, and they
become only really valuable if the freedom of action thus gained is exploited.”21
However, such a foresighted and realistic alternative, one that combined a
balanced defensive fleet with strong cruiser elements, stood no chance in the
IGN. Tirpitz repressed any further strategic discussions so as not to jeopardize
the buildup of the fleet, which had received legislative backing and thereafter was
scheduled to be accomplished over an extended period.22
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: THE NAVAL ARMAMENT RACE
The objectives and planning principles of the German battle fleet construction
can be summarized as follows: The basic prerequisite for gaining sea control was
the destruction, or at least the decisive weakening, of the enemy battle fleet. Thus,
planning focused on the fleet’s capability to impose a decision in battle. The battle
fleet also was considered a political means of power that could enable Germany
to defend its overseas interests adequately. Britain, the most dangerous potential
opponent, was to be deterred from a war with Germany by means of a strong
fleet, or, should deterrence fail, was to be engaged successfully.
Among the liberal bourgeoisie, the naval policy met with strong support,
which was increased even further by propaganda skillfully directed. However,
while drawing up its ambitious armament program, Germany misjudged the
dangers arising from its geographical situation in Central Europe. Any German
approach that strove to establish an international maritime stature and adopt a
counterpoint stance toward Britain was bound to be met with profound suspicion
from Britain. After the German-British alliance talks in 1901 failed to produce
any tangible results—the two sides were pursuing incompatible objectives—the
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buildup of the German battle fleet became and remained a crucial disruptive
factor, preventing any subsequent arrangement with Britain and resulting in an
arms race.
From 1905 onward, that escalatory dynamic was characterized by an enormous increase in the combat power of battleships. With the construction of HMS
Dreadnought in 1905–1906, the Royal Navy set a new standard. Tirpitz had to
keep pace if the IGN was to remain equal, ship for ship, with its potential enemy.
As a result, his long-term financial planning had been in vain, for the construction of capital ships involved ever-increasing costs.
Britain could cope with the cost increases involved in the construction of capital ships, or at least it had to do so since its security was exclusively dependent
on the superiority of the Royal
We should continue to try to present our find- Navy. In contrast, the defense
ings about . . . the past in such a way that . . . of Germany was primarily
an army responsibility, with
historical knowledge and . . . sensitivity become factors serving to help stabilize a liberal the navy playing a secondary
role. Britain’s first lord of the
society.
Admiralty Winston Churchill
(1874–1965) explained this in a public speech in February 1912. The strategic
situations of both countries, Churchill pointed out, made his own fleet a vital
necessity to the British Empire, whereas “from some points of view, the German
Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury.”23
Groaning under the burden of high naval expenditures, in 1912 both governments tried again to come to an agreement that they hoped would reduce the
building rates of capital ships. In February 1912, the British cabinet sent Secretary
of State for War Richard B. Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane (1856–1928), to Berlin
to try to reach a general settlement in these matters. However, Lord Haldane’s
talks with the German side never converted into real negotiations, and the effort failed after a few days. The British were unwilling “to commit themselves to
neutrality,” and the German side—under pressure from Tirpitz—was unwilling
to modify the country’s planned building rate.24 Tirpitz appreciated that for England “the Entente with France gives her the best security against a too powerful
Germany,” he said. “I no longer believe that we can get out of this vicious circle.”25
As Germany did not have enough resources to fulfill all the requirements of both
the army and the navy, the IGN could not keep up in the unconstrained arms
race that commenced thereafter, even though by 1914 it had become the world’s
second-strongest navy.
Before 1914, modern warships, such as capital ships, cruisers, and torpedo
boats, were not only part of a nation’s military potential but striking evidence
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of its industrial and technological capability. Only highly industrialized nations
could solve on their own the complex technological problems that the transition
to modern capital ships involved. This was particularly true for the new technologies of engines and weapons, as well as for the improvement in ship survivability
achieved through the use of high-quality steel armor.26
The period between 1905 and 1914 was characterized by a technological revolution that made naval weapons obsolete rapidly. This applied to cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines as well as larger units. During the first major naval
battles of World War I, the decisive effects of superior speed and more powerful
guns became apparent.
STRATEGY AND GEOGRAPHY
Tirpitz based his strategic concept on the assumption that the Royal Navy always
would act offensively in a war against Germany; in particular, it would establish
a close blockade of the German coast. Such a blockade near Heligoland “would
provide abundant opportunities to equalize naval strength” or to “enter into a
decisive battle.”27 For the IGN, this hypothetical battle became an element of
dogma—the focal point of its operational concept and fleet training. For this
reason, knowledge of and experience with weapons technology, tactics, and
shiphandling were more-decisive factors in the careers of naval officers than
qualification in staff assignments—which had a long-term effect on the choice of
personnel for command-and-control appointments. The work of the Admiralstab (naval staff), established in 1899, and the creation of a specialized corps of
staff officers to man it, seemed secondary in importance. As a consequence, the
naval officer corps remained unprepared for the complex strategic dimensions of
a naval war against Britain.28
Although all the preparations focused on the “decisive battle,” a great deal of
confusion existed regarding the true purpose of the battle.29 While those staffing
the German naval command had adopted Mahan’s theory of sea power willingly,
they paid only lip service to a central element of that theory: the importance of
geographical position and the resultant strategic options. By throttling Germany’s
seaborne trade, an opponent could decide a “war by severing an artery essential
to the existence of Germany.”30
An incorrect assessment of the effects of geography on British naval operations led the German naval leadership to a faulty assessment of British strategy.
Britain had never attempted to eliminate an opponent’s navy at any price; it did so
only when the British Isles and their SLOCs in the Atlantic were threatened. And
these SLOCs remained outside the range of the German naval forces, except for a
few cruisers and, later, submarines. To maintain a close blockade of the German
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coast, the Royal Navy would have found it useful to eliminate the German fleet
at an early date, but the Admiralty was well aware that such a strategic offensive
would involve considerable losses. Especially cognizant of the threat that German
torpedo boats, submarines, and mines represented, after 1911–12 the Royal Navy
no longer considered deploying its Grand Fleet to the southern North Sea.31 In
November 1912, the Admiralty issued a set of “General Instructions” to its war
plans against Germany, summarizing Britain’s strategic approach as follows:
The general idea is to use our geographical advantage of position to cut off all German shipping from oceanic trade and to secure the British coasts from any serious
military enterprise and incidentally but effectually to cover the transport across the
Channel of an Expeditionary Force to France. . . . It is believed that the prolongation
of a distant blockade will inflict injury upon German interests. . . . To relieve such a
situation, Germany would be tempted to send into the North Sea a force sufficient
. . . to offer a general action. Such an action or actions would take place far from the
German coast and close to our own.32

This plan implied a new wartime deployment for the Grand Fleet: basing it at
Scapa Flow, in the Scottish Orkneys.
When in 1912 the German naval staff discovered the new orientation of its
potential enemy, the chief of naval staff, Vice Admiral August von Heeringen
(1855–1927), examined in a war game whether and how Germany’s High Seas
Fleet could counter a distant blockade. The result was sobering. The Blue (i.e.,
German) war-gaming party had advanced its squadrons as far as the Firth of
Forth, but there they encountered difficulties and suffered considerable losses
while withdrawing. The admiral concluded: “If the British really restrict their
activities to the remote blockade and consistently hold back their battle fleet, then
the role of our beautiful High Seas Fleet could be a very sad one in wartime. The
submarines will have to do the job.”33
It must be left open what type of submarine employment Heeringen had in
mind, but his estimate hit the central strategic problem for German naval warfare during World War I. Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the role of the submarine as a naval weapon “had grown from base to
coast defence and from this to an offensive task in enemy waters.”34 Basically, the
submarine was a mobile torpedo boat with long endurance. Submerged, a submarine made only slow progress—but it had the ability to vanish below the surface
of the sea for several hours.
In comparison with other naval powers, the IGN came late to building submarines. The first one, U-1 (282 tons), was commissioned in December 1906.
Obviously, Tirpitz had waited until he was sure that submarines were an effective
offensive weapon. After 1908, he ordered more than forty oceangoing submarines, of which twenty-eight had been completed before war broke out.35
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WORLD WAR I
When Britain joined the war on the side of France and Russia in August 1914,
it became clear that the German High Seas Fleet could not perform its political function of deterrence. Britain, relying on its superior fleet and the strategic
positions the country and its empire held worldwide to protect its vital SLOCs,
considered the German fleet, which could operate only from the North Sea, to
be an acceptable risk.36
In August 1914, the IGN lay under the spell of great enemy superiority. The
naval command placed all its hopes on reducing enemy forces through offensive
submarine and minelaying operations. The assumption was that the opponent
would seek battle, but Germany’s fleet was to be employed in such a battle only
“under favorable conditions.”37
Although the few German cruisers stationed overseas at the outbreak of war
were quite successful in guerre de course (warfare against merchant vessels), the
Royal Navy soon neutralized them. Germany’s East Asiatic Squadron, under Vice
Admiral Maximilian von Spee (1861–1914) moved across the Pacific Ocean and
destroyed a British squadron off Chile, but its advance to the Falkland Islands
in the South Atlantic on December 8, 1914, proved fatal.38 The example demonstrates that the IGN neither recognized nor made use of the strategic advantages
it might have derived from coordinating the operations of its naval forces overseas with those at home.
However, one small but powerful German squadron did influence the balance
of forces and the overall course of World War I: the Mediterranean Division,
comprising the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau, under Rear
Admiral Wilhelm A. Souchon (1864–1946). The breakthrough of the two units to
Constantinople and their formal handover to Turkey in August 1914 influenced
Turkey to join the war on the side of the Central powers in October 1914. The
Turkish straits (the Dardanelles and the Bosporus) became impassable for the
Allies; all their attempts to penetrate them failed, with heavy losses.39 Thus, the
second important route to Russia, other than the Baltic Sea, remained blocked,
contributing to Russia’s loss as an ally of the Entente in 1917. After the war, Sir
Julian S. Corbett commented as follows on this German strategic success:
When we consider that the Dardanelles was mined, that no permission to enter it
had been ratified, and that everything depended on the German powers of cajolery at
Constantinople, when we also recall the world wide results that ensued, it is not too
much to say that few naval decisions more bold and well-judged were ever taken. So
completely, indeed, did the risky venture turn a desperate situation into one of high
moral and material advantage, that for the credit of German statesmanship it goes far
to balance the cardinal blunder of attacking France through Belgium.40
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The various operations the High Seas Fleet conducted in the North and Baltic
Seas, which culminated in the battle of Jutland in May 1916, cannot conceal the
fact that primarily it performed the functions of a “fleet in being”: securing the
German coast, blocking the Baltic approaches, and keeping clear the submarines’
sailing routes.41
In the first few months of the war, the submarine gave a striking demonstration of its power. On September 22, 1914, U-9 (Lieutenant Otto Weddigen
[1880–1915], commanding) sank three aged armored cruisers in an hour. At
first, the Royal Navy could not believe the cruisers “had been attacked by a single
submarine and attributed the disaster to a whole flotilla.”42 Over the next couple
of weeks, the U-boats extended their patrols; by October 1914, U-20 had penetrated the Channel to attack transports on their way to France, circumnavigated
the British Isles, and returned to Germany, having cruised 2,200 miles in eighteen
days.43
Commerce Raiding by U-boats, 1915–18
The varied arguments concerning the degree of success German submarines
achieved in their raiding against Britain’s maritime commerce are a classic example of the civil-military struggle of a nation at war. At the time, this struggle was
influenced greatly by public opinion, for submarine warfare became a popular
myth to which a large number of Germans subscribed; they believed the U-boat
was some sort of infallible, magic weapon that would bring victory. Because of
some successful surprise raids, not only the public but the naval command overestimated the efficiency of submarines.
Initial considerations within the IGN regarding the employment of submarines against British shipping had not yielded a clear picture by the time Tirpitz
spoke publicly on the issue—which he did without consulting Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856–1921) or chief of naval staff Admiral Hugo
von Pohl (1855–1916). In response to the British threat to “strangulate the [German] economy with the help of a blockade,” as Churchill had put it in a speech
on November 9, Tirpitz responded in an interview that Germany could “play the
same game”—by torpedoing all British shipping.44
This triggered a passionate public debate that had repercussions for the naval
command. The young historian Gerhard Ritter (1888–1967) knew from his own
experience during the war that
[i]t was Tirpitz’s interview that poured more oil on the fire when it was published in
late December. Thenceforth the question of submarine warfare was no longer a naval
problem for the experts to judge, but a political issue of the first order, with everyone
having his say. A “U-boat movement” quickly came into being. . . . Again the academic superpatriots were in the forefront with plans and petitions to the Chancellor
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and the navy on how to starve Britain into submission. Some of the most renowned
names at the University of Berlin were among them.45

The naval staff encouraged support for commerce warfare from the government; however, the method’s prospects for success could not be assessed, because
so few submarines were available. Of the twenty-two submarines in the North Sea
in early 1915, only fourteen (those with diesel engines) could operate west of the
British Isles. The chancellor came under both public and naval pressure while
making his decision, and he relied too much on the navy staff ’s optimistic forecast. Early in February 1915, Bethmann-Hollweg gave his consent to submarine
warfare—without either the government or the naval command having analyzed
thoroughly the methodology of commerce raiding itself or the associated political risks and international complications.
The German proclamation of February 4, 1915, declared “the waters around
Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, to be a war
zone in which every merchant ship encountered would be destroyed, without it
always being possible to assure the safety of passengers and crew. Because of the
British misuse of neutral flags, it might not always be possible to prevent attacks
meant for hostile ships from falling on neutrals.”46 By conducting commerce warfare in this way, Germany opened new issues in international law, because submarines could not adhere adequately to the classic prize rules. This was particularly
so after the British began arming merchant vessels, and later created disguised
British auxiliary cruisers (Q-ships), which were a great threat to U-boats.
Despite these challenges, the commanding officers of German submarines,
displaying a combination of caution and skill, achieved remarkable results with
their deck guns while managing to comply with the prize regulations. Owing to
a lack of space, submarines could not embark survivors, but in many cases they
towed lifeboats to nearby coasts. However, the German naval staff criticized this
practice: “The deterring effect of the submarine war will be lost if it is felt that
passing the blockade zone is no longer a serious risk to the lives of the crews.”47
Without providing its submarine commanding officers with clear instructions,
the naval command obviously assumed that most ships would be sunk by torpedoes without warning, further deterring neutral shipping.
When the U.S. government raised concerns about the way the war was being
waged and referred to the international principles of naval warfare, the chief of
the general staff, General Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922), feared the United
States might enter the war. He wanted a guarantee that submarine warfare would
force England “to give in” within six weeks. When the kaiser inquired about the
matter, Tirpitz and the new chief of naval staff, Vice Admiral Gustav Bachmann
(1860–1943), confirmed this amazing forecast—without explaining what they
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meant by England’s “giving in.” On February 12, Bachmann wrote to Admiral
Pohl, then commander in chief of the High Seas Fleet: “It is in the military interest to make submarine warfare as effective as possible. Do not shy away from
sinking enemy passenger liners. Their loss will cause the greatest impact.”48
The first serious instances of confrontation with the United States arose from
German naval activities. On May 7, 1915, the submarine U-20 sank the British
passenger liner Lusitania (31,550 gross registered tons [GRT]), using only one
torpedo. This attack was conducted without warning and claimed the lives of
1,198 civilians, including 126 Americans; however, it was established later that
Lusitania had been carrying some war matériel in its forecastle.
This incident caused a severe diplomatic rift with the United States. President
Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) called on Germany to adhere to the accepted
principles of naval warfare and to respect the safety of American citizens traveling in the war zone. Following a similar incident in August 1915, the German
government yielded. In September, over the objection of the naval command,
commerce raiding was ordered stopped west of the British Isles; only in the
North and Mediterranean Seas was commerce raiding continued, and then in
accordance with the prize regulations.
By early 1916, the number of operational U-boats had risen to fifty-one. Intensified submarine warfare, as demanded by the chief of general staff, resumed
in February 1916. It aimed at sinking armed British merchant vessels, without
warning, while sparing passenger liners. But the French Channel steamer Sussex
was torpedoed on March 24, 1916, and another severe crisis between Germany
and the United States ensued. On April 18, 1916, Washington threatened to sever
diplomatic relations.49
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg now saw his earlier pessimistic assessment of
the situation confirmed. From the onset of the new stage of submarine warfare,
he had doubted the need for such a hazardous venture, “which would claim as a
stake our existence as a great power and the future of our nation in its entirety,
while the chance of winning, that is, the prospect of bringing England down by
fall, is a rather uncertain one.”50
So the chancellor provided assurance to Washington that merchant vessels
“would not be sunk without warning or without saving people’s lives.”51 As a
result, the frontline commanders of the IGN (i.e., of the High Seas Fleet and the
German marine corps in Flanders), acting on their own initiative—later backed
up by the naval command—moved their submarines out of the western operating
areas because they felt that operating under prize regulations exposed their vessels to great danger. Commerce raiding under the prize regulations was continued only in the Mediterranean. In the North Sea, the submarines operated against
military targets until September 1916, without achieving any significant results.
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This extreme reaction—transferring submarines out of the operating areas
entirely—was inconsistent with the actual situation. Of the thirty-five submarines that had been lost by June 1916, only four had been destroyed by Q-ships,
and none had been destroyed by armed merchant vessels.
Submarines’ promising capabilities for commerce raiding, even under the
prize regulations, became more discernible in summer 1916.52 The resumption of
submarine warfare under the prize regulations provoked no political risks while
achieving considerable results: the monthly average of sinkings between October
1916 and January 1917 was 189 merchant vessels, of 324,742 GRT. This was not
enough to force a decision
in the war against Britain,
[T]he first German secretary of the navy in
but the war economy of the
October 1848 forwarded an official request
Allies was damaged heavily
to the American government for assistance
enough to produce a chance
in building up . . . a German fleet. . . . [T]he
German requests met with a positive response for a negotiated peace. Still,
the naval command, in a rigid
within both private and official circles.
and dogmatic manner, repeatedly demanded “unrestricted submarine warfare.” The IGN was convinced that
this would result in decisive victory, even presuming the expected break with the
United States.
The naval staff decided to test the U.S. government by sending a submarine
to the U.S. East Coast. On October 7, 1916, thirty-one-year-old Lieutenant Hans
Rose (1885–1969), endowed with powers equivalent to those of an ancient Roman proconsul (his wording), headed his submarine, U-53, for Newport, Rhode
Island, as a demonstration of the efficiency of German submarines—and as a
warning to the U.S. Navy. After a three-hour visit to the Naval War College, Rose
departed Newport—and sank five enemy merchant ships off the American coast,
under prize rules. Sixteen U.S. destroyers observed this action at close range.53
The atmosphere and attitude among German naval officers at that time were
portrayed in a diary entry by Lieutenant Ernst von Weizsäcker (1882–1951) of
September 27, 1916. “The naval officers are sitting around, drinking, talking
politics, hatching plots, and into the bargain feel patriotic, trying, in a dishonest
way, to force submarine warfare. Submarine warfare is designed to conceal the
foolish things done in developing the fleet and employing the fleet in war. This
inadmissible propaganda evidences their bad consciences.”54
However, the propaganda Weizsäcker mentioned was effective. This was especially significant since the new general headquarters of all army forces, under
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) and General Erich Ludendorff
(1865–1937), realized that the attrition campaign had failed and that, as things
stood, victory in France was becoming less and less likely.
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Unlike the military, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg intended to avoid U.S.
entry into the war on the Allied side. He hoped that President Wilson would arrange a negotiated peace. However, when the British government in December
1916 harshly rejected a German peace offer, German leaders changed their opinion. Now the military leaders, especially Hindenburg and Ludendorff, categorically demanded “unrestricted submarine warfare,” claiming it was the last means
of gaining victory. At a conference on January 9, 1917, after heated discussion,
the chancellor supported their demand, and the German high command recommenced unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917.55 A few weeks later,
at a meeting of the Main Parliament Committee, Admiral Eduard von Capelle
(1855–1931), Tirpitz’s successor, “went so far as to insist that the effect of American entry into war would be ‘zero’! American troops would not even be able to
cross the ocean for lack of transport.”56
In response to unrestricted warfare, the United States broke relations with
Germany, announcing “armed neutrality.” However, the Entente wanted the United States to enter the war, so the alliance could take utmost advantage of a fully
mobilized American war economy. Thanks to maladroit German diplomacy, this
goal soon was accomplished.
Seeking to keep the Americans militarily engaged on their continent and in
the Pacific Ocean, Germany proposed an alliance with Japan and Mexico. The
proposal was sent by cable to Mexico in the so-called Zimmermann telegram on
January 16, 1917. With the aid of captured German codebooks, British naval intelligence managed to decrypt all the German diplomatic cables transmitted among
Berlin, Washington, and Mexico City. To expedite the U.S. decision-making
process, the British government transmitted the pertinent cables to Washington,
and President Wilson had them released to the press on February 28.57
Germany’s offer to Mexico of an alliance inflamed American public opinion
against Germany. Early in April, the United States entered the war on the side
of the Allies. Thus, unrestricted submarine warfare alone did not trigger the
American declaration of war, but Germany’s naval stance contributed to it in a
substantial way.
On February 1, 1917, Germany had 105 operational submarines available to
conduct unrestricted submarine warfare. By June 1917, their number had been
increased to only 129. Because of the increase in operations between February
and July 1917, repair periods gradually were prolonged, leading to a decrease in
the number of operationally ready submarines.58
On the other hand, in April 1917 alone, 458 Allied ships totaling 840,000 GRT
were sunk. This led to a severe crisis for the Allies, who momentarily doubted
their ability to continue the war. However, Germany did not achieve its strategic objective—effective disruption of British shipping. The Allies introduced
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23

NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb 15

32

8/7/17 11:58 AM

27

RAHN

Naval War College: Autumn 2017 Full Issue

GERMAN SUBMARINE LOSSES 1914–18
Cause
Ramming
• By warships
• By merchant vessels

1914

1915

1916

1917

1918

Total

2

1

—
—

8
2

3
2

14
4

• By warships
• By merchant vessels
• By Q-ships

—
—
—

2
—
3

3
—
2

—
—
6

3
1
—

8
1
11

Searching gear with petard

—

1

1

—

1

3

Explosion of ammunition aboard a
merchant vessel

—

—

—

1

—

1

Attack by aircraft

—

—

—

1

—

1

Depth charges

—

—

2

7

21

30

Torpedoing

—

4

1

7

6

18

Mines

2

2

6

21

23

54

Accidents
• By German mines
• By German torpedoes
• By beaching
• During diving
• Collision with German submarine

—
—
—
—
—

2
1

1
—

6
—

10
2

1
—
—

2
—
—

2
1
1

1
1
—
—
—

Unknown

1

2

4

—

7

14

Total

5

19

22

63

69

178

Artillery

5
1
1

Note: excludes accidents in home waters.
Sources: Robert M. Grant, U-boats Destroyed: The Effect of Anti-submarine Warfare 1914–1918 (London: Putnam, 1964); Robert M. Grant, U-boat Intelligence (London: Putnam, 1969). Cf. Joachim Schröder, Die U-Boote des Kaisers: Die Geschichte des deutschen U-Boot-Krieges gegen Großbritannien im
Ersten Weltkrieg (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 2003), and Rahn, “Die Kaiserliche Marine und der Erste Weltkrieg,” p. 72.

convoying in the summer of 1917, and thereafter far fewer ships were sunk.
Between February and June 1917, an average of 363 ships of 629,863 GRT were
sunk per month, whereas during the last quarter of 1917 sinkings averaged 159
per month, totaling 365,489 GRT. In 1918, the numbers of ships sunk decreased
even further. Because of this, the German naval staff was not able to keep the
promise it had made: by the autumn of 1918, about 1.4 million American soldiers
had made it to France. U.S. entry into the war proved to be the decisive factor in
the defeat of Germany.59
After the Allies introduced the convoy system, German submarines faced serious operational and tactical problems. The concentration of merchant ships in
a convoy had to be countered with a concentration of submarines. Even before
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that, reconnaissance was required—the convoys had to be detected. The few
boats available west of the British Isles could not cover the entire operating area,
allowing many convoys to reach Britain undetected. When a submarine sighted
a convoy, it could conduct a submerged attack, with torpedoes. The gun armament, which until the institution of convoying had achieved most results, fell
into disuse.
Along with introducing the convoy system, the Allies enhanced antisubmarine defense by developing more efficient depth charges and the first underwater
locating devices. But above all, it was the intensive mining of the shipping lanes
in the North Sea and the English Channel that caused most U-boat casualties.
Of the 132 German submarines lost in 1917–18, at least fifty sank after hitting
mines.60
At the end of September 1918, the army’s supreme command admitted
military defeat and demanded an immediate armistice. The United States made
termination of unrestricted submarine warfare a precondition for reestablishing
diplomatic contact. Yet the German naval command—to justify its existence—
prepared to send the fleet out for one final battle. The ships’ companies discerned
that the naval command was acting arbitrarily and refused to obey. Within a few
days, this mutiny developed into a revolt that led to the collapse and end of the
IGN, which accelerated a general uprising in Germany.61
The Lessons of the Great War
In spite of outstanding achievements and successes against a superior opponent
in various war theaters, the outcome of German naval operations was negative
at the end of World War I. Not only did the IGN’s strategic concepts for fleet
employment and for commerce warfare using submarines fail, but those failures
were the starting point for a revolt that triggered the political overthrow of the
government. Nevertheless, the High Seas Fleet effectively operated as a fleet in
being. Its presence pinned down the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea, including lighter naval forces, which consequently were not available for convoy-escort
duty in the Atlantic. The fleet protected the German coast, blocked the Baltic
against Allied resupply shipments to Russia, and, to a certain extent, backed up
submarine warfare by keeping the departure and return routes clear. Contrary to
the current view of historians who entirely deny the fleet’s strategic importance,
the fleet was an asset for the German war effort; but a realistic cost-benefit analysis shows that, in the end, the fleet did not achieve what it was expected to.
One of the fundamental lessons learned during World War I was that, over the
long run, an effective blockade could so weaken the German war potential and
economy, which were greatly dependent on the importation of raw materials, that
not even defensive operations could be conducted. The German naval command
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had not realized that sea power, i.e., the ability to control and successfully use the
sea, essentially is the product of both fleet strength and geographical position. If
either factor were deficient, the entire result suffered. This was one of the essential
reasons the High Seas Fleet did not bring about a decision in the overall conduct
of the war. It failed to develop a concept in which the two components of naval
warfare—surface forces and submarines—were integrated to enable timely and effective deployment against the two key strategic weak points in the enemy alliance:
Allied merchant shipping in the Atlantic and the Russian coastline in the Baltic.
During the submarine war against Allied merchant shipping, the naval command rigidly relied on a one-sided and, in the end, inadequate naval concept that
ignored the possibility and reality of U.S. entry into the war, thereby contributing
to Germany’s defeat. During the operations against Russia, Germany hardly ever
exploited its naval superiority. However, Germany’s blocking of access to the
Baltic, in parallel with its ally’s control of the Turkish straits, diminished Russia’s
war potential considerably. This success in the economic war, which Germany
had not foreseen, relieved the country of the necessity to prosecute the war on
two fronts by the spring of 1918; but that was too late to bring about success for
the overall war effort.
The result Germany experienced in World War I was due not only to insufficient concepts and means but to the naval command’s strategic incompetence.
The leadership seemed to be incapable of recognizing the natural limits that
existed—limits that would have to be imposed on any German naval strategy
within the overall strategic concept.
THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1919–39
The Treaty of Versailles reduced Germany to the status of a third-rate naval
power.62 Submarines and military aircraft were forbidden to it altogether. As a
result, the navy lacked the weapons that modern naval warfare required. However, French opposition thwarted the British attempt to abolish the submarine
entirely; Paris became the champion of minor naval powers by emphasizing the
importance of the submarine as a naval weapon for weaker nations.63 During
the preparation of the peace treaty, Admiral William S. Benson (1855–1932),
the American Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), advocated only moderate cuts
in the strength of the future German navy so as to maintain a counterbalance to
the British fleet in the North Sea.64 The British never considered taking over the
German ships for their own fleet—too costly; they simply wanted to sink them.
However, France and Italy dismissed this idea. The problem was solved when the
Germans themselves sank the major part of their fleet at Scapa Flow on June 21,
1919.65 The German naval command regarded this accomplishment primarily
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as a moral success. The consequences of the scuttling were severe: the Allies
demanded full compensation, and claimed 80 percent of all German port equipment; and the navy had to surrender its last five modern light cruisers.
German naval forces came to seem superfluous, given the total military defeat of 1918, the domestic unrest of 1919, and the ongoing border conflicts with
Poland. However, for the navy to continue in existence and preserve its independence from the army, the service required a plausible long-run mission. When,
during the peace negotiations in the spring of 1919, the German government
offered to renounce its force of six old battleships so as to achieve concessions
in other areas, the victorious powers refused, pointing out that Germany should
retain some limited naval forces for its own protection. They projected a small
German fleet as a stabilizing factor in the Baltic area. Thus, Germany’s former enemies contributed considerably to the continued existence—modest as it was—of
the German navy.66
The naval command argued that a navy was necessary because of the territorial changes in eastern Europe, referring primarily to the alterations to Poland’s
borders and the resultant isolation of East Prussia. In 1919–21, a Polish-Russian
border dispute led to war, and future border conflicts could not be ruled out.67 If
Germany had no naval forces at all, it would be impossible to defend East Prussia;
the Poles would be able to cut the sea route across the Baltic—the only reliable
line of supply for the German enclave.
The navy’s deliberations, unlike those of the army, soon expanded to consider
other possible conflicts. As early as 1922 they took into account Poland’s ties with
France. Once again, German naval strategy focused its attention on the North
Sea. Given the German economy’s great dependence on seaborne supplies, the
prerequisites for conducting defensive operations could be achieved only if German shipping in the North and Baltic Seas continued unhindered.
The navy considered itself to be an instrument of territorial defense against
France and Poland, while hoping, in better times to come, for an end to armament restrictions. When it became apparent that the limitations on their own
arms that the victorious powers had announced at Versailles were not going to
materialize, the German government consistently aspired to equal rights and national sovereignty in the military sphere, such that it could develop the country’s
armed forces into an effective instrument of national defense.
In terms of matériel, a new start gradually was made, by constructing some
torpedo boats and light cruisers. However, the challenge of developing a tenthousand-ton armored vessel (permitted by the peace treaty) that had sufficient
combat power to survive an engagement with French capital ships was a tough
nut to crack. Given the displacement limitation, it was not possible to meet normal requirements for armament and armor plating. When the changes in the
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armament limitations for which the naval command had hoped failed to materialize, the navy was forced to concentrate on designing a ship that was more like
a cruiser than a battleship.
The decisive elements that influenced this change in planning lay on two
levels, the tactical-operational and the political-military. In the tacticaloperational sphere, exercises showed that heavy naval forces needed more
speed. In the political-military sphere, the naval command thought it imperative that every German ship
Over the course of the twentieth century, Ger- constructed be superior in at
many twice tried to force a strategic decision, least one respect to the warin direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon ship categories defined in the
naval powers, by cutting the Atlantic shipping Washington Naval Agreement
routes. Both attempts ended in failure.
(encompassing multiple treaties) of 1922. For battleships,
it sought speed; for cruisers, heavy guns. To replace the old battleships while
remaining under the terms of the peace treaty, the naval command planned a
ship carrying six twenty-eight-centimeter (cm) guns and capable of twenty-eight
knots.
To understand the German line of reasoning, it is necessary to look at the status of international naval armaments at the end of the 1920s. The countries that
had signed the Washington Naval Treaty (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the
United States) had navies dominated by capital ships having eight to twelve heavy
guns (with calibers between 30.5 and 40.6 cm) and speeds of twenty to twentythree knots. Only Britain and Japan had battle cruisers equipped with six to eight
heavy guns. These had a top speed between twenty-seven and thirty-one knots.
Until 1930, the Washington Naval Treaty limited the total tonnage and construction of battleships and aircraft carriers. For cruisers, the treaty established ceilings only for the displacement and armament of individual vessels. Thus, cruisers
with a standard displacement of ten thousand tons and light armor were built.
Their main armament comprised six to ten 20.3 cm guns; they had a top speed of
thirty-three knots. Although they could evade the slower capital ships, they had
to avoid contact with battle cruisers, which were capable of similar speed yet far
superior in armament.
Since the core of the French fleet consisted of nine slow capital ships and five
fast heavy cruisers, the German naval command deliberately endowed its tenthousand-ton vessel with the characteristics of a “small battle-cruiser”: it was
superior to cruisers in armament and to capital ships in speed. With six 28 cm
guns in two triple turrets and a speed of twenty-six to twenty-eight knots, the
Panzerschiff (armored ship, also known as a “pocket battleship”) came very close
to the concept of the battle cruiser. Moreover, diesel engines would give the ship a
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maximum range of twenty thousand miles, vastly exceeding that of any cruiser or
capital ship. Owing to its combat effectiveness and endurance, the pocket battleship was suitable for both warfare in the North Sea and offensive operations in
the Atlantic.
The construction of the ship immediately attracted the attention of foreign naval experts. In April 1929, the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold
(1869–1941), reported to his government as follows:
From a naval technical point of view, the building of this vessel is to be welcomed, as
its design promises to include a number of new features in warship construction. The
principal of these are reported to be a comparatively heavy armament of six 11-inch
guns, eight 5.8-inch and twenty antiaircraft guns, six torpedo tubes, adequate armour
protection, special Diesel engines giving a cruising speed of 26 knots, the extensive
employment of light metals and electric welding in place of riveting, and the highest
degree of unsinkability.68

However, Germany’s naval command regarded the construction of pocket
battleships not just as a military necessity but as a political-military lever with
which to upset the entire system of international naval armament controls that
had been established—without German participation—at Washington in 1922.
The naval command hoped this step would give Germany the chance to be
readmitted to the community of major naval powers.69 Of course, if Germany
had been included in the Washington Naval Agreement, this would have been
tantamount to a wholesale abrogation of the naval arms limitations laid down in
the Treaty of Versailles.
Change of Strategy and Operational Planning
The naval command was cognizant that Germany was highly dependent on
seaborne imports. It tried to impress this overall strategic reality on the army so
the latter would take that factor into account when drawing up its operational
plans. From 1928 onward, the new minister of the Reichswehr (German Imperial Defense), Lieutenant General Wilhelm Groener (Ret.) (1867–1939), set new
standards for all operational planning by the army and navy. He stressed that the
idea of a large-scale war had to be ruled out from the start. Military operations
against foreign powers should be limited to two possible types of conflict: (1)
repelling raids from neighboring states onto German territory; (2) maintaining
armed neutrality during a conflict between foreign powers.
Groener demanded that the Reichswehr be combat ready to oppose immediately any sudden Polish invasion. For the navy, this new concept meant it had to
be able, on seventy-two hours’ notice, to begin operations to destroy the Polish
navy and neutralize the port of Gdynia as a naval base.70 Such a demonstrative
strike clearly was intended to be part of a strategy of deterrence. Under this
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concept of calculated escalation, the German government could react quickly
to a possible invasion, then refer the conflict to the League of Nations without
delay. Thus, the government gave the navy, for the first time, a role as an effective
instrument of crisis management.
In the spring of 1929, Groener requested that the naval command review
whether Germany, to conduct its maritime defense, would need any surface
units that went beyond the ceiling of the peace treaty. By so inquiring, Groener
got at the heart of the self-perception of the navy’s leadership, which saw its
service not merely as an instrument of national defense but, in the long run, as
an indispensable prerequisite for a future German maritime position of power.
Under no circumstances would a return to brown-water-navy status be acceptable; the German navy instead intended to build oceangoing units, in accordance
with the traditional concept of naval prestige, and thereby to express hope for a
better future. Naturally, it was not possible, nor was it intended, to explain this to
a minister who, although he had pushed the Panzerschiff through the Reichstag
(national legislature), otherwise had expressed often his critical attitude toward
the buildup of the German High Seas Fleet before 1914.
In his reply to Groener’s question, “Does Germany need large warships?,”
the chief of naval command, Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), championed
the earlier naval concept, which focused on a potential conflict with France and
Poland.71 He argued that the attitude of the navy must not be determined by
wishful thinking to reestablish itself as a major naval power. Its most important
task in war was to prevent—at all costs—enemy forces from interdicting German
SLOCs. World War I had proved the connection between German resistance at
the home front and naval blockade: “Cutting off our sea lanes is the simplest and
safest way, without any bloodshed, of defeating us. Our enemies know this as
well. England has the most powerful fleet world-wide and its geographical position is disastrous for Germany. Therefore, any armed conflict has to be avoided
that would turn England into one of our enemies. We would be doomed to failure
right from the start.”72
Raeder’s memorandum concluded that the navy—without even considering
the limits the peace treaty set—could fight the fleet only of a second-class sea
power, such as France.
Naval Rearmament under Hitler, 1933–37
A few days after seizing power in January 1933, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) made
it clear to naval and other military commanders that he intended to develop the
armed forces into an instrument of his power politics. As far as the translation of
this objective into armament was concerned, Hitler was initially cautious. As he
explained in a speech on February 3, 1933: “The most dangerous period is that
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of rearmament. Then we shall see whether France has statesmen. If she does, she
will not grant us time but will jump on us (presumably with eastern satellites).”73
The Reichsmarine (German Navy) had to make do with compromises regarding the displacement and armament of its future capital ships. However, in view
of the anticipated long-term buildup of the fleet, these compromises seemed
acceptable. The last of three Panzerschiffe was launched in June 1934. The next
two units were upgraded to battle cruisers (31,000 tons, thirty-one knots, nine
28 cm guns) in answer to the French battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg.74
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, allowed Germany to
have a surface fleet with a tonnage up to 35 percent of that of the British Empire. German naval leaders now believed they had attained their goal of “equal”
rights. The 35 percent ceiling applied not just to total tonnage but to individual
categories of warships. In the case of U-boats, Germany was allowed to achieve
45 percent at first, later 100 percent, of British submarine strength. In this context, Germany gave assurances that its navy would adhere to what were known
as the “cruiser rules” regarding submarine warfare conducted against merchant
shipping.75
The navy’s planning thus was based wholly on the structure of that of the other
naval powers. Its motto was: What the other navies, with their rich traditions,
consider proper, and what Germany now is permitted within the 35 percent
ceiling, is what Germany will build. The navy started to build a so-called normal fleet: fast capital ships, heavy and light cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers,
and—for the first time after seventeen years—submarines. One week after the
Anglo-German Naval Agreement was announced, the navy commissioned its
first, small (250-ton) U-boat—thereby revealing its long-term secret preparatory
activity in this area.76
Even if the U-boat had not been improved in basic ways since 1918, it had
developed considerably in every direction (e.g., in its improved torpedoes, its
minelaying ability, and its capacity to transmit and receive signals both while surfaced and while submerged). Nevertheless, opinion was widespread in all navies
that the U-boat had lost the eminence it had achieved in World War I as one of
the most effective naval weapons. The British Admiralty was convinced that asdic
(a submarine location device named after its progenitor, the Anti-Submarine
Detection Investigation Committee) had reduced the submarine threat almost to
extinction. In contrast to this opinion, the small German U-boat staff, centered
on Captain Karl Dönitz (1891–1980), was convinced that antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) weapons were greatly overrated and had not made decisive progress since
1918.77
From 1928 onward, Admiral Raeder determined the navy’s thinking. In studying Germany’s World War I cruiser campaign, he had come to the conclusion
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that during the autumn of 1914 there had been a strategic correlation between
the North Sea campaign and the operations of the cruiser squadrons in the Pacific and South Atlantic. Raeder realized that all naval theaters of war formed an
interconnected whole, so any operation had to be viewed in relation to those in
other areas. Accordingly, he made overseas cruiser warfare and battle-fleet operations in home waters integral components of a single naval strategy that sought to
exploit diversionary effects, thereby exhausting the enemy’s forces and disrupting
his supplies.78
Raeder formulated his strategic thinking most clearly in a briefing to Hitler
on February 3, 1937. Analyzing Germany’s Great War experiences, he pointed
out the correlation between strategy and a country’s military-geographical situation. Raeder was aware of the likely “totality” of a future war—that it would be
a struggle not just between forces but of “nation versus nation.” He emphasized
the negative consequences for Germany if it were unable to procure continually
the raw materials it lacked. In so doing, Raeder pointed out the glaring weaknesses in Germany’s war potential—but was unable to influence Hitler’s policy
of confrontation.79
Buildup of the Navy against Britain, 1938–39
A fundamental change in strategic planning by the Kriegsmarine (as the German
navy was known after 1935) commenced in spring 1938. As it became apparent
that the Western powers opposed German expansion, Hitler issued a directive
that all German war preparations should consider not only France and Russia but
also Britain as potential enemies. A second confrontation with Britain now influenced all further planning for the next naval war. Raeder followed Hitler’s hazardous course of confrontation willingly, or at least without protest, in contravention
of his strong statement on this matter to Groener in 1929. Raeder assumed—
erroneously—that the navy would have several years of peace to continue its
buildup.
In the summer of 1938, the naval staff produced a strategic study that concluded that, given a geographical starting position similar to that of 1914, only
oceanic cruiser warfare, employing improved Panzerschiffe and U-boats, held
any prospect of success.80 Despite this realization, a planning committee of senior
officers busied itself with the question of what tasks battleships could perform
in a cruiser war in the Atlantic. The result was paradoxical and revealing: “The
chief of staff of the naval staff concluded at the end of the discussion that all participants agreed that battleships were necessary, but that no consensus regarding
their use could be achieved for the time being.”81
Traditionalists considered the most important arm of naval power to be
capital ships. Focusing on them meant that the concept of sea control pushed
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the concept of sea denial into the background. Unlike the big-ship traditionalist
Tirpitz, the naval staff during the 1930s had proposed a sea-denial strategy repeatedly. In contrast, the suggestion to develop a German strategy of sea control
constituted a new, alternative approach to sea and world power in the twentieth
century. In September 1938, the commander in chief of the fleet, Admiral Rolf
Carls (1885–1945), noted as follows: “If, in accordance with the will of the Führer,
Germany is to achieve a firm world-power position, it will need, in addition to
sufficient colonies, secure sea
The allied forces—especially . . . Admiral
routes and access to the high
Arleigh Burke . . . —supported . . . creation
seas. . . . A war against Brit[of the Federal German Navy]. . . . [A] close
ain means a war against the
cooperation and friendship developed between Empire, against France, probAdmiral Burke and Vice Admiral Friedrich
ably also against Russia and a
Ruge . . . , the first head of the [FGN]. Burke
number of countries overseas,
created a basis of confidence with his firm
in other words against oneconviction that allied forces could fulfill their
half or two-thirds of the whole
common tasks only if their cooperation were
world.”82
based on openness and mutual trust. Vice
Nevertheless, Raeder was
Admiral Ruge succeeded in establishing this
more inclined toward a seabasis of confidence, which today is accepted as denial strategy via an oceanic
a matter of course.
cruiser campaign with Panzerschiffe, and he intended to
give this strategy priority in the future armament program. However, by November 1938 he had been unable to gain Hitler’s support for his program. Hitler did
not accept the cruiser warfare strategy, insisting instead that the navy step up the
pace of its battleship construction so that as soon as possible he would have at his
disposal an instrument of power he could employ globally.
The navy had to accept this decisive change. It formulated a new concept, the
so-called Z-Plan, which centered on the construction of six capital ships by 1944.
Additionally, battle cruisers, Panzerschiffe, aircraft carriers, fast light cruisers,
and 247 U-boats were to form the backbone of German naval forces for the future
Battle of the Atlantic. On January 27, 1939, when Hitler ordered that the buildup
of the navy was to take precedence over all other tasks, including the rearmament of the army and the Luftwaffe (air force), he heralded a gigantic buildup
of naval forces. Within a few months, the planning of a series of six new-design,
diesel-driven battleships was complete; the construction of two units began in
the summer of 1939. In the meantime, on April 27, 1939, Hitler denounced the
Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935.83
The experiences of World War I acted as the starting point for developing the
so-called pack tactics that German U-boats employed against enemy sea routes
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during World War II.84 Dönitz recognized that the concentration of merchant
shipping in convoys would require a similar concentration of U-boats to counter.
And before the U-boats could attack a convoy, they needed to locate it—in other
words, the problem of reconnaissance would have to be solved. In 1917–18, a
number of U-boats had attacked successfully on the surface, under cover of darkness. During the evaluation of wartime experiences, former U-boat commanders recommended adoption and further development of this method of attack.
Dönitz also had drawn attention to the advantages of night attacks in his book
Die U-Bootswaffe, published in 1939. Nonetheless, later in World War II, this type
of attack took British ASW defenses by surprise—they had relied too much on
the supposed superiority of asdic. The escort forces were unable to cope with the
German tactic, particularly as asdic had an effective range of no more than about
1,400 meters, which left it ineffective against U-boats operating on the surface.85
WORLD WAR II
Disillusionment came on September 3, 1939. Totally unexpectedly, Hitler ordered the navy to launch a naval war against Britain.86 The German navy was in
no way prepared. Raeder’s initial estimate of the situation was very pessimistic,
and he resigned himself to the realization that neither the few U-boats nor the
surface forces would have any decisive effect on the outcome of the war: “They
can do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are willing to create the foundations for later reconstruction.”87
However, the progress of the war soon demanded a new estimate of the situation. Nine months on, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands had been occupied; by June 22, 1940, France had suffered a total
defeat. German naval control extended from Norway to the Pyrenees. Therefore,
the German naval staff switched to an offensive concept of naval warfare, aimed
solely at destroying Britain’s maritime transport capacity. The Kriegsmarine’s
surface forces were insufficient for such a task; to supplement them, the navy
concentrated on constructing and employing the means of naval warfare that had
proved its worth during World War I—the U-boat.
The naval staff knew from its experience during the previous war that employment of the U-boat against the enemy’s merchant marine could be successful only
if U-boats were deployed continuously along the enemy’s SLOCs, employing as
many vessels as possible. The navy calculated that the number of U-boats permanently at sea should range from 100 to 150 boats. Taking into consideration time
for maintenance and resupply, this meant the navy needed approximately three
hundred operational boats at its disposal.88 In the quest to achieve this, time was
an important factor:
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1.	 In an economic war waged against a country that depended on supplies
by sea, success could only be achieved in the long run. It was therefore
a question of continuously weakening the enemy’s maritime transport
capacity to an extent that exceeded the rate at which the enemy could
construct new merchantmen.
2.	 From the summer of 1940 onward, it became apparent that the British
war effort increasingly was being supported by the resources of the United
States. This made the naval staff intent on “putting Britain out of action
soon, before the effects of even greater American aid made themselves
felt.”89
3.	 Since it took around two years to construct a U-boat and bring it to
operational status, amassing the numbers the navy envisaged so as to
achieve the necessary concentration of forces required plans to be made at
a very early stage.90
While a numerically increasing U-boat fleet held out the prospect of German
success, the naval staff had to take into account that the enemy, in view of the
looming threat, would do everything he could to strengthen his ASW effort.
In October 1939, the naval command presented a U-boat buildup plan that
set a monthly rate of twenty-nine boats. Hitler approved the plan; however, he
refused to sanction priority, since he was at that time more concerned with the
demands of the imminent land campaign against France.91 One year later, in
November 1940, the navy had to realize that U-boat construction was being held
up by shortages, and that the current building rate barely covered the current
loss rate. The naval staff foresaw that there would be limits to the Reich’s material resources and production capacities. In December 1940, it viewed America’s
growing support of Britain as a dangerous development “towards a marked prolongation of the war.” To the naval staff, this portended a “very negative effect on
the overall German war strategy.”92 This statement expressed the simple, obvious
fact that Germany could not win a prolonged war of attrition against the two
Atlantic naval powers.
For this reason, in December 1940, Grand Admiral Raeder requested that Hitler “recognize that the greatest task of the hour is concentration of all our power
against Britain.” To Raeder, this meant focusing air and naval forces against British supplies. The admiral was firmly convinced that U-boats were the decisive
weapon to be used against Britain. Although Hitler did not reject Raeder’s view,
he referred to the allegedly new political situation: the necessity “to eliminate at
all cost the last enemy remaining [i.e., Soviet Russia] on the continent, before he
can collaborate with Britain. . . . After that, everything can be concentrated on the
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needs of the Air Force and the Navy.”93 In Hitler’s eyes, Britain was not the enemy
on which all weapons had to be concentrated, but a potential partner who might
be made to “see reason” if an appropriate amount of military pressure were applied. Hitler also knew that a forced economic war could not lead to any marked
success in one year. Furthermore, this kind of effort could increase the danger of
the United States entering the war, something he sought to avoid at that point.94
In July 1941, after the first successes in the war against Russia, the naval staff
tried to convince both the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) Command and Hitler of
the immediate strategic necessity to concentrate on fighting the Anglo-Saxon
naval powers. Analyzing the threat to which Germany was exposed, the naval
staff portrayed the dilemma of a European continental state that lacked the vital
elements of a naval power but was forced to fight against the greatest naval powers: “While in World War I we had the second strongest battle fleet in the world
but no appropriate operational base, we now dispose of a strategically favorable
operational base, however, we do not have the required battle fleet to operate
within the Atlantic.”95
The naval staff predicted that the two Allied naval powers would continue to
fight, even if the Soviet Union collapsed, so they could reach their “final goal”:
destroying Germany on the continent. The naval staff came to the conclusion that
“the enemies’ prospect for the battle in the Atlantic for the year 1942 must be assessed as favorable.” For this reason, the naval staff advocated that Germany bring
about a decision in the Atlantic by taking advantage of both political assets (the
cooperation of Vichy-France and Japan) and military assets (the concentrated
employment of all available forces, in particular the U-boats and air forces).96
From 1940 onward, Germany possessed a good geographical position for
naval warfare in the Atlantic, but this basis could not be exploited fully, owing
to insufficient weaponry. The U-boat provided an effective weapon in the fight
against enemy shipping up to 1942, but thereafter wider war demands, especially
the critical situations in the Mediterranean and on the eastern front, forced the
naval command to employ its last remaining offensive capability like an “operational fire brigade.”97 This led to enormous attrition, which was counterproductive to the strategic concept of mass concentration in the Atlantic. As the Allies
developed better ASW weapons, the concept of a “U-boat war” failed in 1943
because the submarine had lost its ability to escape from enemy surveillance.
In fact, the concept of attrition warfare began to fail by the fall of 1942 in the
face of the mobilization of Allied resources and industrial capacities, especially
those of the United States. The German naval staff analysis at that time of the
accelerating buildup of Allied maritime transport capacity already revealed that
the U-boats could not increase the monthly rate of sinkings to a level necessary
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to win the “tonnage race.” The naval staff delivered a pessimistic prognosis: “If,
. . . considering the enemy’s rising production output, Germany wishes to diminish the enemy’s tonnage from the end of 1942 onwards to the same extent as is
currently being achieved, ship sinkings per month will have to be increased to
approximately 1,300,000 GRT. Given the current situation, it is doubtful whether
such a high rate of ship sinkings will be feasible for a sustained period of time.”98
Recalling the historical argument that “no war in history . . . has yet been won by
the use of one method of warfare,” the naval staff came around to an understanding that reflected actual conditions.99 By the end of 1942, German U-boats, as a
realistic threat, had succumbed to the immense industrial capacity of the United
States.
From 1943 onward, the navy had an officer at the helm, Grand Admiral
Dönitz, who both was a charismatic leader and had close links to Hitler and Nazi
ideology. Not until after Hitler’s death did he change “from the almost-blind tool
of a criminal to the responsible soldier of the traditional Prussian school.”100 At
that point he did everything in his power to end the already-lost war in a proper
fashion and, at the same time, to evacuate as many people as possible across the
Baltic to the West. The latter effort—the navy’s last wartime act—brought the
service much positive postwar public recognition.101
Over the course of the twentieth century, Germany twice tried to force a strategic decision, in direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon naval powers, by
cutting the Atlantic shipping routes. Both attempts ended in failure. The second
defeat brought with it the end of the German Reich and the dissolution of all
German armed forces.
BUILDING A NEW NAVY AFTER 1955
The Western orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) led to close
integration of the new German armed forces into the Atlantic Alliance.102 Ten
years after the surrender of Germany’s World War II forces, a new German naval
force came into existence. The allied forces—especially the U.S. Navy, including
its CNO, Admiral Arleigh Burke (1901–96)—supported its creation. During the
first years of the buildup, a close cooperation and friendship developed between
Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge (1894–1985), the first head of
the Federal German Navy (FGN).103
Burke created a basis of confidence with his firm conviction that allied forces
could fulfill their common tasks only if their cooperation were based on openness and mutual trust. Vice Admiral Ruge succeeded in establishing this basis of
confidence, which today is accepted as a matter of course.
This meant for the FGN, the smallest of the armed services within the FRG
armed forces, that, for the first time in its history, the naval service was obliged
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merely to perform that function “which a German Navy can actually perform,”
in close cooperation with the great maritime powers.104
At the same time the FRG joined NATO in May 1955, the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) was integrated into the Warsaw Pact. The formation of light
naval forces ensued, out of the Volkspolizei See (i.e., the national sea police force
of the GDR) that had been in existence since 1950. In 1960, the GDR’s newly established forces were termed Volksmarine (People’s Navy), in commemoration of
the 1918 revolutionary tradition. This navy, which was strictly integrated within
the ideological leadership claimed by the Communist Party, demonstrated little
continuity with former German naval forces, whether in formation, structure, or
mandate. Within the Warsaw Pact it evolved into an offensive naval force for use
in confined and littoral waters.
The two German naval forces exhibited great disparity until 1990. Each navy
regarded the other as a potential military adversary in the context of the system
of alliances. However, both were spared the necessity to prove their combat
strength. With the reunification of the German republics in the fall of 1990, parts
of each were incorporated into the German navy.105
Today, the German navy has not only a lively interest in its history but a special relationship to it. A clear link can be seen between the historical self-understanding
of its officers and the history of their service. In the past, this link often served
only as an attempt to legitimize and secure the service’s position. The navy, which
came into being in the mid-nineteenth century, often had to fight for recognition
and even for its existence during a relatively short history. However, when historical interest is limited only to the navy and naval warfare, there is a danger that too
little attention will be paid to the overlapping political correlations.
Nowadays the situation is different. Germany is one of the leading export
nations in the world, and therefore extremely dependent on trade and the unhampered use of the high seas. This situation requires an understanding and an
acceptance of the maritime domain as a vital Achilles’ heel for the prosperity of
the German economy and society. This situation underlines the necessity for a
well-balanced navy that is able to conduct demonstrations and to protect German
maritime interests, in cooperation with alliances and partners. The situation for
the German navy is much more comfortable at present than in previous eras,
reinforcing its self-confidence; but a wider understanding of its roles is needed,
now more than ever.
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THE NEW TIME AND SPACE
Dimensions of a Maritime Defense Strategy
Tomohisa Takei

Your Majesty, King of Zhao, if you serve the King of Qin, he will ask to
be given the castles of Yiyand and Cheng Gao. If you provide the castles
this year, the King of Qin will then tell you to give him some land the
next year. If you give away parcels of land, eventually the amount of
land suitable for release will be reduced, and, if you do not provide land,
then everything that you have done up until now will become useless,
and eventually you will run into big trouble. . . . [W]ithout doing any
battle, your land will be sliced away, continuously.

C

蘇秦列傳 [BIOGRAPHY OF SU QIN]

ompared with previous years, the Japanese defense white paper for fiscal
year 2016 devoted more pages to discussing territorial disputes in the South
China Sea—where China has been behaving with disrespect to international
norms. The Chinese are overriding international law with Chinese civil law.
China’s activities, such as reclamation activities on submerged features, reefs,
and rocks, have exacerbated longstanding territorial disputes among Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. International and regional attention has been drawn to the decision in favor of the Philippines versus China
by a tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the
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of generally accepted land-reclamation practices, the Chinese allow no time for
the foundation to stabilize; instead they build multiple facilities right away and
militarize the area. Just two years after starting reclamation activities at Fiery
Cross Reef, for example, China announced the completion of a three-thousandmeter runway and peripheral facilities. China also conducted a test flight of a
civilian airplane on January 2, 2016. By early 2017, facilities had been completed
for twenty-four military aircraft on three reclaimed “islands”: Fiery Cross Reef,
Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef. The Vietnamese government condemned this act as
an infringement of sovereignty.2 According to estimates based on similar projects
in Japan, the costs to build an artificial island as big as the one on Fiery Cross Reef
(2.74 square kilometers in area, five meters in height), pave a three-thousandmeter runway, and build an airport with all the necessary ancillary facilities (e.g.,
aircraft warning lights and guide lights) could be as high as U.S.$2.4 billion (¥240
billion).3
China is executing six construction projects similar to the Fiery Cross Reef
reclamation simultaneously, bringing several dredging boats and pump dredgers
to expedite the effort. Many view this activity as an effort to gain territorial control of the South China Sea. Neighboring countries and the international community at large, including Japan and the United States, have pursued peaceful,
legal resolutions of this issue, so far to no avail.4
From August 5 through August 9, 2016, while two to three hundred Chinese
fishing boats were operating around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea,
up to fifteen China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels entered and exited the contiguous
zone repeatedly, and fifteen CCG vessels entered Japanese territorial waters (i.e.,
within twelve nautical miles of shore) during this short period.5 Considering the
abnormal number of CCG vessels (three to four have been more common for
such incursions) and their intrusion into territorial waters, the Japanese government made a diplomatic protest to the Chinese government. Suspicions arose
that the activities of the many fishing boats and CCG vessels operating in the area
surrounding the Senkaku Islands actually constituted an invasion being directed
by the Chinese government, especially because after the most intrusive entry to
date occurred on August 9 the invasion of territorial waters suddenly paused—
abnormal behavior for ordinary fishermen.
Two issues emerged from these events in the South and East China Seas.
The first is that China has demonstrated that it has the resources to carry
out multiple massive, expensive marine-construction projects simultaneously
and quickly, and it seemingly disregards limitations imposed by UNCLOS and
complaints from the international community. China’s one-party-rule political
system makes it easy for the Chinese Communist Party to control and direct
numerous fishing boats and deploy a large force of CCG vessels.
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NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb 2

55

8/7/17 11:58 AM

50

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 23

The second issue is that the land-reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands
and the dispute over the Senkaku Islands both can be considered part of China’s
strategy to expand its maritime claims in the region. The nature of the country’s
political system, combined with the massive economic resources available to it,
provides China with the flexibility needed to adjust the speed and scale with
regard to time and space considerations for its territorial-expansionist maritime
strategy. No other country in the Asia-Pacific region can match China in this regard. Consequently, every effort must be made to avoid “mirror imaging” China
when analyzing the current security environment.
This article examines the concepts of time and space from the perspective of a
status quo nation that seeks to deter the designs of a revisionist power, and helps
formulate a new maritime self-defense strategy for Japan that serves as a useful
reference for small and medium-sized countries that seek to preserve stability in
their regions.
THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE TIME DIMENSION
During the height of America’s military intervention in Vietnam, from 1965 to
1968, the quantity and quality of the American military was so overpowering visà-vis the Vietcong, along with their North Vietnamese allies, that it seemed the
United States could not lose the war. But, as Yōnosuke Nagai observed in his Jikan
no Seijigaku (Politics and Time), one must understand America’s loss in terms of
who lost to whom.
Conclusively speaking, it is a cruel historical fact that the metropolitan power, empowered through an urban industrial/technological society, lost to [the Vietcong],
empowered through a primitive, agricultural society. This battle was not a simplistic
battle of military “ability” but a battle of “will.” While the battle of “ability” is basically a spatial and quantitative battle, the battle of “will” is determined by the system’s
stamina size, or the size of the sacrifice (cost) measured by time.6

In other words, as the struggle became protracted, an increasingly war-weary
American citizenry lost its will to fight. In contrast, the North Vietnamese, despite dramatic battlefield losses and the defeat of the Vietcong following the Tet
Offensive, eventually prevailed because they never lost their will to fight, despite
the passage of time.
Nagai also notes two asymmetries that generally (including in the Vietnam
War) work to the advantage of a liberation army fighting against a government
army: (1) The existence of sanctuaries helps the liberation army avoid defeat.
(2) The liberation army—the revisionist force—takes the initiative against the
government army—the status quo defenders.7 The Vietnam War was an asymmetrical battle between a metropolitan power, the United States, and a liberation army. The liberation army based itself in its sanctuary of North Vietnam,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
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supported by China and the Soviet Union, and used this advantage to carry out
guerrilla war freely against South Vietnam. Over time, the liberation army took
advantage of the two asymmetries, patiently continuing to fight in such a way
as to avoid defeat. The war eventually exhausted the will of the metropolitan
power to continue to fight. The liberation army skillfully used a “ripening-time”
strategy—it waited until the time was ripe, then took decisive action.8
National liberation wars that follow such a ripening-time strategy, such as the
Vietnam War and the Algerian War, continue to be fought today, such as in Afghanistan, Syria, and North Africa. However, in these modern conflicts we see a
variation in the strategy in the form of indiscriminate terror attacks, such as those
carried out by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Not only does ISIL
send terrorists disguised as Middle Eastern refugees into Europe; it uses social
media to promote its version of violent extremism, sending out propaganda and
encouraging terrorism. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the Syrian
civil war and Libya’s domestic disorder have flooded Europe. This phenomenon,
accompanied by continuing terrorist acts, has made the member states of the European Union (EU) suspicious about refugees, which led to a fundamental shift
in EU refugee policy. ISIL’s indiscriminate terror attacks are intended to demonstrate the organization’s power and to exhaust the national will of those opposed
to it. In this context, ISIL’s indiscriminate terror attacks can be categorized as part
of a ripening-time strategy.
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea using “hybrid warfare” and its promotion
of conflict in eastern Ukraine, like China’s one-sided land-reclamation activities
in the South China Sea, exhibit characteristics of the ripening-time strategy.9
Russia’s military is overwhelmingly more powerful than Ukraine’s, and Russia has
placed about forty thousand soldiers in the vicinity of the shared border. Ukraine
cannot recapture Crimea, and because Russian public opinion strongly supports
President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy, Russia can maintain its efforts—fighting
to avoid defeat—and wait until Ukraine loses its will to fight and concedes.10
With regard to the South China Sea, China has pursued a strategy similar to
Russia’s in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. China’s land-reclamation activities, its
construction of harbor and airport facilities, and its militarization of the entire
body of water have ensured China’s actual control over the features under dispute. Now China waits for the international community to lose its will to contest
Chinese actions.
On July 12, 2016, an Annex VII arbitration tribunal denied China’s claim to
historic title within the area of the “nine-dash line” as being incompatible with
UNCLOS. It further determined that the Spratly Islands consist only of mere
rocks and low-tide elevations, rather than islands that can sustain human habitation; only the latter would have been entitled to an exclusive economic zone
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(EEZ). Consequently, regardless of which state has lawful title to the features in
the Spratly Islands, those features are entitled, at most, to a territorial sea; no feature generates an EEZ. Specifically, the court’s ruling noted that four of the seven
China-controlled “lands” were constructed on rocks; they accrue twelve nautical
miles of territorial waters, but not an EEZ or an extended continental shelf. The
other three features, Subi, Hugh (or Hughes), and Mischief Reefs, are low-tide
elevations in that they are above water at low tide but submerged at high tide.
These features are considered to be part of the seabed; no state may claim title
over them. If they lie in the EEZ of a coastal state, that state does enjoy exclusive
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the living and nonliving resources of the
features. However, almost half of the seven features in question are located within
two hundred nautical miles of the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia, which dispute ownership with China, while the remaining features are located on the high
seas, belonging to no country and falling within no country’s EEZ.11 Because EEZ
borders in the South China Sea are not finalized, the several countries involved
are left fighting over the “territory” of the Spratlys and many other small features,
sometimes trying to seize control by force (even if on a small scale), through land
reclamation, or both.
The seven features where China is reinforcing its control have been transformed from their original state, and CCG patrol vessels now block foreign vessels from the area. The number of ships in the People’s Liberation Army Navy
and the CCG continues to expand, now exceeding the totals of their counterparts
in Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines combined.12 Numerous fishing boats
assigned to the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia further skew the odds
against China’s regional neighbors in any maritime dispute.
China prefers to conduct only bilateral negotiations with its regional neighbors. To be most effective, interested nations should resist such lopsided negotiations and act only multilaterally. However, some countries with strong economic
ties to China oppose adoption of a legally binding code of conduct, and as a result
have prevented ASEAN member states from acting together.13
Confusion and uncertainty in the South China Sea work to China’s advantage.
The government of the Philippines appears to be losing its will to fight in its territorial dispute with China. President Rodrigo Duterte announced on September
13, 2016, that the Philippines would end joint maritime patrols with the United
States—to which both parties had agreed previously—in April 2017; thereafter it
will allow only aerial patrols, and only within territorial waters.14 On September
28, 2016, while visiting Vietnam, Duterte stated that the Philippines would hold
the U.S.-Philippine bilateral war games—military exercises that China opposes.
However, Duterte stated that following the PHIBLEX 33 amphibious exercise,
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his government also would reinforce its economic relationships with China and
Russia.15
On the basis of the foregoing, it appears that China has undertaken a cunning
strategy designed to wear down its regional neighbors: ignore the PCA ruling
(calling it “a political farce staged under legal pretext”—Wang Yi, China’s minister of foreign affairs); reinforce control of the artificial islands and surrounding
waters via CCG patrols; use economic leverage (involving, e.g., economic aid and
export/import restrictions) over neighboring countries to demand compromise;
and squat in the area until disputant nations eventually give up.16
Compared with Russia, China has executed its ripening-time strategy more
slowly and flexibly, taking advantage of having the world’s second-biggest economy and a single-party political system that offers its leadership almost complete
autonomy from domestic interference in its foreign and defense policy making. If
China had taken actions in the South China Sea as clear and aggressive as those of
Russia in Crimea, nearby nations would have reacted strongly. Instead, to avoid
fueling its neighbors’ suspicions, China took its time testing the waters to see how
the international community would react to its slow but continual transgressions.
Indeed, China has taken further advantage of the power vacuum in the region
caused by America’s continued preoccupation in the Middle East. Applying its
vast resources to marine construction projects, China made such significant territorial changes over such a short period that it is now impossible to revert to the
status quo ante. At this point, China need only wait patiently until the nations
involved give in and compromise.
THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE SPACE DIMENSION
While it waits for a situation to ripen, it is important for a revisionist power
to restrict the other parties’ ability to seek restitution, and instead to extract
concessions.
Modern history offers Nazi Germany’s accession of the Sudetenland from
Czechoslovakia as an example of effectively drawing out concessions from an
opposing party. As part of its “salami slicing” of eastern Europe, Nazi Germany
at the 1938 Munich Conference demanded that other countries, principally the
United Kingdom and France, allow the cession of the Sudetenland, justified by
the presence of the many ethnic Germans living in that area. The appeasers acceded to this demand in exchange for a guarantee that Germany would settle
for these new boundaries and not go to war. The people of western Europe,
still weary from World War I and remembering how difficult it had been to deescalate tensions once mobilization plans were initiated in August of 1914, sought
to avoid war at all costs.
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In other words, there was no temporal or spatial redundancy in either political
or military affairs. Public opinion influenced and pressured politicians’ decisionmaking processes, to the detriment of more-sound military advice.
These days, the development of truly global information-communications
technologies means the mass media report incidents that happen on the other
side of the world as if they occurred next door. Economically, the world is much
more mutually interdependent than during Hitler’s day; in this way, political as
well as economic relationships among nations are intimate. As a result, should
war break out, there is much less spatial redundancy than in the past. If an unforeseen armed conflict occurs between China and Japan (the countries with the
world’s second- and third-largest economies, respectively) the effect on the world
economy and international affairs would be devastating—even if the war zone
were limited geographically.
In a strategic environment such as this, revisionist powers have taken the
initiative—China and Russia already have crossed the line. By contrast, status
quo powers tend to be psychologically suppressed, desiring to avoid retaliating
with military force or even exercising a police function. Revisionists, by their
willingness to take the initiative at any time, can manipulate the rate by which
they increase their governmental presence, encouraging status quo states to conclude that a forceful response is not necessary. Then revisionists can expand their
military operations in the area slowly, increasing the tempo gradually, such as by
adding air operations to sea operations, or vice versa.
Human senses have thresholds. For example, when exposed to loud noise,
your hearing gradually becomes immune; and if continuously pricked with a
needle, eventually you feel no pain. The threshold for enduring pain rises as time
goes by. Similarly, if revisionist actions are repeated and expanded with some
subtlety, the mass media and the international community will accept such actions as the new norm, unless the status quo powers take some kind of sudden,
unexpectedly aggressive action.
When revisionist powers practice salami tactics skillfully in peacetime, it
imperceptibly raises the pain threshold. If defenders of the status quo take no
action in the face of graduated, repetitive aggression, it suggests acceptance
of a new stasis. One act of appeasement will lead to another. For defenders
of the status quo, how to put a stop to the cycle of appeasement is a crucial
challenge.
SOLUTIONS TO THE NEW SPACE AND TIME
As a useful example for understanding space and time in the new security environment, consider NATO’s response to Russia.
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Altering the Space Dimension
To increase their security in the face of salami tactics, small and medium-sized
powers have only two choices: appeasement or collective security through bilateral or multilateral alliances. Alliances bolster deterrence by creating closer relationships among the threatened states, thereby making the space “denser.” During
the Cold War, NATO and the neutral states of northern Europe recognized this
reality and reacted effectively to Russian aggression in the region.
In 1994, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine signed
the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, under which Ukraine
gave up its nuclear weapons. In exchange, the signatories promised that they
would not use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
Ukraine.17 However, twenty years later, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed the
Crimean Peninsula, then muscled in on the Donets region of eastern Ukraine,
both enclaves of Russian speakers with historic and cultural links to Moscow.
Fighting continues today between the forces of the Ukrainian government and
the rebel armed forces—another revisionist effort initiated by a power out to
challenge the status quo in defiance of international law.18
NATO condemned Russia’s activities as an attempt to destabilize eastern
Ukraine and a violation of international law. NATO and its member states repeatedly called on Russia to withdraw from Crimea and fulfill its obligations under
international law.19 NATO held a summit in Warsaw in July 2016 and issued a
communiqué that branded a wide variety of Russian activities destabilizing to
the European security environment. The cited actions included the ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea; the violation of sovereign borders by
force; the deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine; and large-scale exercises
and other provocative military activities near NATO borders, including in the
Baltic and Black Sea regions and the eastern Mediterranean.20
Although historically Sweden’s foreign policy has opposed participation in
military alliances in general, the Swedish government made clear in 2009 that it
supported multinational security and cooperation. It enthusiastically promoted
security cooperation and interactions with other countries through international
institutions, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Sweden, although not a member of NATO,
reinforced its relations with the organization by signing the memorandum of
understanding (MOU) regarding host-nation support. Sweden also is building
bilateral, multilayered, cooperative security relationships with other countries.21
On June 8, 2016, Sweden’s minister of defense, Peter Hultqvist, signed a letter of
intent with his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, to enhance defense cooperation. This followed an earlier defense-cooperation understanding with the
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United Kingdom in 2014. While there is no mutual defense obligation between
Sweden and the United States, their MOU laid out five key aims: enhancing interoperability, strengthening capabilities and posture through training and exercises, deepening armament cooperation, advancing cooperation in research and
development, and meeting common challenges in multinational operations.22
Finland’s foreign and defense policies are similar to Sweden’s in many ways,
but there are some differences. After Finland became independent from Russia in
1917, it attempted to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union, a country with which it shares a long, troubled border. Finland remained more neutral
militarily than Sweden (i.e., less Westward tilting). For example, the Agreement
of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1948, was canceled
in 1992 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but Finland replaced it with a
basic treaty with Russia. Then, after Finland joined the EU in 1995, it changed
its policy to “military non-alignment, backed up by a credible national defense.”
After Russia annexed Crimea, Finland, also a nonmember of NATO, enhanced
its relationship with the organization by signing the MOU regarding host-nation
support in 2014.23 On July 9, 2016, in connection with NATO’s Warsaw summit,
Finnish defense minister Jussi Niinistö and his British counterpart, Michael
Fallon, signed a declaratory expression of intent between their countries.24 The
document does not obligate Finland or Britain to provide mutual assistance in
the event of a crisis, but rather sets a framework for cooperation.25 A short time
later, on August 22, Niinistö told Reuters that Finland also was negotiating a
defense-collaboration agreement with the United States.26
Motivating these changes in the foreign policies of Sweden and Finland, including the rapid enhancement of their relationships with NATO, the United
States, and the United Kingdom, are Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the
continuing “hybrid warfare” being practiced in eastern Ukraine, and the growing
military competition between NATO and Russia in and around the Baltic Sea.
Altering the Time Dimension
Deterrence also can be reinforced by improving military readiness with regard
to time. The following discussion continues to consider the example of northern
Europe, where NATO has placed combat troops in the Baltic countries and Poland, each of which shares a border with Russia.
The histories of all four of these countries provided grounds for profound suspicion of Russia; in particular, Poland has been partitioned many times over the
centuries. After the Cold War, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania did try to
maintain good relationships with their large eastern neighbor, but for reasons of
national security they also took steps to enhance their relationships with NATO
and the EU. They joined NATO to avail themselves of the principle of collective
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self-defense.27 After the Russian annexation of Crimea in the name of protecting
Russians, it is not surprising that these countries requested that NATO station
troops on their territories. Latvia is particularly vulnerable, as 40 percent of its
population is Russian speaking; Estonia’s equivalent proportion is 30 percent.
Poland shares a border with Ukraine. It is easy to understand why these countries
are particularly fearful of what Russia might do.
At the same July 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO welcomed the offers of Canada,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to serve as framework
nations for a robust, multinational forward presence. Beginning in early 2017,
that enhanced forward presence was to rest on four battalion-sized battle groups
introduced into Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, provided by framework nations
and other contributing allies.28 To enhance its presence in its southern area, such
as Romania, NATO further decided to improve integrated training.29 However,
establishing a forward allied military presence is not a sufficient deterrent.
In a discussion focused on China’s antiaccess/area-denial strategy, Aaron L.
Friedberg invokes a more general principle: that the most difficult question confronting U.S. military planners is not what kind of military power they should
use, but how aggressively American military power should be used in an opponent’s land. At a critical moment, if the opponent discerns that the United States
has neither the intention nor the ability to employ its military power on the opponent’s territory, the leader of that opposing country will not fear retaliation and
will underestimate the risk of war that an attack will cause; he will devote more
resources toward mounting an offense than to maintaining a defense.30
Applying Friedberg’s logic to the future of eastern Europe, if Russia believes
NATO has no specific response plan and is not ready to retaliate out of concern
for Russian escalation, there is little to deter Russia from continuing its salami
tactics. The main purpose of positioning NATO troops in the Baltic countries is
to deter Russia’s next action.31 Will NATO’s forces counterattack against Russia,
despite the risk of escalation? The answer to this question is at the core of NATO’s
existence.
Space and Time
These two responses to the new security environment—making space more
dense and speeding up the readiness timetable—are intended to prevent additional applications of salami tactics by China and Russia. Where a situation
seems to have reached the last stage of a ripening-time strategy (i.e., the revision
is almost completed), is there any way to recover?
Russia’s action in Crimea is clearly illegal, but as a permanent member of the
UN Security Council (UNSC) Russia can veto any UNSC resolution. Russia also
has more military power than Ukraine, including nuclear weapons. It would
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be difficult for Ukraine to recover its illegally occupied territory anytime soon.
Ukraine’s only viable strategy is to maintain its citizens’ will, thereby preventing
the situation from “ripening” any further. It must continue patiently to negotiate
within a multinational environment, understanding that any favorable resolution
will take significant time.
The best global strategy to prevent larger powers from intimidating weaker
ones into making concessions is to never accept any change to the status quo
and never confer legitimacy on the illegal use of force. The status quo ante must
be maintained. To avoid giving revisionist powers even the smallest opportunity
to undermine stability, small and medium-sized nations also should take proactive measures, such as reinforcing alliances and creating favorable international
public opinion. Deterrence also can be improved by enhancing collaborative
relationships with other nations in areas for which no collective-defense system
like NATO exists.
Whether applied reactively or proactively, the basic concepts discussed in this
article should be understood and employed dynamically. Static military measures
meant to maintain a status quo are meaningless. States need the capability to
respond to peacetime salami tactics by revisionist powers to a degree calibrated
not to cross the threshold of excessive force. To do so, it is important to have
available and to deploy, at the right time and in the right way, both a dynamic
police force and such military power as will enable a country to deter or respond
to the situation.
Globally, military conflict is expanding. Small and medium-sized states facing
intimidation from revisionist powers naturally hesitate to employ military force,
even in their own defense. But in the new security environment, in which revisionist powers ingeniously adjust and rebalance the status quo, states must plan
for an opponent’s initiatives, maintain the ability to act, and be sure of the political will to use force in a crisis, despite the risks of escalation. Above all, the key to
calming a crisis before it escalates is to return to the original state of affairs before
the revisionist power enters the waiting-game phase of a ripening-time strategy.
The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) has dispatched its patrol ships and aircraft into
the sea and air areas around the Senkaku Islands. This helps to maintain security
and reinforces the effectiveness of JMSDF surveillance activities in the sea and air
domains. Even now, four years after property rights to the Senkaku Islands were
transferred from private parties to the Japanese government, the mass media’s
interest in East China Sea affairs remains high, and they continue to broadcast
JCG reports on the activities of Chinese vessels in the waters near the Senkakus.
Japanese citizens maintain high awareness of the current situation, and their interest in the Senkaku Islands ensures the government will protect the islands and
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Japanese citizens. Japan’s response stance is at the threshold level. Mass-media
contributions such as these undoubtedly play a significant role in shaping public
attitudes, which helps prevent China from unilaterally altering current conditions as part of a ripening-time strategy.
This article has analyzed the security-environment dimensions of time and
space, from the perspective of status quo–maintaining nations. The discussion
should provide readers with some ideas bearing on Japan’s maritime self-defense
strategy and its future national security with regard to China. More generally,
the article illustrates that the current security challenges vis-à-vis revisionist
states such as Russia and China are complex; any attempt to address changes in
the status quo is complicated by the many actions and calculations of different
parties. Such a situation cannot be explained using military rationales alone, and
must be addressed using a multilateral approach that employs all the instruments
of power.
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REBUILDING THE UKR AINIAN NAV Y
Deborah Sanders

T

he Russian Federation’s rapid and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 has
had a profoundly negative effect on the Ukrainian navy. The service lost access to a third of its Black Sea coastline, control of the Kerch Strait, and access
to the defense industries located in Crimea.1 It lost the majority of its service
personnel and access to its military and maritime infrastructure and ports in
Crimea. The Ukrainian navy also lost two-thirds of its warships, including its
most modern platforms. Despite Russia’s slow return of some of Ukraine’s maritime platforms, the Russian seizure of many of Ukraine’s major warships and naval aviation and air assets has dealt a serious blow to the already small Ukrainian
navy. Andri Ryzenko, a former deputy head of the Ukrainian navy, has described
the fleet as an “operational shadow of its former self ” in urgent need of modernization and rebuilding.2
In light of these severe losses and the realization
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conceptual, and financial challenges in reviving its maritime power, it has made
some modest progress toward building a “mosquito fleet.” This fleet has been
bolstered by the addition of some small, new ships and the increasing professionalization of Ukraine’s naval personnel, in particular its marines. This progress
suggests that Ukraine can go in a radically different direction as it redevelops its
navy: toward coastal defense.
To make this argument, this article proceeds in three sections. The first examines why maritime power is important to Ukraine. It argues that Ukraine’s commercial and economic interests already have been affected adversely by the lack
of a navy. The war in the east has revealed the vulnerability of Ukraine’s coastline,
and Russia’s seizure of maritime infrastructure and its attempts to exploit energy
reserves in Ukraine’s territorial waters have reinforced the urgent requirement
to rebuild the fleet. The second section explores the range of difficulties Ukraine
faces in rebuilding its navy. These factors include the impact of the Russian annexation of Crimea, the lack of a coherent and realistic concept for the navy,
and domestic challenges. The final section evaluates the progress made so far in
building a small, coastal-defense navy.
The rebuilding of the Ukrainian navy merits further analysis for several reasons. First, it illustrates the often intrinsic link between land and maritime power:
for Ukraine’s navy, the loss of Crimea has been equivalent to, or even worse than,
a defeat in a fleet action. It demonstrates the problems of “rebuilding in contact,”
in which medium- to long-term maritime interests may have to be mortgaged
to address short-term military needs in the east. Finally, it demonstrates the
problems of generating maritime capabilities in a weak-state context in which
economic challenges and political instability interfere with the ability to establish
and implement effective maritime policy and strategy.
UKRAINE AS A MARITIME STATE
Long land borders and proximity to Russia have given the Ukrainian state a
continental focus, but Ukraine also has important maritime interests. President
Poroshenko has stated unequivocally that Ukraine, was, is, and will remain a
maritime state. Some of its maritime interests are economic in nature, but others are military strategic. In June 2015, the then deputy head of the Ukrainian
navy, Andri Ryzenko, pointed out that Ukraine’s prosperity, its economy, and the
potential growth of tax revenues depend on realization of the country’s maritime
potential. A quarter of Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP) is generated by
the five regions with access to the sea.3 Ukraine’s maritime ports and maritime
infrastructure in the Black Sea are important national strategic facilities. Before
the annexation, Ukraine had twenty commercial seaports; eighteen of these were
state owned, and together they contributed more than 1.55 billion Ukrainian
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hryvnia (UAH) (approximately U.S.$55 million) to the Ukrainian state budget.4
While Ukraine has lost access to five of its ports located in Crimea, it retains four
important commercial ports in Odessa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhny, located on
the northwestern coast of the Black Sea, and Mariupol’ in the Sea of Azov.5 Taken
together, these ports account for almost 70 percent of the total commercial cargo
into Ukraine. In a sign of their significance to the Ukrainian economy, Ukraine
increased its container turnover by almost 6 percent in the first quarter of 2016.6
Further demonstrating the economic importance of these ports, Cargill, an
American global corporation, announced in early 2016 that one hundred million
dollars had been invested to build a grain terminal in Yuzhny.7
Ukraine’s ports also matter because Ukraine has an export-oriented economy;
it is a major exporter of machinery, grain, coal, steel, and fertilizers, which are
shipped out through its ports. Indeed, these are of growing importance, and from
2015 to 2016 Ukraine increased its export volume by 12 percent.8 Mariupol’, for
example, is the busiest commercial maritime hub on the Sea of Azov, and before
the Russian annexation of Crimea it produced almost a third of the Donets
region’s total industrial output, including over 70 percent of the region’s steel
production.9 Considering these important maritime economic and commercial
interests, rebuilding the Ukrainian navy clearly is necessary to protect Ukraine’s
national interests.
Ukraine’s maritime interests are also military in nature, and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine against separatist and Russian forces has only sharpened
them. This protracted conflict and the vulnerability of the strategically important
city of Mariupol’ also have created incentives to rebuild the Ukrainian navy. Ma
riupol’ constitutes a key battleground—the front line and a decisive point in the
ongoing conflict. For the separatists, Mariupol’ represents an important strategic
prize: taking it would give them control of the two hundred miles of coastline
running from Donetsk to Crimea, effectively halving Ukraine’s Sea of Azov and
Black Sea coastlines. The seizure of Mariupol’ also would represent a symbolic
coup for the separatists, as President Poroshenko named the city Ukraine’s provisional capital of the Donets region in 2014. Importantly, the capture of Mariupol’
also could provide a land corridor from Russia to the Crimean Peninsula.
Although Ukrainian forces have secured control of the city, Mariupol’ remains
contested, and Ukrainian positions in the surrounding area are under almostconstant attack. After separatists seized its administrative buildings in the spring
of 2014, the city was brought back under Ukrainian control in June 2014.10 In August 2014, the rebels launched another offensive to take Mariupol’; it was halted
by the signing of the Minsk Agreement. However, in a sign of the importance of
this port to the separatists, Mariupol’ was shelled again in January 2015, killing
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thirty people and injuring eighty-three others.11 This protracted battle for Mariupol’ is far from over. In August 2016, one Ukrainian soldier was killed and five
were wounded after the separatists launched an intense artillery barrage near
Mariupol’. Shyrokyne, a seaside village just east of Mariupol’, was attacked sixteen
times by Russian-backed separatists, nine of those times with heavy weaponry.12
A month later there were reports from Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist Operations
Headquarters that rebels again had fired on Ukrainian positions near Mariupol’.13
The constant attacks around Mariupol’ clearly demonstrate a very real and ongoing threat from the separatists to Ukraine’s maritime interests and security.
More widely, Ukraine faces a growing threat from Russia’s maritime capabilities. Ukraine’s military doctrine identifies the Russian Federation as a direct
threat to Ukraine.14 This threat encompasses not just support to Ukrainian separatists but a more general military buildup. For example, since the annexation,
estimates suggest that Moscow has spent almost $750 million upgrading its forces
in Crimea, and essentially has “turned the peninsula into an iron fortress capable
not just of defending itself, but also of delivering missile strikes on ground targets
in central and southern Ukraine.”15 In the early months after the annexation, Russia moved quickly to develop a fully capable air-defense system and deployed mobile, long-range, antiship systems. These, together with similar systems installed
on the coast of Krasnodar, give Russia the ability to strike surface targets from
its ground-based locations across about a third of the Black Sea.16 As part of the
more recent military buildup, the Russian navy will deploy batteries of Buk missiles in Crimea, which, along with the S-300 and S-400 missile systems already
stationed in Crimea, effectively will secure (Russian) airspace over the peninsula
and the Black Sea.17
Russia almost has doubled the number of service personnel in Crimea, creating seven new military formations and eight military units in addition to those
available to the Black Sea Fleet.18 Russia also has increased the number of tanks
and combat armored vehicles in Crimea by a factor of almost seven, artillery systems are 7.2 times more numerous than before the annexation, and the numbers
of helicopters and submarines also have doubled.19 Russia has replaced the aviation component of the Black Sea Fleet, landing its first fourteen multirole Sukhoi
Su-27SM and Su-30 fighters at Belbek Airport in Crimea.20 Advanced Russian
missile systems deployed to Crimea include batteries of Pantsir-S1 combined
surface-to-air (SAM) antiartillery systems, capable of engaging both airborne
and land-based lightly armored targets, as well as conducting fire on military and
industrial targets. Russian Bastion antiship missile systems also have been deployed along the Crimean coast; these can engage both surface ships of different
classes and land-based targets. Lastly, Russia has deployed the Bal coastal missile system from the Caspian to control its territorial waters, and the air-defense
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troops stationed in Crimea also received S-300PMU SAM systems.21 Commenting on the upgrading and renewal of Russian capabilities in Crimea, NATO’s then
supreme allied commander Europe General Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, stated in
early 2015 that the new weapons systems have made Crimea “a great platform for
power projection in this area.”22
Russia has ambitious plans to strengthen the Russian armed forces in Crimea
further over the period 2020–25, to include increasing service personnel, armaments, air assets, and missile systems, as well as the size, power-projection capabilities, and antiaccess/area-denial ability of the Black Sea Fleet.23 The Black Sea
Fleet will be augmented with up to six new frigates, two new missile corvettes,
and six Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines.24
The emergence of a separatist micronavy complicates further the traditional
Russian naval threat. There is increasing evidence to suggest that the separatists
are building their own maritime capabilities, including cutters armed with largecaliber weapons.25 A report by a pro-Russian newspaper in May 2015 claimed
that the rebels had set up an Azov Flotilla, with a maritime Spetsnaz element, in
the Donetsk People’s Republic.26 This development by the separatists—of a small,
highly mobile fleet equipped with antitank guided missiles, automatic grenade
launchers, and machine guns, able to carry out attacks on Ukrainian shipping
and ports or to land forces and conduct raids or sabotage missions—is clearly a
serious threat to Ukraine’s coastline and the country’s ability to protect its maritime domain.27 In August 2016, there also were reports that the separatists had
practiced carrying out and defending against an amphibious landing.28 A video
of the landing posted online shows soldiers coming ashore in several dozen small
speedboats and BTR-80 amphibious armored personnel carriers.29 Although the
reach of this potential amphibious force currently is limited by a lack of landing
ships, local media reports claimed that the separatists had demonstrated a high
level of combat readiness in both defensive and offensive coastal operations.30
In a sign of the seriousness of this threat, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry announced that Ukrainian marines, coastal artillery, and other naval detachments
were taking part in antiterrorist operations to prepare to “deter an armed aggression from the sea.”31
Ukraine clearly faces many challenges to its maritime interests. In meeting
these threats, Ukraine’s government has attached significant importance—at
least in theory—to the rebuilding of the Ukrainian navy. In rebuilding its navy,
Ukraine could be assessed as having a number of advantages over other states
attempting to develop their maritime capabilities. For example, Ukraine has a
clear threat against which to frame its maritime policies and capabilities; the
war in the east has removed some of the domestic barriers to increased defense
spending; and the loss of so much naval equipment might reduce the physical
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb 5

71

8/7/17 11:58 AM

66

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 23

and intellectual constraints that legacy systems impose. In practice, however,
Ukrainian naval regeneration has been impeded by a number of key difficulties.
THE CHALLENGES TO UKRAINIAN MARITIME REGENERATION
One clear challenge facing those rebuilding Ukraine’s navy is the losses suffered
at the hands of Russia. The key losses that impinge on the future development
of the Ukrainian navy were of the maritime infrastructure and ports in Crimea.
The loss of these facilities has had a devastating effect on the Ukrainian navy—as
noted, equivalent to a major defeat at sea. The Ukrainian navy lost its headquarters in the Black Sea and much of the service’s signals-intelligence, training,
administration, maintenance, and logistics infrastructure, including its ammunition storage facility in Inkerman Valley.32
As a result, the truncated Ukrainian navy has been relocated to Odessa, which,
as a commercial rather than a military port, lacks the maritime infrastructure
necessary to support and maintain the fleet effectively. Compared with Sevastopol’s waters, the sea near Odessa is shallow, which creates practical challenges
if Ukraine is to realize its plans to build an underwater capability to deter a
potential enemy. Considerable investment will be required to turn Odessa into
an effective maritime base for the fleet, and the Ukrainian government has been
slow to develop maritime infrastructure there. In April 2016, more than two years
after the loss of Crimea, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry finally announced plans
to begin construction of a modern maritime base in Odessa for the Ukrainian
navy.33 Three months later, the defense minister confirmed that UAH 100 million
(almost four million dollars) had been allocated to construct the navy headquarters in Odessa.34
Given the challenging security environment in the east, the eventual construction of a safe and effective naval base in Odessa is likely to remain problematic,
however. Not only has there been a spate of terrorist attacks, but the situation
on the ground in Odessa remains difficult. In January 2016, a Ukrainian sailor
prevented an attack on a naval facility in Odessa, and Ukrainian military patrols
also recently foiled an attempt to plant a mine near a military checkpoint in the
city.35 There has been a series of terrorist attacks in Odessa that call into question
the safety of the fleet and its service personnel.36 A recent Jane’s Sentinel Security
Country Risk Assessment on threats to Ukraine states that government assets,
transport infrastructure, and assets associated with progovernment troops and
businessmen in Odessa are currently at risk of attack.37
The loss of Ukrainian naval platforms also created a serious challenge in terms
of rebuilding the fleet, because those lost included a majority of the navy’s most
modern ships.38 In total, the service lost eleven ships and boats, eight auxiliary
vessels, and its only submarine. These vessels included three of the navy’s most
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23

NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb 6

72

8/7/17 11:58 AM

Naval War College: Autumn 2017 Full Issue

SANDERS

67

modern: two corvettes, Ternopil and Lutsk, and the command ship Slavutich.39
Other key losses included the landing vessel Olshansk; two of Ukraine’s minesweepers, Cherkasy and Chernihiv; the antitorpedo boat Kherson; and the antisabotage boat Feodosiya.40 As a result, the fleet currently operates only ten ships,
with thirty-three support vessels. Reports suggest that half of these platforms
need to be repaired and all are outdated, due to end their operational lives in
2018.41 Highlighting the poor state of the current fleet, Vice Admiral Serhiy Hayduk, a former commander of the Ukrainian navy, stated in January 2016 that the
fleet had “lost its fighting capacity.”42
Personnel losses also posed a significant problem. When Russia annexed
Crimea, about twelve thousand of the Ukrainian navy’s almost sixteen thousand
service personnel were based in the region, and almost 75 percent of Ukraine’s
maritime personnel remained in Crimea.43 The loss of so many of the navy’s
experienced personnel had a damaging effect on its operational effectiveness, at
least in the short term.
Another set of difficulties in regenerating the Ukrainian navy is conceptual
and policy related: it has proved easier to define the threats to Ukraine’s maritime
interests than to determine clearly what sort of navy is needed to meet those
threats. While there has been some discussion of what a revived navy actually
would or should look like, many of the suggestions have been conservative in outlook, focusing on a balanced fleet and traditional roles—ignoring the high cost
of and other challenges to building such capabilities. Admiral Ihor Kabanenko, a
former Ukrainian deputy defense minister, has suggested that the Ukrainian navy
should be a small, modern, and balanced fleet that consists of surface ships and
submarines, naval aviation, naval infantry, special operations forces, and other
components that can react adequately to threats from the sea. Vice Admiral Serhiy Hayduk has stated that Ukraine should revive its submarine force, purchasing
between two and four subs, probably secondhand from Turkey. The naval staff
also recognizes the need to purchase new minesweepers.44
A paper written by former deputy navy chief Ryzenko provides the most
comprehensive outline of the naval staff ’s vision of what a future Ukrainian navy
should look like. In this paper, Ryzenko examines what assets and capabilities,
investment, and organizational changes the Ukrainian navy will need in the
future to perform its core mission of protecting Ukraine’s maritime sovereignty
and national interests at sea. According to Ryzenko, the fleet’s core mission will
be divided into three tasks. The first of these is defending Ukraine’s coastal area,
including its harbors and ports; securing critical infrastructure; and countering
landing operations. The second task is performing general maritime operations
and wider sovereignty protection; this includes securing sea lines of communication, performing antisurface and antisubmarine warfare, and carrying out
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defense diplomacy missions. The third task is conducting what Ryzenko terms
offensive maritime operations; these would include destroying enemy ships at
sea, controlling the air where needed, and conducting amphibious landings.45
Some have argued that Ukraine should implement a much more modest “mosquito fleet,” or coastal-defense, navy concept. A mosquito fleet–type force aims to
deny command of the sea to adversaries with larger and more powerful navies.46
Such a fleet consists of small, fast, and relatively cheap platforms, backed up by
gunboats, mines, and coastal-defense ships. The goal is to make it impossible for
an enemy to approach the country’s coastline.47 Under such a plan, the Ukrainian navy would have a much smaller force, with no submarines, more-limited
coastal-defense and combat-support units, and very limited air-control ability
over the fleet. In effect, it would focus on performing just one of the three tasks
Ryzenko laid out: the defense of Ukraine’s coastal area, including its harbors and
ports, securing critical infrastructure and countering landing operations. As will
be discussed later, Ukraine has made some modest progress toward building both
the quantitative and qualitative elements of a coastal-defense force.
A third key challenge in rebuilding the Ukrainian navy is the gap between
the Ukrainian government’s rhetorical commitment to such a reconstitution and
its actual funding priorities. In light of the ongoing conflict in the east, the government made the decision in its defense spending to prioritize increasing the
combat effectiveness of its land and air, rather than its naval, forces.48 As a result,
while Ukraine’s defense budget has increased significantly, the navy’s share of the
overall budget has remained small.49 Ukraine’s 2016 defense budget is four times
higher than 2014’s, and 2017’s will increase further.50 The Ukrainian navy’s budget, however, amounts to just 2 percent of the defense ministry’s total budget, and
only 0.5 percent of the total budget is spent on procuring weapons and military
equipment for the fleet.51 The lack of investment in the fleet, in comparison with
the other two services, can be seen clearly in the so-called White Book, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s annual publication on the current state of the armed
forces. For example, in 2015 the army acquired nine new weapon systems; the air
force had twelve new acquisitions, including four helicopters and ten unmanned
aerial vehicles; but the navy added no new weapon system or capabilities to its
arsenal.52
At the root of all these difficulties is the parlous state of the economy, which
has necessitated hard choices. The Ukrainian government still is fighting a costly
war in the east, and the Ukrainian economy has been slow to recover from the
crisis. In a speech at the UN summit in New York in September 2015, President
Poroshenko spelled out the high economic costs of the conflict in the east: he
claimed it was costing Ukraine five million dollars a day. He went on to point
out that Ukraine had lost about a fifth of its economic potential with its eastern
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territories.53 Production within the Donets region has plummeted 70 percent,
and estimates suggest this has cost Ukraine 7 percent of its GDP. Russia’s annexation of Crimea has contributed to the loss of another 4 percent of Ukraine’s
GDP.54 In addition, the flow of refugees from the region either to Russia or
to other parts of Ukraine not only represents an important loss of manpower
but puts additional strain on the Ukrainian economy.55 Although there have
been some positive signs that Ukraine’s economy will begin to recover in 2017,
structural shortcomings and domestic impediments to economic growth—such
as unsustainable fiscal policies and the difficulty of attracting foreign capital—
suggest that this recovery will be slow at best.56
Thus, even if the Ukrainian government were able to allocate a larger share of
the defense budget to the navy, the capital-intensive nature of naval investment
and the poor state of the Ukrainian shipbuilding industry would make it difficult
to effect any quick transformation in naval capabilities. Estimates suggest that rebuilding a navy capable of performing all three of the core tasks discussed earlier
—defending Ukraine’s coastal and maritime area, conducting wider maritime
operations, and carrying out offensive maritime operations—would require the
navy’s budget to increase by a factor of about twenty. To procure the necessary
platforms (artillery boats, landing craft, corvettes, submarines, and auxiliary support vessels) and coastal-defense and combat-support units, as well as to invest
in maritime aviation and personnel, Ukraine would need to spend about $3.6
billion over the next five years, according to Ryzenko.57 Indicating the scale of the
challenge facing the Ukrainian government, this amount constitutes significantly
more than Ukraine’s whole defense budget for 2016. In contrast, development of
a mosquito fleet that would enable the navy to perform one core task effectively
would require a more modest fourfold increase in the current naval budget.58
The long-term decline of the Ukrainian shipbuilding industry also has had an
impact on the rebuilding of the Ukrainian navy. After the collapse of the USSR,
Ukraine inherited a significant shipbuilding capacity, with plants in Kiev, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Sevastopol, Kerch, and Feodosiya. They were capable of building
missile and aircraft carriers, large antisubmarine ships, heavy transport ships,
boats, lighter carriers, and multipurpose icebreaking supply vessels.59 During the
last three decades, however, Ukraine’s shipbuilding industry has become increasingly unprofitable and has lost much of its competitive edge in both international
and domestic markets.60 Several large enterprises are close to bankruptcy, and
many of the shipyards have been operating at 15–30 percent of their production
capacity.61 As a result of these challenges, the shipbuilding industry’s contribution
to Ukraine’s overall industrial output has dropped from 5 percent to less than 1
percent.62 This decline in the shipbuilding industry has been caused by a number
of factors, including increasing steel prices, limited credit resources, a lack of
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government support, and the investor-deterrent effect of the conflict in Ukraine’s
east.63 As a result of these challenges, many of Ukraine’s shipbuilding enterprises
have had no new orders over the last few years, have large wage arrears, and suffer
an acute shortage of experts.64
Because of weak domestic demand for shipbuilding and a lack of government
investment in the country’s shipbuilding industry, Ukraine is unlikely to receive
any new major warships in the imminent future. 65 Ukraine’s Project 58350 corvette program not only has failed to produce a single ship but appears to have
been shelved. Under plans announced in 2011, ten corvettes were to be built for
the Ukrainian navy by 2026. However, construction of the Project 58350 flagship,
Volodymyr Velykyy, had been progressing extremely slowly, and a decision was
made in October 2015 to allocate funds toward upgrading the existing fleet rather
than developing new platforms.66 While the manufacturers claim that 80 percent
of the hull is ready, the ship’s technical readiness stands at closer to 17 percent,
suggesting that even if the platform secures sufficient funding it is unlikely to be
brought on line until at least 2018.67
Ukraine’s tumultuous domestic politics further complicates all the previously
discussed difficulties in building an effective navy. Despite the president’s commitment to implementing wide-ranging economic reforms, they will be difficult
to achieve, given the fragility of the new government coalition and endemic
corruption.
In April 2016, the former prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk was replaced
by the former speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament)
Volodymyr Groysman. The new coalition, made up of the political parties of the
president and the former prime minister, has only a very small parliamentary
majority, so it relies on support from other parliamentary factions and groups.
This weakening of the government majority will complicate all policy making
further.68
Endemic corruption in Ukraine compounds all these problems. Highlighting
the extent of the problem, Transparency International ranked Ukraine 143rd out
of the 173 countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index, and estimates have
suggested that over twelve billion dollars per year disappear from the Ukrainian
budget.69 Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, has argued that
corruption is an inadequate word to describe the conditions in Ukraine; the
problem is not that a well-functioning state has been corrupted, but that the
“corrupt” practices themselves now constitute the “rules” by which the state is
run.70 Calling into question the ability of the government to engage in reform in
the future, the worst corruption “occurs at the nexus between business oligarchs
and governmental officials,” where a few oligarchs control over 70 percent of
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Ukraine’s economy and have captured and corrupted Ukraine’s political and
judicial systems.71
BUILDING A MOSQUITO FORCE
Faced with problems in funding and procuring maritime capabilities, Ukraine
has prioritized, at least in the short term, the acquisition of smaller, faster platforms, in effect building the elements of a small coastal-defense force. In November 2015, the Ukrainian navy began acquiring the fast-attack elements of a mosquito fleet when it received two Gurza-M (Project 51855)–class small armored
artillery boats designed for patrolling coastal areas. Currently undergoing sea
trials, each boat carries a combat module fitted with automatic cannon, a grenade
launcher, a machine gun, and two antitank missile systems with laser guidance.72
In March 2016, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry signed a contract with the stateowned Ukroboronprom Company in Kiev to provide four more of these small
armored gunboats for the Ukrainian navy.73 Two of these gunboats are likely to
be Centaur armored amphibious assault ships based on the Gurza-M, but with
extended functionality. They would be designed to deliver marines or special
forces, and to deliver fire support to land forces under engagement in littoral and
inland waters (estuaries, rivers, and water-storage basins) at distances up to one
hundred miles.74 In addition, these boats will be highly deployable and could be
sent by land to Mariupol’ to operate in the Sea of Azov. Each boat can fit into
two trailer trucks: one truck for the hull with the weapons removed; the other
for the tower, plus a container with the dismantled weapons.75 Further augmenting Ukraine’s mosquito fleet, a U.S. contractor, Willard Marine, also will supply
four high-speed patrol boats to the Ukrainian navy, accompanied by on-site
crew training in the design, operation, maintenance, and repair of the boats.76
It is interesting that the combination of a lack of government funds, consequent equipment shortages, popular engagement in the war, and the leveraging
of the opportunities that new technology affords actually has facilitated the development of the fleet, in particular via some very innovative forms of equipment
procurement. For example, in December 2015 the navy’s flagship, the frigate
Hetman Sagaidachny, was fitted with a modern navigation radar system financed
by a charitable organization, a part of the Come Back Alive volunteer movement.
The movement raised the funds through Internet crowdfunding.77 This organization has funded similar systems for other maritime platforms.78
Beyond the headway it has managed in developing the physical capabilities of
a mosquito fleet, Ukraine has made much more progress in developing the qualitative aspects of its maritime power.79 In this regard, the conflict in the east has
had a paradoxically positive spillover effect on the building of a coastal-defense
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navy. Training to fight and actually fighting the separatists have enhanced the
professionalism of Ukraine’s naval personnel, particularly its marines; this has
served as a force multiplier, by improving the ability of the fleet and its personnel
to operate. In a visit to Odessa in September 2015, Vice Admiral James G. Foggo
III, then commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, commented positively on what he
saw of the professionalism of the officer corps and sailors of the Ukrainian navy.
In September 2014, the fleet demonstrated its commitment to developing the
ability to conduct joint operations. Special units of the Ukrainian navy and Interior Ministry as well as naval aviation units practiced a joint search-and-attack
training operation involving the detection and destruction of illegal armed
groups in the Odessa region. In July 2015, another joint tactical training exercise
took place in the Southern Bug estuary in the Mykolayiv region of Ukraine, in
which the Ukrainian navy, air force, and ground forces practiced conducting an
amphibious assault and an airborne landing, further enhancing their joint skills.80
Indeed, Ukraine’s marines in essence have been rebuilt from scratch into one
of the most combat-ready elements of Ukraine’s naval forces. When Russia annexed Crimea, only one-third of the six-hundred-strong Feodosiya-based marine
battalion opted to return to Ukraine, depriving the fleet of its most combat-ready
element.81 The marines subsequently have been reconstituted and have gained
valuable combat experience fighting in eastern Ukraine. In recognition of their
enhanced combat abilities, units of the marine corps were deployed to the outskirts of Mariupol’ in July 2015 to bolster the city’s defenses. Commenting on
this deployment, Ukraine’s president stated that the marines “will enhance the
protection of Mariupol significantly.”82 The marines also have benefited from
an increase in the number and scope of their training exercises. In 2015, the
numbers of marine corps battalion and company tactical exercises increased
seven- and 5.5-fold, respectively, and platoon field-firing exercises also went up
fivefold over the previous year.83 In July 2015, they also held their first brigadelevel tactical training exercise, and they developed their joint skills further by
practicing their ability to coordinate with air and maritime platforms to capture
a shoreline and destroy enemy forces.84 Ukrainian navy commander Hayduk
claimed that by these exercises the “marine corps have [sic] completely renewed
its battle readiness.”85 More recently, in August 2016, in response to the Russian
Federation’s announcement of a large naval exercise in the Black Sea, Ukraine’s
president announced that the country’s marines and coastal artillery units also
would hold a large military exercise, which would seek to heighten further the
combat readiness of all naval forces, especially the marines.86
The fleet’s active participation in multinational maritime operations also has
played an important role in enhancing the combat effectiveness of its service personnel. In September 2014, just months after the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine
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held its annual SEA BREEZE exercise, demonstrating its commitment to developing the professionalism of its maritime forces. As part of this cohosted multinational exercise, Ukrainian naval personnel practiced setting up and securing a
maritime safety zone in a crisis area. In October 2015, Ukraine’s frigate Hetman
Sagaidachny also took part in a joint PASSEX drill with Bulgarian, Romanian,
U.S., and Turkish ships in the western part of the Black Sea. Vice Admiral Hayduk claimed that this operation was a testament to the high level of cooperation
between the Ukrainian and NATO navies and that multinational operations
such as this allow fleet personnel to master NATO standards and enhance their
interoperability.87
Ukraine’s marines also have benefited from taking part in multinational maritime exercises. These exercises have allowed the marines to develop a number of
important skills, ranging from conducting amphibious landings or tracking down
an enemy submarine to protecting critical maritime infrastructure. In July 2016,
over 220 U.S. and Ukrainian marines, along with other naval forces, conducted
an amphibious landing during another annual SEA BREEZE exercise in Odessa.
During this exercise the marines practiced establishing a safe beachhead ashore
and protecting critical infrastructure. Commenting on the progress Ukrainian
naval forces had made, Captain Richard Dromerhauser, USN, stated that he had
witnessed the flawless execution of a very difficult and complex operation.88 In
August 2016, Ukraine’s marines also practiced tracking down an enemy submarine as part of the SEA SHIELD multinational military exercise, which took place
in the western part of the Black Sea off Odessa. A month later, Ukrainian marines
participated in the PLATINUM LYNX 2016 exercise held in Romania. Working
alongside NATO allies, they enhanced their interoperability in a combined training environment.89 The United States also recently announced the funding of a
two-week training course in Mykolayiv for noncommissioned marine corps officers to enhance further their operational and combat effectiveness.90
Despite the many challenges Ukraine faces in rebuilding its fleet, the government has made some modest progress in developing a mosquito force. Recent
additions to the fleet include two small armored artillery boats designed for patrolling coastal areas. In 2017 the navy will be augmented further by additional
small attack craft.
Ukrainian naval forces, in particular the marines, have enhanced their combat effectiveness significantly, including their ability to operate in a joint environment. By increasing their training and their participation in multinational
exercises, Ukraine’s marines have enhanced significantly their ability to protect
Ukraine’s maritime interests.
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However, while increasing the operational effectiveness of its naval personnel
is an important enabler in allowing the Ukrainian navy to protect the country’s
immediate maritime interests, it cannot substitute for, and could be compromised by, the current lack of maritime platforms. Owing to the low number of
serviceable maritime platforms, the Ukrainian navy has struggled to increase the
time spent training its naval personnel at sea.
Nonetheless, it is clear that, while Ukraine will continue to face some tough
challenges in building a small mosquito force, Kiev is moving, albeit slowly, in
the right direction. Faced with building a “navy in contact,” Ukraine should be
encouraged to adopt a more pragmatic—but ultimately a more radical—model
for its navy of the future. Ukraine can neither afford nor sustain a balanced, bluewater maritime force. In contrast, developing an effective and efficient mosquito
fleet would give Ukraine the capability to protect its EEZ and deter threats to
its maritime infrastructure and coastline. The Ukrainian naval staff ’s ambitious
plans to build a balanced force able to perform all three roles discussed in this article (protecting the EEZ, engaging in wider operations, and conducting offensive
maritime operations) need to be discouraged actively. Such plans are unrealistic
and unrealizable, and pursuing them will delay the construction of a more modest and achievable mosquito fleet. By continuing to invest in the development of
small, highly mobile attack craft and in the enhancement of the professionalism
of its naval forces, Ukraine can continue to be a maritime state, at least in the
short to medium term.
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CONFRONTING UNCERTAINT Y WITH
DECENTR ALIZED COMMAND
British Naval Decision Making at the Outbreak of the War of 1812
Kevin D. McCranie

O

n June 18, 1812, the United States declared war on Britain. Although the declaration hardly could be described as unexpected, given years of strained relations, the United States did obtain a degree of surprise.1 This was inevitable given
the distance between the two countries and the nature of period communications
—it took weeks to transmit information between the United States and Britain.
The slowness of communications created a window of vulnerability for British
naval forces in North American waters.
Events in Britain only exacerbated the exposure of its naval forces. On June 8,
ten days before the American declaration of war, a new government formed in
London. One of its first acts constituted an attempt to ameliorate a major point
of conflict with the United States: it suspended the restrictions on American
commerce delineated in previous orders in council. Through late June and most
of July, British leaders in London hoped their conciliatory gesture would lead to
a favorable response. Little did they know that the Americans had declared war
five days prior to Britain’s repeal of the orders.2
Only in late July did news of the American war reach London. British decision
makers then had to consider whether the Americans, given the suspension of
the orders in council, would back away from hosKevin D. McCranie is a professor of strategy and
policy at the Naval War College. He is the author of
tilities. The uncertainty contributed to additional
Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Nadelays, and it was not until September 26 that new
poleon (University Press of Florida, 2006) and Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in instructions and leadership reached Halifax, Nova
the War of 1812 (Naval Institute Press, 2011).
Scotia.3
Between the June 18 declaration of war and
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September 26, British naval leaders in North American waters faced tremendous
uncertainty. Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer, commander of the North American
station and the senior officer at Halifax, served as the theater commander for
an area of operations that spanned southward from the Gulf of Saint Lawrence
in the north, past Halifax and the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, to the
northern edge of the Bahamas; Sawyer’s command stretched eastward to include
Bermuda as well.4
Sawyer had to go to war with the force he had, not necessarily the warships
he needed. He had to execute operations relying on old instructions and his
understanding of British strategic priorities and intent. In an uncertain environment, he had to lead British naval operations in theater while providing his
political leaders with assessments of American intentions. Captain Philip Broke,
commanding the thirty-eight-gun frigate Shannon, was the second key British
naval decision maker in North American waters.5 He oversaw Sawyer’s principal
strike force. Broke’s primary mission involved mitigating the threat the U.S. Navy
posed. This article assesses how Sawyer and Broke made decisions, executed
operations, managed risk, and dealt with uncertainty at the outbreak of the War
of 1812.6
Royal Navy (RN) operations during the opening months of the War of 1812
underscore the complexity of naval decision making at the campaign level. This is
a subject that all too often is lost between descriptions of naval battles and general
narratives of naval war. Yet a study in naval decision making aids in understanding the relationship among governmental leaders, their theater commanders, and
operational elements at sea.
THE WORLD SITUATION
Much of what Sawyer and Broke encountered at the outbreak of the War of 1812
was expected. Naval leaders in the age of sail operated in an environment in
which communications were slow, so officers had to be agile enough to deal with
evolving circumstances, from minor incidents to acts of war. Naval officers had
to be aware of government intent so their actions could fulfill broader objectives.
Yet the specific circumstances that Sawyer and Broke encountered were
unique. Britain already was engaged in a protracted, multitheater war against
Napoleonic France, with the Royal Navy operating in the role of the dominant
naval power. The War of 1812 originated on the periphery of the larger conflict,
meaning the isolation Sawyer and Broke faced was more extreme than their peers
faced in European waters. This was not a new theater in an existing war against a
familiar naval foe, but a new opponent in a geographically distant region fought
in parallel with the ongoing Napoleonic struggle. For Britain, the existential
threat was France, not the United States.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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THE SITUATION IN AMERICA
Even so, leaders in London recognized that something needed to be done. “As
soon as the discussions in America began to take a serious turn,” the secretary
of the British Admiralty explained, “the British government sent orders to their
naval officers, not couched in doubtful terms, but in the plain good old English
style.”7 Leaders in London understood that if the United States initiated hostilities, their theater commander in American waters required guidance.
Sawyer received the following three directives, dated May 1812:
1.	 To repel any hostile aggression, but also take care not to commit one.
2.	 In the event of a declaration of war by America, or the issue of letters of marque,
or any invasion of the provinces and islands [of Canada], to commence and direct
hostilities, and to sink, burn, or destroy American ships, and to pursue all other
measures, offensive and defensive, for the annoyance of the enemy and the protection of his Majesty’s subjects.
3.	 To exercise, except in the specified cases, all possible forbearance towards citizens
of the United States.8

These three instructions sought to meet wider policy aims. Governmental leaders in London attempted to minimize tensions by directing the Royal Navy to
employ “all possible forbearance towards citizens of the United States.”9 They
wanted to avoid a war that necessarily would drain assets from the primary war
against France. If hostilities did occur, destroying American ships would deprive
America of commerce while driving commerce into British protection. Moreover, the elimination of American warships and privateers that could threaten
British merchant shipping forwarded “the protection of his Majesty’s subjects.”10
Avoiding war was the best-case scenario, but if war did occur the initial naval
object sought to limit America’s ability to use and disrupt the maritime commons.
Sawyer’s order “to sink, burn, or destroy American ships” highlighted the
way to protect a critical vulnerability—Britain’s sea lines of communication
(SLOCs). The commerce that passed along these maritime arteries ensured
Britain’s global economic position.11 In 1812, every major RN deployment had
for its fundamental object the protection of British commercial interests, with
naval stations arranged at terminal, choke, and transit points along the SLOCs.12
Major trade routes included the link between the British Isles and their possessions in the West Indies. These trade routes were largely dependent on prevailing
currents and winds. The latter circled the Atlantic in a clockwise pattern. Shipping outward bound from Britain plunged south until it reached the latitude
of Barbados, where it caught trade winds that propelled it westward across the
Atlantic. The return voyage to Britain followed the predictable current of the Gulf
Stream. This brought such shipping close to the Eastern Seaboard of the United
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
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States. Sawyer’s North American command mitigated threats to commerce on
this part of the return voyage. At approximately the latitude of Boston, shipping
pressed eastward into the Atlantic, using the Azores as a waypoint on its voyage
to the British Isles.13 Moreover, Sawyer’s command was positioned to protect the
terminal point of the sea-lanes between the British Isles and its possessions in
Canada. The U.S. declaration of war put these sea-lanes at immediate risk. The
instructions to Sawyer attempted to mitigate this vulnerability by directing him
to destroy American warships, privateers, and merchant commerce. The object of
ensuring the security of the SLOCs dominated the design and execution of British naval operations during the opening months of the War of 1812.
OPENING ENGAGEMENTS—AND CONFUSION
On June 23, 1812, about a hundred miles east of New York, lookouts aboard the
thirty-six-gun British frigate Belvidera sighted a small squadron. Captain Richard
Byron identified the strangers as American warships. Given his orders and the
tension between the United States and Britain, he beat a hasty retreat, but the
squadron gave chase. During the afternoon, the lead ship, the American frigate
President under Commodore John Rodgers, opened fire. Only then did Byron
allow his crew to engage. Three hours into the chase, Byron had his crew start
the water over the side and cast nonessential items into the sea. Now lighter, Belvidera drew away from its pursuers. It had been a close-run affair.14 These were
the opening shots of the War of 1812 at sea.
Four days later, Byron brought Belvidera into the harbor at Halifax, where he
found Admiral Sawyer.15 Sawyer must have been unsure how to proceed. His
most recent instructions directed him “[t]o repel any hostile aggression, but also
take care not to commit one.”16 With regard to the latter, he had only to remember
several previous shooting incidents between British and American warships. In
1807, HMS Leopard had fired on the American frigate Chesapeake owing to a suspicion of British deserters aboard the American warship. Outrage in the United
States nearly resulted in war. Four years later, in 1811, Rodgers, commanding
President, almost destroyed the British warship Little Belt. This shooting incident
occurred in the dark; both the British and the Americans thought the other at
fault.17 Indicative of the early confusion over Belvidera’s encounter, one British
periodical posited, “Our Government has expressed an opinion, that the attack
made upon the Belvidera had neither resulted from any new orders of the American Government, nor was any proof that war had been decided on.”18
Was Belvidera’s engagement merely another incident, or was it war? Sawyer
needed confirmation. If it had been a mere incident, an overzealous and aggressive reaction could precipitate actual war; whereas if hostilities already existed,
hesitation could result in the loss of British warships, commerce, or worse.
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Sawyer’s instructions were clear: if he could confirm that a state of war existed,
he was “to commence and direct hostilities.”19
Given the high level of uncertainty about American intentions, Sawyer’s first
move involved the collection, assessment, and dissemination of intelligence. Less
than a day after the battle-scarred Belvidera made Halifax, Sawyer dispatched
the naval sloop Colibri to New York under a flag of truce to determine whether
a state of war existed. He also sent vessels to London and Jamaica with details of
the attack. Just in case it had not been an accident, he dispatched another warship
to warn the commanding officer at Newfoundland and ask for reinforcements.20
All these reports were incomplete. Sawyer could only speculate about why the
Americans had attacked Belvidera. Doing the best he could, Sawyer pieced together the disparate accounts he could glean from American newspapers and the
dated reports of British diplomats.21 It took over a week after Belvidera reached
Halifax to confirm the declaration of war. When Sawyer did receive indisputable
proof of hostilities on July 5, it cost him another warship to carry this news to
England.22
THE SITUATION IN HALIFAX
Sawyer’s response also had to take into account the means at his disposal. He had
but twenty-three operational warships.23 On paper, this might appear impressive,
but his area of operations required extensive deployments. Moreover, he had to
provide escorts to convoys. Few warships were then at Halifax, or at least nothing
approaching the combat power of the American squadron that nearly had overwhelmed Belvidera. That the Admiralty in London had provided Sawyer with less
than an optimal force might lead to accusations of mismanagement, considering
that Britain was the dominant naval power, possessing approximately half the
world’s warship tonnage.24 However, the navy as a whole was stretched thin, given
global naval commitments and ongoing operations against Napoleonic France.25
On June 30, three days after the battle-damaged Belvidera had anchored at
Halifax, the thirty-eight-gun frigate Shannon and the thirty-two-gun frigate
Aeolus arrived. Captain Broke of Shannon related, “We came in five days from
Bermuda—thinking all tranquil & pacific with America—& counting only on
a dull tiresome refit at this port, before we could resume our cruize, . . . but on
arriving here . . . we met rumours of war” (emphasis original).26 Chance favored
the British. Not only had Belvidera escaped, but a planned refit had brought two
additional frigates to Halifax. Sawyer saw an opportunity. Belvidera completed
hasty repairs and Sawyer’s flagship, the sixty-four-gun Africa, stood ready. With
Shannon and Aeolus, the British had three frigates and a sixty-four-gun ship
concentrated for operations. Sawyer thought this force sufficient to deal with the
American squadron. Shannon, Africa, Belvidera, and Aeolus sailed from Halifax
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
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on July 5 under the overall command of Captain Broke, just hours after receiving
indisputable proof that the United States in fact had declared war.27
Rather than assigning Broke command of his most powerful naval detachment, Sawyer surely wished to raise his flag in Africa and personally proceed
in quest of the American squadron, but he remained at Halifax. The uncertain
political and naval situation meant that Sawyer needed to stay in communication. At Halifax, Sawyer could coordinate better among the various elements of
his command. He had no idea when reinforcements would arrive, he had yet to
receive instructions from London detailing specific objectives or rules of engagement, and he was unclear regarding what kind of war the Americans intended
to wage. In addition, the location of the American squadron that had attacked
Belvidera was unknown. Tracking down leads would require significant adaptation, and this could draw the British squadron far from Halifax.
Moreover, Sawyer expected developments in the Gulf of Maine and its offshoot, the Bay of Fundy. This constricted area of water contained several important British Canadian ports, including Saint John, New Brunswick. To complicate matters, the bordering New England states were the center of American
maritime activity. Sawyer expected cities such as Boston, Salem, Gloucester, and
Marblehead, Massachusetts, to fit out numerous privateers.28 Such commerce
raiders possessed government-issued licenses to prey on British shipping but
were owned, fitted out, and manned by private individuals, resulting in a statesanctioned business venture that sought profit from the capture of commerce
belonging to hostile states.
The threat of American privateers materialized more slowly than expected,
however. It took eight days after the declaration of war for the U.S. government to
legalize their use.29 An additional factor delayed the sailing of privateers: in April
1812, Congress had placed a ninety-day embargo on all American shipping. This
prevented the sailing of American merchant ships, with the object of keeping the
Royal Navy from sweeping them from the seas in the first weeks of a war. The
embargo did not expire until July 4, 1812—and the government made no exception for privateers.30 As one U.S. newspaper aptly printed, “Is it not very odd that
privateers would be prevented from sailing sixteen days after war is declared?”31
A narrow window of opportunity existed during which the Americans might
have benefited from the Royal Navy’s ignorance of hostilities. That window had
closed by the time American privateers entered the fray because HMS Indian,
an eighteen-gun sloop, and Plumper, a ten-gun brig, already had reached the
Bay of Fundy.32 Although this did not prevent American privateers from taking several quick prizes and even blockading the British Canadian port of Saint
Andrews, British actions mitigated the damage. Sawyer assessed the threat as
severe. When Spartan, a thirty-eight-gun frigate, returned to Halifax on July
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9, Sawyer dispatched it to the Bay of Fundy. The thirty-six-gun Maidstone, the
first wartime reinforcement to reach Sawyer’s command, joined Spartan. British
warships alternated among escorting convoys, including a hastily organized one
of a hundred vessels; patrolling to sweep up privateers; and conducting small
raids up rivers to neutralize privateers in their nests.33 The British had significant
success, taking more than twenty privateers between mid-July and mid-August,
with nearly all the captures occurring in the waters between the Bay of Fundy
and Halifax.34
Sawyer’s decision to remain at Halifax instead of sailing in quest of Rodgers’s
squadron also allowed for the more effective employment of eleven reinforcing warships. Quietly dispatched between mid-May and July, they trickled into
North American waters during the early months of the war. The Admiralty had
intended these warships to take the place of those cycling home with convoys and
to provide limited reinforcements to buttress Sawyer’s command in the midst of
worsening tensions with the United States. But they served a different purpose,
giving Sawyer additional options and helping to soften the initial blows to British
commerce.35
TWO SQUADRONS
With Admiral Sawyer remaining at Halifax to manage naval deployments across
the theater of operations, Captain Broke had a more specific objective: dealing
with Commodore Rodgers and his squadron of American warships. The British
decision to seek out the American squadron rested on the assessment that Rod
gers posed the most dangerous threat to British maritime interests. He had the
strength to eliminate British warships, put SLOCs at risk, and savage a valuable
convoy. Whereas American privateers aimed at inflicting cumulative losses on
British maritime commerce over a protracted period, Rodgers’s squadron in a
single blow could inflict significant damage, not just to commercial shipping, but
even to British warships.
Sawyer had two choices when developing instructions for Broke. He could
provide restrictive orders, in an effort to maintain tighter control, or he could
provide his intent, trusting his subordinate to execute operations effectively.
During the period of uncertainty at the outbreak of the conflict, it was unclear
whether the Americans expected direct aid from France. Sawyer worried that
such aid would manifest as a combined expedition aimed at Halifax. In hindsight, an attack on Halifax was beyond the means of the United States; however,
the possibility caused Sawyer concern during July 1812, and he had no way to
recall Broke in the event such an attack transpired.36 Given this factor alone, there
certainly was much to be said for keeping tight control over Broke’s detachment.
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However, the nature of communications, coupled with the scarcity of warships,
led Sawyer to choose a decentralized command model. The speed of communications limited any attempt at control because it would stifle Broke’s initiative.
This was particularly true given the uncertainty about the Rodgers squadron.
Restrictive orders would make an encounter with the American squadron less
likely. Sawyer explained to Broke that his actions “must depend on information
you may from time to time obtain either of the situation or movements of the
American Squadron or other circumstances, and it is left to your judgement and
discretion to act as shall appear to you best for His Majesty’s Service.” Sawyer
prioritized forward deployments, but this caused Sawyer to explain to Broke, “I
have no means of keeping up a communication with you, till the arrival of reinforcements from England.”37 Without reserves, Sawyer became isolated from the
operational elements of his command. Sawyer decided to trust Broke to make
informed decisions.
Four days out, Broke’s squadron linked up with the thirty-eight-gun British
frigate Guerriere.38 Broke now controlled four frigates and a ship of the line. This
was a powerful squadron, especially when viewed as a percentage of Sawyer’s
overall command. At the outbreak of hostilities, Sawyer controlled five true frigates; Broke now had four of them in his squadron, leaving only Spartan for other
assignments. Also attached to Broke’s squadron was the sixty-four-gun Africa.
Launched in 1781 and hardly considered a frontline warship by 1812, Admiralty
documents still described Africa as a third-rate ship of the line—the sole warship
larger than a frigate in Sawyer’s entire command.39
Thus, Sawyer had depleted the combat power of his entire command to provide Broke with an effective force. It now fell on Broke to determine the location
of Rodgers’s squadron. The last positive intelligence was over two weeks old, dating from Belvidera’s running fight. Broke had to make an educated guess regarding what Rodgers had done in the meantime. He concluded that the Americans
most likely had returned to either Boston or New York, the principal ports with
the maritime infrastructure to sustain a powerful American naval squadron.
Therefore Broke took his squadron toward Nantucket, to place his ships between
those two cities. He hoped to lure Rodgers out for a fight by attacking trade in the
area.40 Broke maintained that he would “continue to destroy all such as are not
worth our sending in . . . and hope thus to make the Enemy feel the Evils of the
War they have so wantonly began.”41
Then, on July 12, Broke fell in with Colibri, the flag-of-truce vessel Sawyer had
sent to New York. Several British diplomats had taken passage aboard Colibri there,
and they provided Broke with intelligence on the strength of Rodgers’s squadron. It
contained the forty-four-gun President, the forty-four-gun United States, the thirtysix-gun Congress, the eighteen-gun Hornet, and the sixteen-gun Argus.42
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Sawyer had dispatched Broke’s command with an object of defeating the
American squadron. How well would the sixty-four-gun Africa, the thirty-eightgun Shannon, the thirty-eight-gun Guerriere, the thirty-six-gun Belvidera, and
the thirty-two-gun Aeolus have done in an engagement with Rodgers’s command? First, it should be noted that the rated number of guns provides only an
approximation of combat power; most of the warships mentioned above mounted more than their rated number of guns. The rating system itself was a legacy
system that did not take into account developments such as the introduction
of the short-range carronade. Moreover, the Americans had a tendency to rate
warships smaller than they actually were—this served a propaganda purpose.43
In this case, it meant that the thirty-six-gun Congress displaced roughly two
hundred tons more, and had a slightly heavier broadside, than either the thirtyeight-gun Shannon or the thirty-eight-gun Guerriere.44
How the British warships compared with forty-four-gun American warships
such as President and United States is a particularly thorny question. William
James, a contemporary observer and the first British historian of the war, argued
that warships such as President were built of heavier timbers than seventy-fourgun British ships of the line.45 In a later study, Theodore Roosevelt countered,
“The American 44-gun frigate was a true frigate.”46 In reality, President and
United States displaced about 40 percent more than thirty-eight-gun frigates such
as Shannon and Guerriere and 50 percent more than thirty-six-gun frigates such
as Belvidera. In terms of armament, the principal battery of the American warships consisted of twenty-four-pound guns, while British frigates such as Shannon, Guerriere, and Belvidera mounted eighteen-pound guns. In comparison
with a sixty-four-gun ship such as Africa, President and United States displaced
approximately 150 tons more, had a similar complement, and threw a broadside
that was one hundred pounds heavier, albeit with a larger percentage of shortrange carronades.47
Considering the above information, the two squadrons were fairly equal in
aggregate combat power, but several factors gave the British a slight advantage.
Although each squadron contained five warships, the small sizes of the Americans’ Hornet and Argus would make them very fragile instruments of war in any
engagement. Moreover, two-thirds of Rodgers’s total broadside weight consisted
of carronades, including almost the entire armament of Hornet and Argus; carronades comprised only 40 percent of the British broadside weight.48 In a longrange engagement, the Americans would have to rely on two oversized frigates
and one just a bit more powerful than Shannon to fight a sixty-four-gun ship and
four smaller frigates.
Although the odds were in Broke’s favor, he worried that Rodgers had linked
up with other U.S. frigates. Information gleaned from American newspapers
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indicated that the thirty-two-gun Essex likely had joined the American squadron.
And Broke believed that Constitution, the third forty-four-gun American frigate,
also might have joined Rodgers.49 The addition of either of these warships would
tilt the odds in Rodgers’s favor.
In the worst case, Broke’s command had the combat power to inflict enough
damage to make the American squadron a nonfactor in the coming months. By
the time the Americans had repaired any battle damage, British naval reinforcements would have shifted the naval balance in American waters permanently.
OFF NEW YORK
The diplomats aboard Colibri also informed Broke that Rodgers had not returned
to port after his action with Belvidera. “It was generally believed they were
gone in search of the homeward bound West Indies Fleet under convoy of the
Thalia.”50 Although this was accurate information, Broke needed confirmation,
so he proceeded toward the entrance to Long Island Sound.51 On July 14, he left
his squadron over the horizon and brought Shannon inshore to gather intelligence about the American squadron. Specifically, Broke sought local fishermen
or those involved in the coasting trade; such individuals stayed connected with
events ashore and had access to local newspapers.52
Since it was unlikely that an American would speak with a British naval
captain knowingly, Broke perpetrated a ruse. He hoisted American colors over
Shannon and pretended to be the U.S. frigate Congress. It would take an extremely
educated eye to tell Congress and Shannon apart: their dimensions were nearly
identical and each mounted eighteen-pounders on its main gun deck.53 (Flying
false colors was a perfectly legitimate deception that all navies of this period used;
the deception became dishonorable only if one fired on an opponent while still
under a false flag.)54
In two separate incidents, Broke lured fishermen aboard Shannon. He even
told them that he had parted company with Commodore Rodgers after running
low on water. Broke described the fishermen as “thoroughly deceived,” for they
provided him with significant information, including accurate details about the
engagement with Belvidera.55 Since Broke knew the correctness of this news, he
viewed the remaining information as more reliable, including reports that Rod
gers had pursued a homeward-bound British West India convoy.56 The information gleaned from the fishermen, in combination with the reports received from
the diplomats aboard Colibri, indicated that Rodgers had pursued a West India
convoy. But Broke remained skeptical; although the diplomats and fishermen had
provided similar information, Broke worried that the newspapers on which the
intelligence was based were inaccurate. Broke announced, “I shall anxiously seek
for some further accounts of the American Squadron.”57
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Broke was not the only one attempting to locate Rodgers; U.S. Secretary of
the Navy Paul Hamilton also wanted to find him. At the outbreak of hostilities,
Hamilton had given Rodgers permission to surprise British warships in the offing before “returning immediately after into port.”58 However, after attacking
Belvidera Rodgers did not follow Hamilton’s instructions. It took several weeks
for Hamilton to realize that Rodgers was seeking bigger objectives than isolated
British warships. The arrival of British warships on the U.S. coast caused Hamilton’s apprehension to grow, so he dispatched the fourteen-gun Nautilus to locate
Rodgers’s squadron. Nautilus proceeded to sea on July 15 with a difficult task.
There were two squadrons at sea—one under Rodgers, the other under Broke.
They were similar in size, and from a distance would look very much alike. Nautilus’s challenge was to find the right squadron; at this it failed. Nautilus fell in
with Broke’s command on July 16, and after a short chase became Broke’s prize.59
No sooner had Broke gobbled up Nautilus than his frigates chanced on Constitution. The outbreak of hostilities had found the latter in Annapolis, Maryland,
and in need of additional men. Hamilton ordered Constitution to join Rodgers
at New York. The ship was off New Jersey when Broke’s squadron found it. After
an epic chase, Constitution finally outran the British squadron on the morning
of July 19.60
During the pursuit of Constitution, Broke’s squadron became badly strung out,
with the frigates drawing well ahead of Africa and Nautilus; Africa, an old sixtyfour-gun ship, could hardly keep up with the more nimble frigates, and Nautilus
was manned with only a prize crew. Africa’s captain, not waiting for instructions,
sent Nautilus to Halifax with the information that Broke had obtained. Sawyer
had not provided Broke the means to stay in contact, but the fortuitous capture
of Nautilus alleviated this issue. Later, Broke described the captain of Africa as
acting with “great judgement”: with only a prize crew, Nautilus added little to
the British squadron but could provide Sawyer with valuable intelligence, and
Africa’s captain seized the opportunity.61
The news Nautilus carried informed Sawyer of Broke’s movements over the
previous two weeks. Broke consistently had positioned his squadron where
Rodgers was most likely to come to him. Initially, Broke had expected Rodgers’s
squadron to be anchored at either Boston or New York. He tried to draw Rodgers
out for a fight by putting American commerce at risk. Simultaneously, he sought
intelligence. What he obtained indicated that Rodgers was still at sea, likely in
search of a convoy. If true, such intelligence changed Broke’s mission. While
continuing to seek confirmation, Broke placed his command between Rodgers’s
squadron at sea and his most likely base of operations at New York. In this location, Broke’s squadron was positioned to snap up Nautilus and Constitution. The
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latter escaped only by superior sailing. Broke accurately concluded that both
Nautilus and Constitution also were on the lookout for Rodgers’s squadron.62
OF CONVOYS
After chasing Constitution, Broke pondered his next move. He needed to shift his
squadron from its position off New York. The longer it remained, the more likely
it became that Rodgers would divine Broke’s position and avoid him by seeking
another port. Rather than gamble on the port to which Rodgers would return or
search for the American squadron directly, and “[h]aving received undoubted
information [that] Commodore Rogers [sic] was gone upon the Grand Bank of
Newfoundland to lie [in] wait for our West India Convoys and considering the
vast injury his squadron might do in that point,” Broke later would explain that
“it appeared to me the more important duty to abandon the plan we had entered
upon for distressing the Enemy trade, for the protection of our own.”63
Broke understood the centrality of Britain’s maritime trade. No matter how
much he wanted to engage the American squadron or gain prize money by capturing American merchant commerce, the ulterior objective of protecting British
commerce remained paramount. So Broke sailed eastward across the Atlantic
in quest of the West India convoy. Oddly enough, finding the convoy increased
the likelihood of encountering Rodgers: since convoys sailed along predictable
routes, this one would act as a magnet for the American commodore. By seeking
out the convoy, Broke again was attempting to force Rodgers to come to him.
On the morning of July 29, the squadron exchanged signals with the convoy’s
sole escort, the thirty-eight-gun frigate Thetis, about six hundred miles east of
New York City.64 Broke explained, “This fleet was talked of confidentially in
America as the chief object of Commodore Rogers’ [sic] hazardous enterprise;—
we shall at least ensure their safety, and I hope our escorting them may lead to a
meeting of the Squadron.”65
But Broke’s assessment was flawed: although he had found a West India convoy, he had not found the one Rodgers had pursued. The convoy Broke located
comprised approximately seventy ships and had sailed in early July; Rodgers
instead had pursued the May convoy, comprising 120 merchant vessels escorted
by the thirty-six-gun frigate Thalia and the eighteen-gun sloop Reindeer.66 After
the running fight with Belvidera, Rodgers had approached the May convoy. Rodgers nipped at its heels between June 29 and mid-July; he received reports from
several merchant vessels that the convoy was nearby; his squadron even sailed
through garbage the convoy had left floating in its wake. But the pursuit was to
no avail, and on July 13, when Rodgers was nearly into the approaches to the English Channel, he called it off. All this occurred before Broke even had captured
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Nautilus. After Rodgers gave up his quest for the convoy, he made a large circuit
of the Atlantic before heading home.67
The convoy Broke found was never in danger—but this assessment is available
only from the perspective of hindsight. Both the Admiralty in London and Sawyer at Halifax approved of Broke’s actions.68 Given the convoy’s value, the weakness of its escort, and the uncertainty of the American threat, the risk had been
too high to act otherwise. The convoyed merchant vessels had arrived safely; the
prime difficulty in assessing successful commerce defense involves understanding why it worked. Rather than seeking the enemy and defeating it through a
sequential series of actions, commerce protection involved the complex interplay
of convoys, escorts, and patrols—and a high degree of chance. Only by knowing
Rodgers’s position in relation to that of the convoy can one conclude that Broke
did nothing either to deter the American squadron or to protect the convoy most
at risk. Although Broke failed to bring Rodgers to battle, he had assessed the
available intelligence, understood the centrality of commerce in Britain’s grand
strategy, and concentrated his squadron at a decisive point—in this case, in relation to a convoy. Instead of directly seeking battle with Rodgers, Broke prioritized
Britain’s trading empire, understanding that this course of action was the most
likely way to bring Rodgers to him.
So Broke’s squadron stayed with the convoy as it lumbered toward England.
Africa and Thetis provided direct protection, while the frigates chased down
sightings. One of these turned out to be an American merchant vessel that had
encountered Rodgers’s squadron on July 10. Broke learned that Rodgers had
not pursued Thetis’s convoy but instead was ahead of it. Prevailing currents and
winds would make it difficult for Rodgers to double back and attack the convoy
that Broke now protected. Thus, it was reasonably safe. Even so, Broke split his
squadron, leaving Africa and Guerriere to assist Thetis in shepherding the flock
of merchantmen.69
At longitude 45 degrees W, these two warships followed Broke’s orders and
parted with the convoy. Over the next week, they slowly clawed their way back toward Halifax. On the afternoon of August 14, Guerriere and Africa intentionally
went separate ways: Africa steered for Halifax, carrying Broke’s official reports,
while Guerriere continued on patrol. Only five days after parting with Africa,
Guerriere encountered Constitution. The ensuing battle resulted in the first significant British naval loss of the war.70
GROPING IN THE DARK—TO LITTLE EFFECT
Meanwhile, Broke took Shannon, Belvidera, and Aeolus toward the American
coast, where he hoped to intercept Rodgers. Broke was now attempting to confront the American squadron with only three frigates, since he had gleaned from
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various sources of intelligence that Rodgers also had three frigates, not four or
even five as Broke once had believed.71 Another factor in Broke’s decision to confront Rodgers with a reduced force stemmed from his assessment of the U.S. Navy.
When Broke learned of Constitution’s victory over Guerriere, he concluded, “We
are all eager for an opportunity of convincing the Yankees how much they are indebted to chance for their success in this contest. Their force is superior in ship &
metal & number of men—but not in skill or courage equal” (emphasis original).72
Broke did not respect his opponent, and it can be assumed that he thought the
crews of his three smaller frigates equal to the task of defeating Rodgers’s more
powerful frigates.
However, by reducing his squadron to three frigates Broke had accepted additional risk; there was no margin for any circumstance that would further reduce
his command. This is exactly what occurred on the night of August 10, when
Belvidera became separated from Shannon and Aeolus during a chase. Belvidera’s
Captain Byron then captured Hare, an American merchant brig with a treasure
trove of intelligence. Some weeks earlier, Hare had encountered Rodgers’s squadron. Thinking the merchantman would beat the American squadron home, a
number of letters were sent across. These now fell into British hands. Understanding their significance, Byron immediately pressed for Halifax.73
When Belvidera arrived on August 24, Byron not only brought Sawyer the captured letters; he provided the first reports of Broke’s movements over the previous
month. Problematically, Byron did not have Broke’s actual reports—these were
aboard Africa, which still was making its way slowly toward Halifax. Without a
clear description of Broke’s intentions, Sawyer faced considerable uncertainty, but
he needed to act quickly. The captured letters indicated that the Americans would
return to the United States at the end of August. Sawyer directed the thirty-eightgun Spartan and thirty-six-gun Maidstone to reinforce Broke.74 These reinforcements became even more important when Aeolus had to go in for water—Broke
was now alone as Rodgers approached.75
At Halifax, Sawyer obtained additional intelligence about Rodgers from
Statira, a thirty-eight-gun frigate that Sawyer had taken under his command after
the start of hostilities. The ship encountered Rodgers’s squadron on August 26
while patrolling along Saint Georges Bank. The distance between the American
warships and Statira was enough to leave both sides in doubt about the exact
nature of the encounter, but two days later Statira again fell in with the squadron,
and this time the Americans spied the British frigate and gave chase. The pursuit
lasted sixteen grueling hours before the weather came on thick, swallowing up
the British ship.76 Rodgers again had failed to capture an isolated British warship;
and, just as Belvidera had done two months earlier, Statira carried news of the
encounter to Halifax. Sawyer quickly assembled another squadron comprising
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Statira; the forty-gun Acasta and the thirty-eight-gun Nymphe, two other wartime frigate reinforcements; and the former U.S. sloop Nautilus, now recommissioned as Emulous. This squadron sailed on September 2 with orders to find
Broke and defeat the American squadron.77
This was all for naught, however. The same day that Statira made Halifax, the
American squadron anchored at Boston. Sawyer characterized the American
venture as “a very unsuccessful cruize—having taken and destroyed seven vessels
of little value.”78 Rodgers certainly achieved less than he had desired. He failed
to capture a single British warship or locate even a small British convoy. Yet the
British could consider themselves extremely fortunate. The American squadron
had chased Statira and had come within the narrowest margin of capturing Belvidera. And only a few miles had separated Rodgers from an extremely valuable
but weakly escorted West India convoy of approximately 120 merchant vessels.
A RETURN TO THE LARGER PICTURE
Sawyer had devoted the best of his command to seeking out Rodgers’s squadron,
at the expense of other responsibilities. Even as late as September 9, Sawyer wrote
of “the inferior force I had to meet the various exigencies” on the station.79 Broke
added, “I am bitterly disappointed at not meeting the squadron we are looking
for—& who have diverted our attention from every other pursuit.”80 Privateers
had damaged British commerce, and many American merchant vessels had escaped the tentacles of the Royal Navy while Broke sought Rodgers.
Worse still, British deployments had broken down. British actions hinged on
Broke maintaining concentration at the critical point, but the nature of period
communications and the lack of smaller vessels to carry reports between Broke
and Sawyer curtailed effective interaction. Without efficient communications,
the instructions Sawyer provided Broke in early July became critical. High levels
of uncertainty caused Sawyer to allow Broke significant discretion in developing
a course of action. By all evidence, Broke ably assessed available information
and acted in accordance with the intent of his instructions and Britain’s strategic
priorities. The result, however, drew Broke deep into the Atlantic to protect a
vulnerable convoy. There was no way to keep Sawyer informed. After seeing the
convoy to safety, Broke allowed his command to fragment. This was in part a response to intelligence about the strength of Rodgers’s squadron, but other factors
contributed to the five-ship squadron becoming five widely separated individual
warships.
In the aftermath, Guerriere was lost in combat. Africa slowly lumbered back
to Halifax with Broke’s reports. The delay in getting these to Sawyer further
contributed to the uncertainty gripping British operations in late August and
early September. Belvidera separated from Broke in a chase, then captured vital
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intelligence about Rodgers’s movements. Captain Byron took the information to
Halifax, since this was a fixed point, whereas seeking Broke was akin to finding a
needle in a haystack. After apprising Sawyer at Halifax, Belvidera failed to rejoin
Broke before Rodgers reached Boston.81 Aeolus parted with Shannon on August
28 because of a lack of water. As luck would have it, Aeolus encountered Spartan
and Maidstone the next day. They provided Aeolus with enough water to remain
on station, but they failed to locate Shannon.82 Broke found himself alone on the
American coast—and Rodgers slipped by everyone.
Then, adding insult to injury, Broke encountered the U.S. frigate Essex late
in the afternoon of September 4. Although Shannon overhauled the American
frigate, darkness fell before Broke could bring the American to action. It was a
close-run affair, with the captain of Essex describing his escape as “extraordinary.”
The result likely would have been quite different if Broke had had another frigate
or two in company, allowing him to use multiple warships to cut off Essex.83 The
lack of water, chance, and other priorities had left Broke alone, however.
BRITISH NAVAL LEADERSHIP
Captain Broke’s performance exemplifies naval leadership at the operational level
of war. His assessment of intelligence, acceptance of risk, and decision making
despite limited information provide instructive examples. Six weeks into the operation, Broke’s squadron fragmented. This was, at least in part, the result of the
choices he made; but how long can an isolated squadron commander maintain
the mental acuity to make the best choices before uncertainty leads to negative
results?
While Broke dealt with the single problem of Rodgers’s squadron, Sawyer had
to master theater command. He had twenty-three warships at the outbreak of
hostilities, and this number grew with the arrival of the thirty-six-gun Maidstone,
thirty-eight-gun Nymphe, forty-gun Acasta, and thirty-eight-gun Statira. In addition, seven smaller warships arrived with convoys.84 These reinforcements were
offset during the first three months of the war by the combat losses of the thirtyeight-gun Guerriere and the schooner Laura, while the British lost the eighteengun Emulous to the wiles of the ocean.85 Normal operations also diminished
the command. Sawyer dispatched several warships with convoys, while others
carried news of hostilities to distant locations. By September, Sawyer’s command
was only slightly larger than it had been at the outbreak of hostilities; however, it
did contain a larger percentage of frigates.
Sawyer juggled forces and prioritized commitments, acting most decisively
when he received news of Rodgers’s squadron, first by dispatching Broke, then
by sending Spartan and Maidstone, and finally by dispatching Statira, Nymphe,
and Acasta. Convoys sailed at regular intervals—Sawyer did not interrupt their
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sailings because of the war; in fact, he provided escorts for the unexpected convoy that departed British Canadian ports in the Bay of Fundy in July. Sawyer also
provided warships to maintain a presence around Halifax and Bermuda, the two
bases that were essential to sustaining his command.
Finally, Sawyer sought out American privateers. This proved easier than it
should have been, owing to U.S. government delay in passing enabling legislation
for commissioning private armed vessels, as well as the decision not to amend
the 1812 Embargo Act to allow privateers to sail before it expired. For privateers,
surprise came not from where but when they would strike. Commerce warfare
could inflict more significant damage if conducted before widespread knowledge
of the commencement of hostilities. Once Sawyer had learned of the declaration
of war, he understood that the Gulf of Maine and the Bay of Fundy would be
prime operating grounds. It would take longer for the Americans to commission
a meaningful number of large, oceangoing privateers; until then, hastily commissioned, smaller private armed vessels could seek easy prizes in nearby waters.
Overall, however, the British were less vulnerable than they should have been,
owing to American delays and Sawyer’s foresight.
Sawyer managed naval deployments during the opening months of the war effectively, but the Admiralty decided he was unfit for independent command. He
had been appointed to his position in October 1810, when North America was a
backwater: tensions had calmed after the Leopard-Chesapeake incident, and the
shooting incident between President and Little Belt was months in the future. But
once the Admiralty became aware of hostilities in late July 1812, it sought a more
experienced commander.
Although Sawyer managed naval operations effectively, he lacked an appreciation of broader political considerations. In early July, Sawyer had dispatched
Julia to England with “certain intelligence of the act of the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States Declaring War against Great Britain having
been approved by the President.” When Julia’s commander, Valentine Gardner,
brought Sawyer’s dispatches to the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, they
censored Sawyer, noting “their regret that on a subject of such extreme importance as that of a declaration of war by America you should not have given their
Lordships the particulars of the information which you state yourself to have
received, and that you did not send the American official documents upon this
subject which Captain Gardner of the Julia reports to have seen at Halifax.”86
Sawyer’s haste in dispatching this information to London likely led to the
omissions. Certainly, he had operated in a vague sense of suspended animation for the week between Belvidera’s arrival at Halifax following the ship’s escape from Rodgers’s squadron and the official confirmation of the war. These
were tense and uncertain days, and it is understandable that Sawyer failed to
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provide the Admiralty all the details. Although the omission might have been
understandable, the Admiralty did not view it as excusable. For one thing, the
First Lord of the Admiralty had to address other government leaders about the
declaration of war without critical documentation, which was embarrassing.
Moreover, Sawyer did not direct Captain Gardner to detain the mail and passengers aboard Julia until the Admiralty had been informed about the declaration
of war. This failure led the Admiralty to complain that the resultant “spillage” (to
use a modern term) provided that “the Public was in possession of as early and
more ample information than His Majesty’s Government” (emphasis original).87
This was not just embarrassing; it caused Britain’s political leaders to work at a
disadvantage as they tried to address the outbreak of hostilities. So, while Sawyer
may have managed naval operations on a distant station adequately, he lacked
the political acumen to interface with the British government. There was more
to command on a distant station than merely being proficient at the operational
level of war. The Admiralty understood that Sawyer was operationally competent,
but not politically savvy.
Rather than remove Sawyer, the Admiralty decided to amalgamate the North
America, Leeward Islands, and Jamaica stations under a senior admiral who
could provide the oversight necessary to link the political, strategic, and operational aspects of Britain’s naval response to the War of 1812. Sawyer would
remain the senior officer at Halifax, where he could focus on operational issues,
while the new commander would manage operations from Halifax to Barbados.88
The presumed ability of one officer to command such an extensive area of operations led to the following quip: “Why they have excluded the East Indies and the
Mediterranean, I know not, for surely they might as rationally have been included
in this most unprecedented command.”89 Certainly, it was unparalleled—and in
fact proved unwieldy.
The Admiralty’s choice to fill the new positon was Admiral Sir John Borlase
Warren. He had commanded in North America in the aftermath of the LeopardChesapeake affair and had extensive experience both operationally and as a
diplomat.90 Although Warren’s command included the North America, Leeward
Islands, and Jamaica stations, it is telling that he sailed directly for Halifax. This
was the decisive point for controlling British naval operations in its war against
America, and Warren needed to establish communications with Sawyer to obtain
firsthand information about the progress of the naval war.
When Captain Broke learned of the change, he wrote, “Sir John Warren’s arrival makes a grand revolution in our government, poor Adml Sawyer is much
hurt at the rude manner in which the Admty have deprived him of his chief
command.—perhaps he will go home.”91 This was prophetic. Warren reached
Halifax on September 26, and just days later Warren wrote privately to a member
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of the Admiralty that Sawyer was “unwell & I believe it is so & he is very Grumpy
also at what he calls being superseded in his command.” Rather than having a
disgruntled subordinate, Warren gave Sawyer permission to return to England.92
With Warren’s arrival, the first chapter of Britain’s naval War of 1812 came to a
close. Operationally, British naval leaders had demonstrated considerable skill at
managing fog and friction while accounting for uncertainty. The British lacked
a complete picture of American political intentions and an exact understanding
of how the Americans planned to wage war at sea. This required leaders such as
Admiral Sawyer and Captain Broke to work with available information and make
assumptions about the rest.
At the same time, they had to prioritize. Prioritization does not come easily to
a dominant naval power; after all, its navy should be able to master all threats. But
in this case the available warships were insufficient, and it took time for reinforcements to arrive. Sawyer and Broke sacrificed everything else to protect British
commercial shipping. Warships protected convoys and the SLOCs rather than
directly engaging American warships and privateers or sweeping up American
commerce. Sawyer and Broke understood the difference between seeking battle
and ensuring maritime security. In uncertain conditions and with a less-thanadequate force, security took priority. British naval officers in North American
waters showed a keen regard for Britain’s commercial position and understood
the role of warships in supporting Britain’s global maritime trading empire.
Yet Sawyer’s reward was to be superseded as theater commander. The Admiralty did not plan to remove Sawyer—he was an effective operator. Instead, Sawyer asked to be removed, since he felt aggrieved when the Admiralty placed Warren in a position to be his immediate superior. To demonstrate that the Admiralty
held little ill will, the same First Lord of the Admiralty by 1814 had appointed
Sawyer to command the Irish station. This was a command in close communication with London that oversaw convoys and patrols on the approaches to the
English Channel—a command that demanded Sawyer’s expertise.93
However, the outbreak of war with the United States required a different
type of know-how; it demanded an admiral who simultaneously could manage
deployments and communicate broader strategic and even policy-level considerations. Sawyer did not communicate well enough with his political superiors.
Distance and the speed of communications certainly made exchanges with
London more difficult, but these factors were known, and Sawyer could have
accounted for them by lavishing more care on his reports, to include all available
documentation. That he did not do so proved embarrassing, which led to friction
between the civilian leaders and their senior officer at Halifax.
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Understanding intent, identifying objects, and managing risk are not the only
hallmarks of success in decentralized command; clarity and precision in communications prove just as important, for without these attributes, the tenuous
links among decentralized nodes of authority become strained. The Americans
contributed enough to the uncertain environment; ambiguity need not have been
exacerbated by the failure of naval leaders to provide adequate communications
with their civilian masters.
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MONEY, MOTIVATION, AND TERRORISM
Rewards-for-Information Programs
Christopher M. Ford

A

ttempting to neutralize terrorists is a vexing problem. Terrorists are elusive:
they emerge to commit acts of terror, then blend back into their environment.
Frequently they are lone individuals who travel freely, do not wear uniforms, and
assiduously seek to avoid detection. Governments historically have employed
a hard/soft-power approach to the problem: targeting terrorists through direct
action (counterterrorism units, drone strikes, etc.), while employing soft-power
mechanisms either to gain information or to create an environment that is less
conducive to facilitating, supporting, and encouraging acts of terror.
The most recent significant terrorist attack against the United States—the
attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya—provides a useful illustration of
the classic hard/soft approach. In the immediate
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U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) rewards program have paid more than two
hundred million dollars to informants since 1984.
Despite these programs’ size and scope and our reliance on them, they receive a surprising lack of scrutiny or attention from the media, academia, and
the government.3 Indeed, no government or research entity ever has evaluated
or even questioned the efficacy of these programs. While this fact is surprising
on its own, it is downright astonishing given that a significant body of psychology research demonstrates that extrinsic rewards structures—such as those that
underlie these rewards programs—can undermine motivation and thus prove
counterproductive. To structure rewards programs better, the rewarder must
appreciate the relationship between the award and information: why and when
people are motivated to provide useful information. With this in mind, rewards
programs can be restructured to motivate potential informants more effectively,
achieving far better results at a much reduced cost.
This article then has three goals. The first is to highlight both the importance
of rewards programs and the lack of critical attention they have received. The
second is to review the implementation of current rewards programs through
two heretofore unused lenses: research into the psychology of motivation, and
the historical case study provided by what the British experienced during what
they called the “Malayan Emergency.” Finally, this article introduces two suggestions for structuring rewards programs better. These approaches, termed here
maximizing and minimizing, seek to provide readily implementable improvements that apply historical lessons, together with guidance taken from years of
academic research on motivation.
THE EXISTING REWARDS PROGRAM
Background
The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism established the RFJ program.4
The DOS Bureau of Diplomatic Security manages the program, which permits
the Secretary of State to authorize “rewards for information that leads to the arrest or conviction of anyone who plans, commits, aids, or attempts international
terrorist acts against U.S. persons or property, that prevents such acts from occurring in the first place, that leads to the location of a key terrorist leader, or that
disrupts terrorism financing.”5
Rewards can be up to U.S.$25 million, or more if the Secretary of State “determines that a greater amount is necessary to combat terrorism or to defend the
United States against terrorist acts.”6 Since 1984, the program has put up more than
two hundred million dollars in rewards and has paid out more than $125 million.
The DoD rewards program allows the Secretary of Defense to pay rewards for
nonlethal assistance that benefits the U.S. armed forces.7 The standard operating
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procedure referred to as Money as a Weapons System implements the DoD program, which provides smaller rewards in greater numbers than RFJ.8 Many other
countries, including Afghanistan, Argentina, China, Greece, Guinea, Kenya,
Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, offer similar
rewards programs for assistance against those designated as terrorists.
Judging Program Effectiveness
There has never been an evaluation of the effectiveness of either U.S. program.
DOS long has maintained that RFJ is both successful and effective. On the program’s web page, administrators state that the program has “provided information that has helped prevent or favorably resolve acts of international terrorism
against U.S. interests and bring to justice some of the world’s most notorious
terrorists.”9 This statement is true; then again, twenty-five-million-dollar rewards
have failed, and in some cases continue to fail, to lead to the capture of Saddam
Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.10 Further, multimillion-dollar rewards have failed to
produce information on virtually any major terrorist attack on the United States,
stretching from the Benghazi attack (2012) back through the attack on USS Cole
(2000), the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (1998), the
bombing of the Khobar Towers (1996), the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 (1986),
the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 830
(1982).11
So, determining whether RFJ is a “successful” program depends on the metric of success used. Perhaps generating a single piece of information would be
deemed successful; researchers at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (known as CERN) spent an estimated $13.25 billion to discover a single
Higgs boson elementary particle—by all accounts, a successful effort.12
In the context of rewards programs, however, a far more important metric is
the efficiency of the program. Consider the following example: a terrorist bomb
injures two U.S. citizens. If the U.S. government offered a ten-million-dollar reward and received information leading to capture of the terrorists, the rewards
would be successful—but not necessarily effective. If a one-million-dollar reward
generated the same information, it would be both successful and more effective.
Or consider a rewards program that produces one hundred pieces of information,
but could produce five hundred pieces of information if its administration were
changed slightly.
The goal of any rewards program should be increased efficiency: more information at a lower cost. Increasing efficiency requires first understanding a
program’s costs.
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Valuing Rewards Programs: The Cost of Information
Conducting an objective, academically rigorous evaluation would be the best
method for understanding the costs and benefits of the programs. Interestingly,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted evaluations of rewards and incentives for federal employees, tax whistle-blowers, and those who
report Medicare and Medicaid fraud.13 The GAO report on incentivizing federal
employees provides useful guidance for evaluating the combined DOS/DoD
rewards program. The report notes that “[a]gencies that fail to evaluate their incentive programs have no basis for determining whether their programs actually
motivate and reward employee high performance.”14
In any rewards program, the actual reward paid is the largest and most obvious cost of the program. RFJ has paid out more than $125 million in rewards. In
exchange, the U.S. government has received information. Was the information
worth more than $125 million? Would it have been worth a billion dollars? Or
perhaps “only” one million? Might the information have been provided for free?
When information is received through a rewards program, the government
often presumes that the program motivated the informant. However, informants
may act out of a sense of patriotism, personal animus, or some other motivation
that we falsely attribute to the reward. In such cases, a reward would be “wasted,”
as the individuals would have come forward for a much smaller reward, or perhaps none at all. Without understanding what motivates an individual to come
forward with information, it is impossible to fix an efficient price (the amount of
the reward) for what the government is purchasing (information).
Absent objective valuations, officials must resort to subjective valuations; what
makes Ayman al-Zawahiri “worth” twenty-five million dollars and Mullah Omar
“worth” ten million dollars remains unclear. Government officials have indicated
that there is an internal process that establishes these numbers; but given the
suspiciously round reward figures, the valuation is at least somewhat subjective.
Beyond the actual cost of the reward, ancillary costs must be considered. The
majority of RFJ targets are thought to be located in predominantly war-torn,
rural, impoverished areas.15 Injecting large sums of cash into such regions has
the potential to cause any number of unintended consequences. Most obviously,
rewardees or others could use the money to perpetuate violence by purchasing
weapons or funding violent operations that will destabilize the region further.
Conversely, the rewardee may become a target for revenge or robbery. The DoD
program guidance expressly discusses this possibility.16 A broader negative implication of a large reward is its destabilizing impact on the local economy. In
theory, these unintended outcomes are more likely in some regions than others.
Accordingly, rewards programs should take into account the recipient’s location.
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There also exists the possibility that the offer of a reward could bolster the
reputations of wanted individuals, inflating their standing among associates and
possibly in the broader community, and bringing them greater support (money,
personnel, and equipment). Thus, the reward may exacerbate the problem it is
seeking to resolve. Some, for example, believe that offering a reward for the capture of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi increased his reputation.17 DoD has recognized
this possibility, noting in its reward program guidance that “lower rewards limit
notoriety for insurgents (Jesse James effect).”18
A rewards program also may embolden or anger the target of the reward. For
instance, in 1975 members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) assassinated Ross
McWhirter (a cofounder of the Guinness Book of World Records) three weeks after
he offered a reward for information leading to the arrest of members of the IRA.
One of the killers, after his release in 1999, noted that McWhirter “put a bounty
on our heads. He asked for it.”19 Poor rewards program execution can lead to such
blowback.
Finally, it is instructive to look at the GAO report on incentivizing federal
employees, which identifies several problems with rewards programs, including
concerns regarding the possibility of fostering negative internal competition.20 A
poorly structured or advertised program can even result in program failure. The
FBI, for instance, pulled an advertising campaign for RFJ in the Seattle area following widespread complaints that the campaign promoted stereotypes.21
The true cost of a rewards program, then, is the cost of the reward plus the
cost of any follow-on effects of the program such as increasing violence; bolstering enemy reputations; angering enemies, thereby incentivizing their actions;
and fostering negative competition for information. The very idea that a rewards
program could have negative implications is anathema to the DOS view of its
program, which is that as long as information is coming in, the program is working. Yet such costs are very real and should be considered when structuring rewards programs. This was one of the lessons the British learned in their Malayan
rewards program.22
THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY:
A REWARDS-FOR-INFORMATION CASE STUDY
Governments long have offered monetary rewards in exchange for beneficial
information or action. Letters of marque—essentially licenses for private individuals to capture enemy ships, rewarded from the sale of booty—date from as
early as 1295.23 Similarly, in the sixteenth century countries began formalizing
the concept of prize money—at first, money paid to crews for capturing a wanted
pirate.24 Rewards for information on terrorists are a more recent development.
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One of the earliest references relating to rewards for information for capturing
what the British termed terrorists comes from the Malayan Emergency.
The Malayan Emergency traces its origins to the establishment of the South
Seas (Nanyang) Communist Party in 1925; the organization was renamed the
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1930.25 The party, comprising primarily
ethnic Chinese, garnered widespread popular support after Japan’s invasion of
Malaya in 1942. The MCP established the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army
(MPAJA), which the United Kingdom and the United States officially recognized
as the “foremost resistance organization behind the Japanese lines.”26 At the end
of the war, the MPAJA “had established de facto control of many areas.”27 The
British sought to control MPAJA forces by placing them under British military
command—paying, clothing, and otherwise providing for all MPAJA forces. By
1946, however, relations between the British and the MCP were collapsing rapidly.28 In February 1948, the communists—now styling themselves the Malayan
Races Liberation Army—launched a series of major labor strikes, followed by a
terror campaign, and eventually an insurgency that became protracted.29
The British initially responded with military force, but shifted to a whole-ofgovernment approach with the implementation of what was called the Briggs
Plan, named after British lieutenant general Sir Harold Briggs, the commander
of British forces. The overall intent of the plan was to cut off the insurgents from
their support base.30 While the plan was, at its essence, a population-control program, a major component of the program was a psychological warfare campaign,
with an associated rewards program.31 Briggs enlisted the assistance of Hugh
Carleton Greene, whose mission was “to persuade the terrorists to surrender,
disrupting their organization and spreading disaffection in the process, and to
encourage the civilian population to oppose them.”32
Before Greene arrived, the British had attempted—disastrously—an amnesty
plan and were contemplating a rewards program.33 Greene conducted a cultural
assessment of the communist fighters and their sympathizers and found that—
ironically—they were motivated by “greed.”34 Greene recognized that properly
targeting the motivation could incentivize peasants to provide information, and
those recruits tired of the jungle lifestyle to quit. In December 1950, Greene secured funding for large increases in the size of rewards. In March 1952, Briggs’s
successor, Sir Gerald Templer—who is thought to have coined the phrase “hearts
and minds”—further increased the size of the rewards.35
Large reward size was one factor that made the Malaya rewards program successful. Rewards ranged from three times the average Malayan worker’s annual
income to as much as eighty-five times the annual figure. In one example from
1956, an informant who supplied information that led to the ambush of three
terrorists received an award equivalent to seventeen years of pay.36 By contrast, in
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2010 the gross domestic product per capita in Iraq was $6,594, yet the vast majority of rewards under the DoD program are below ten thousand dollars. Granted,
there are complications with advertising very large rewards (discussed later in
the article), but both the British in Malaya and the Americans in Iraq recognized
the problem.
While the size of the reward the British paid was important, so too was the
structure of the program: it provided rewards for nearly everything and everybody. The program paid rewards both for surrenders and for information leading
to captures.37 Personnel who surrendered were rewarded at a rate commensurate
with their importance; for instance, a surrendering platoon leader might receive
double the reward provided to a surrendering platoon sergeant. Informants who
provided information leading to the capture of a wanted person were given a
reward equal to 75 percent of the “surrender value” of the person. Further, voluntarily surrendered insurgents who provided information still were provided
rewards, but at a 50 percent discount on their “surrender value.”38
The program proved extraordinarily successful. In 1953, for instance, 372
insurgents surrendered, compared with only seventy-three captured.39 During
the entirety of the program, 2,702 insurgents surrendered, compared with only
1,287 captured.40 Seventy percent of defectors cited the program as having influenced their decisions to defect. This number, a RAND study notes, “leaves out
of account those who were captured, wounded, or killed on the basis of defector
intelligence. It also ignores the profound effect which surrenders had on morale
in the insurgents’ camps.”41
What can the Malayan Emergency tell us with regard to modern rewards programs? Among other lessons, three are particularly instructive. First is the program’s recognition that “large public bounties on the heads of terrorist leaders,
coupled with their continued immunity from the government, were inadvertently
turning them into objects of hero worship among the rank and file.” So British
authorities stopped advertising maximum rewards; instead they announced base
reward amounts, with the provision that the reward could be much higher.42
The second lesson learned is that rewards can generate or encourage vigilante
justice—a rewards program is a modern-day “Wanted Dead or Alive” campaign.43
While this would be a valid critique of the Malayan rewards program, both the
DoD and DOS rewards programs are limited by statute to “nonlethal” assistance.44
Finally, the British program highlighted the “blood on the hands” issue.
Should a reward be paid to an individual who has participated in acts of terrorism
or violence? If so, is there a limit to the acceptable level of violence? For instance,
what if, in 2002, Ayman al-Zawahiri had offered to give up Osama Bin Laden?
The answers to such questions likely are situation dependent. The British in
Malaya struggled with this question, modifying their position several times over
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the course of the program. One commentator summarized the moral quandary
as follows:
[T]o the soldiers on the ground it seemed almost surreal that “terrorists who were
caught were treated like murderers, while those who surrendered were ‘treated like
kings.’” That this dilemma was keenly felt by the men on the spot cannot be overemphasized. Many argued that it was morally indefensible that a man caught with a
truckload of supplies intended for the terrorists could be prosecuted and sentenced to
death, whereas a terrorist with “several brutal murders to his discredit” could decide
to surrender, “walk out of the jungle and get a job.”45

Reasoning that anything that brought the war to a faster conclusion was morally
justified, the British in August 1950 stopped prosecuting those with “blood on
their hands.”46
MOTIVATION
Motivating People
A rewards program constitutes a government attempting to entice a person to
do something (provide information assistance) in exchange for an incentive
(money). Understanding a person’s motivation allows the rewarding government
to aim its rewards programs better, such that they produce the maximum amount
of information for the minimal cost. Hugh Greene, for example, understood that
the Malayan insurgents were motivated by money, and he structured the British
program accordingly.
Psychologists generally categorize motivation as either internal or external.47
Intrinsic motivation is internal—it arises from within the individual.48 External
motivation is the result of outside pressures on the individual, such as rewards
and punishments.49 An intrinsically motivated person receives satisfaction from
the activity itself, whereas the externally motivated person receives satisfaction
from the result.50
Rewards programs are external motivations designed to encourage action
(providing information) toward the desired outcome. While the desired outcome
is easy to understand, it is devilishly difficult to predict the behaviors that will
lead to that outcome—and, by extension, the incentives that will encourage these
behaviors. Many rewards programs target complex environments in which myriad internal and external motivations may be in play. Misidentifying motivations
for providing information can render a rewards program ineffective quickly.
Studies by psychologists in the early 1970s were “the first of many to illustrate
the paradox that extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation.”51 The
relationship between reward and motivation, however, is exceedingly complex.
When the reward is external to the activity, for instance, numerous studies have
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found that “using an extrinsic reward to motivate someone to do something that
the person would have done anyway could have detrimental effects on the quality
and creativity of the person’s performance and on the person’s subsequent motivation to perform the activity once the extrinsic reward was received.”52 External
rewards can cause people to “lose touch with their natural interests, psychological
needs, and intrinsic satisfactions.”53
Edward Deci and Richard Ryan published a seminal paper on the subject in
1985. In it they argue that, in instances where “the primary significance of [the]
event for [the rewardee] is that it conveys [the rewardee is] being controlled,” it
will “decrease [the rewardee’s] subsequent motivation.”54 This paper generated
a flood of studies and papers reaching varying conclusions. A comprehensive
review of the research in 1996 concluded that “(1) the detrimental effects of rewards occur under highly restricted, easily avoidable conditions; (2) mechanisms
of instrumental and classical conditioning are basic for understanding incremental and detrimental effects of reward on task motivation; and (3) positive effects
of rewards on performance are easily attainable using procedures derived from
behavioral theory.”55
Deci and Ryan formulated their work into a theory they dubbed cognitive
evaluation theory, which holds that “events that negatively affect a person’s autonomy or competence diminish intrinsic motivation, whereas events that support perceived autonomy and competence enhance intrinsic motivation.”56 Again
conducting a meta-analysis of their theory and its scholastic progeny, Deci and
Ryan concluded that “tangible rewards made contingent on task behavior tend
to be experienced as controlling and to undermine intrinsic motivation.”57 The
solution is to structure rewards that “minimize the control in the situation by
making the rewards nonsalient, by using an autonomy-supportive interpersonal
style, and by highlighting competence clues.”58
Surprisingly, the research that Deci and his colleagues conducted came up
with findings that were even more unexpected with regard to the person providing the reward. In a study of teachers and students and the effects of rewards on
performance, the researchers found that teachers who endorsed the concept of
rewards for performance had a negative effect on their students’ performance.
The researchers found that other measures of external control (e.g., grades) were
“highly detrimental to . . . self-motivation.” A further conclusion was that where
external mechanisms (e.g., grades) were motivating, they often motivated the
wrong behavior (e.g., a desire to get a good grade as opposed to a desire to master
the material).59
Deci, Ryan, and others also have conducted a great deal of research on the
separate but related issue of intrinsic versus extrinsic aspirations. RFJ and all
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similar rewards programs presume that the rewards offered (money) will motivate persons to provide information. These programs offer, in effect, a promise
to fulfill what Deci refers to as the “American Dream”—where “wealth and fame
are believed to produce happiness and well-being.”60 Unsurprisingly, this may not
be the desired end state for everyone. The research suggests that “overinvestment
in the extrinsic ‘having’ goals may be harmful to, rather than the foundation
for, well-being and life satisfaction.”61 This phenomenon appears to have crosscultural application. Deci, Ryan, and others argue that “intrinsic pursuits such as
relatedness, growth, and community are likely to directly satisfy basic psychological needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence[,] . . . [while] placing
heavy emphasis on pursuit of extrinsic goals and rewards such as money . . . can
provide only indirect satisfaction of these basic needs and may actually distract
from or interfere with their fulfillment.”62
Identifying the importance of intrinsic motivation is only half the equation;
it is equally important to understand how to structure a rewards program to
target intrinsic motivation. With regard to the latter, there are, of course, various
schools of thought. Adherents of cognitive evaluation theory hold that “intrinsic
motivation springs from two innate sources (the need for competence and the
need for self-determination).”63
The psychologist Abraham H. Maslow provides another perspective. Maslow
theorized that humans are driven by wants and needs—specifically, unsatisfied
needs.64 Satisfied needs, Maslow argued, do not motivate behavior. Maslow organized all needs in a hierarchy and theorized that the needs at each level must
be satisfied in full before the individual will be motivated by higher-order needs.
At the base level are physiological needs (breathing, food, water, etc.), followed
by safety (of self, family, food, property, etc.), love (friendship, family), esteem
(confidence, achievement, respect, etc.), and finally self-actualization.65 In other
words, if a person is starving, his or her entire motivation for action will be to
satisfy that unsatisfied need.
Interestingly, a study of the U.S.–South Vietnamese rewards program Chieu
Hoi found that the program attracted defectors, “since it provided for all their
needs such as shelter, food, medical care, clothing, and also saved them from
the threat of the US army.”66 Soldiers, Vietcong or otherwise, are not motivated
by other needs until these fundamental needs are met. Once that level of need is
satisfied, the individual is motivated by subsequent unfulfilled needs at higher
levels of the hierarchy. Unsurprisingly, a RAND study of the British rewards-forinformation program in the Malayan Emergency found that “[u]ntil the government could provide a defector or informer the protection he needed, the program
got nowhere.”67
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Motivating Informants
Applying Maslow’s model to a rewards paradigm produces some interesting
insights. Take, for example, a farmer living in Pakistan’s Federally Administered
Tribal Areas who knows the location of Sirajuddin Haqqani and the existence of a
reward for him. The farmer realizes that his life will be upended if he provides the
information about Haqqani—doing so has the potential to disrupt his hierarchy of
needs. Being a rational person, the farmer will weigh that potential cost (disruption) against the benefits of providing the information (cash). A cash reward can
provide for the basic needs (e.g., food, water, shelter, clothing). Then the farmer
will consider his other needs, specifically his personal and financial security.
Here is where the current rewards systems break down. The farmer recognizes
that his personal security will be threatened once he provides information against
the Taliban—a concern that will be heightened if he is paid an in-kind reward
(e.g., a new goat suddenly shows up on his doorstep). He quickly realizes that a
reward cannot guarantee physical security, so his only realistic option would be
to move away. The DoD rewards program acknowledges this problem, noting in
the case of Iraq that “[l]arge reward amounts for the Iraqi people primarily provide an expeditious means to leave the country, and an average citizen and their
family are at risk if they come into a sizeable amount of U.S. dollars.”68 Moving
away, however, would disrupt the farmer’s familial relationships and his sense of
belonging in the community. His attention then will shift to whether and how a
reward can fill these unsatisfied hierarchical needs. Current rewards programs
provide nothing in this regard; not only do they fail to fulfill an informant’s
unsatisfied needs, but they have the potential to disrupt needs that currently are
fulfilled.
Another interesting case study is the Taliban foot soldier living day to day in
the same camp as Sirajuddin Haqqani. How can a rewards program incentivize
him? Or, viewed another way, what is motivating the soldier not to provide information? To answer this question, it can be instructive to look at what put the
foot soldier in the camp in the first place. To recruit a member successfully, the
Taliban must be able at a minimum to convince him that it can satisfy his basic
needs (e.g., food, water, and shelter). If the recruit is truly destitute and starving,
this may be the only motivation he needs. The Taliban offers further incentives
to motivate behavior, such as a sense of belonging, friendship, recognition, selfesteem, and even the prospect of self-actualization.
To motivate the foot soldier to give up his comrade, friend, or leader or to quit
the Taliban, the rewarding agent must be able to satisfy these needs of the reward
recipient that suddenly no longer will be fulfilled once he takes action against the
Taliban. In a study of the Chieu Hoi program, researchers found that the reasons
cited most frequently for defecting were “the physical hardships, the economic
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needs of the family back home, the desire to evade criticism or punishment, fear
of death, and homesickness.”69 The British in Malaya distributed “thousands of
leaflets carrying photographs showing healthy-looking [former insurgents], apparently happy and reunited with their families.”70
In contrast, the U.S. programs, as currently structured, fail to satisfy even the
most basic need of personal safety. Proponents of the program would argue that
the cash payment allows the recipient to move to ensure his and his family’s security. This argument assumes they have the ability and desire to travel. There also
may be physical, bureaucratic, and political impediments (e.g., health, passports,
visas, finding a new home country that will take them) that would prevent such
individuals from traveling. But even assuming a rewardee and his family can and
will travel, when they move away from their community the hierarchical needs
that community formerly supplied (love, esteem, achievement, etc.) no longer
will be fulfilled.
Like the hypothetical farmer, the foot soldier is a rational actor who will weigh
the benefits and costs of providing the information. Unless the reward can mitigate the disruption to his hierarchy of needs, the reward will do little to motivate
him. With regard to awards, Professor John Esposito has noted that “[y]ou have
to be sure that people are protected . . . , because in order for the system to work
well, there should be complete anonymity.”71
It is worth noting that Maslow’s theory does not apply perfectly to this subject.
Organizations rooted in religious doctrine have the capacity to attract adherents
who are willing to forgo basic needs in exchange for self-actualization. A monk,
for example, may be willing to forgo physical comfort and secular community
acceptance in a quest for spiritual fulfillment. Al Qaeda may attract individuals
willing to forgo the fulfillment of basic needs such as physical safety in exchange
for self-actualization (i.e., martyrdom). Maslow’s hierarchy provides little guidance about how to motivate such individuals.
Yet despite the gaps in Maslow’s theory, it provides a relevant and useful illustration of a fundamental point: in most instances, money alone will not motivate
people to provide information if their personal safety cannot be guaranteed.
On the broader point of applying psychological models to the structuring of
rewards programs: no model can provide the details. Even if one accepts that
rewards must address hierarchies of needs, those needs are very situation dependent. Consider two hypotheticals. In the first, the informant is a U.S./Afghan
citizen whose family lives in the United States; in the second, the informant is
an Afghan citizen whose family lives in Afghanistan. The needs of these two
individuals are different. Similarly, programs have to be adapted to the cultural
environment in which they are implemented. Wisely, the DoD rewards program
in Afghanistan is based on Afghan culture.72
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Program Models

Minimizing the Reward Profile. Given the issues addressed above, consideration should be given to approaches that address these issues. The first approach
would seek to provide rewards in a way that minimizes the conspicuousness of
the reward. A minimized-profile rewards approach provides the dual benefits of
reducing threats to an informant’s safety and reducing the appearance of control, to avoid undermining intrinsic motivation. Various methods are available
to minimize a reward’s profile. For instance, rather than soliciting information
from individuals, information can be solicited from and rewards paid through
organizations (neighborhoods, companies, government agencies), with the organization reaping the benefits collectively in the form of in-kind rewards.
Providing rewards across a large organization significantly reduces the threat
of retribution, thereby reducing individual members’ concerns for their safety.
Naturally, under this reward paradigm, the organization as an entity will reap a
greater short-term reward than the individual members of the organization; the
owners of a factory, for instance, benefit from a new piece of equipment. The
long-term benefit, however, accrues to everyone: a more productive business
leads to economic stability and long-term security.
Another method would be to provide rewards in the form of annuitized payments. Rather than being paid in a lump sum that would increase scrutiny on
the informant, the reward would come in small payments over a long span of
time (e.g., a few dollars a week for many years). A related tool could be the use of
“micro” rewards. A micro rewards program would seek small bits of seemingly
inconsequential information. The idea is that the information requested would
be so innocuous that it would not cause the informant any of the concern about
potential disruption to his life that might result from giving up more-significant
information. For instance, how many cars pass a given intersection in a given
day? When was the last time you saw somebody in the village you did not know?
The key to this program is the relative anonymity of the rewarding party’s involvement in the program and restricting the requests to very low-level, seemingly innocuous information. The downside to this model is the possible flood
of information, much of which will be useless.
On this point, a relevant case study concerns a competition that the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored in 2009. DARPA was
interested in exploring how social networking can be applied to solving problems. For the competition, it required participating teams/individuals to find “10
8-foot balloons moored at ten fixed locations in the continental United States.”73
Just before the competition began, the balloons were floated surreptitiously at
random locations in nine states. The winning team found all ten balloons in less
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than nine hours. Its performance beat that of the other four thousand participating teams so roundly that it shocked DARPA, which had scheduled the competition to last two weeks.74
This case study is interesting and relevant for two reasons. Critical to the
winning team’s success was its ability to work through thousands of tips in an
extremely short period. Over the course of the competition, the four thousand
teams’ social networks were churning out significant amounts of information;
indeed, many of the teams engaged in disinformation campaigns intended to
mislead other teams. Despite this, the winning team was able to parse all the
information coming in and separate the quality information from the useless or
misleading.75 This demonstrates that there is a mechanism that can be applied
to a problem set such as this, allowing the user to evaluate lots of small bits of
information and identify the valuable ones.
Furthermore, the DARPA competition itself could provide a model for rewards programs. The key to the winning team’s success was its incentive structure. DARPA offered a total of forty thousand dollars in prize money. The winning team allocated this evenly among the ten balloons, giving each a “value” of
four thousand dollars. Two thousand dollars went to the person who found each
balloon. This was hardly unique; most other participating teams offered some
reward for finding balloons. What set the winning team apart is that it then gave
one thousand dollars to the person who had referred the balloon finder to the
team’s website (if there was no referral, the finder received two thousand dollars
and the other two thousand dollars went to charity). Then the team gave five
hundred dollars to the person who referred the referrer, $250 to the person who
referred that person, and so on.76
This diffuse incentive structure essentially propagated itself over existing social networks: people were incentivized to get as many friends working for the
winning team as possible. The speed with which this propagated itself is remarkable. Each of the five members of the team sent out an e-mail explaining the competition and the incentive structure. Within forty-eight hours, team members
had five thousand people signed up to assist them.77 This likely could be replicated to address any discrete problem or pursue any piece of information. While
networked computers, e-mail, and websites make this incentive structure easier
to manage and propagate, it could be done in the absence of computers through
phone networks or even word of mouth. The British rewards-for-information
program employed a similar model, paying members of the public a cash reward
for assisting terrorists in surrendering.
The minimized-profile rewards model is not without its downsides. Substantially increasing the number of rewards paid greatly complicates management of
the program. Rewards must be tracked and paid. Regardless of the sophistication
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of the algorithm used to sort the data, each piece of the data would have to be
entered into the system. Further, providing small payments over a long period
creates an ongoing concern for the safety of the informant.

Maximizing the Reward Package. A program that minimizes the reward profile
seeks to satisfy an informant’s need for security by keeping the reward clandestine. An alternative model would address this need by maximizing the reward.
Maximizing does not refer to the dollar value of the reward; as noted above,
money alone rarely satisfies a person’s psychological needs, and may have the opposite effect. Rather, maximizing refers to a program that creates award packages
that, along with providing monetary rewards, also ensure the informant’s safety.
In a rare congressional hearing on RFJ, Representative Brad Sherman noted
that after giving the United States information, some informants “might find
their country of origin to be a dangerous place.”78 He asked DOS’s Robert A.
Hartung whether the department has the authority to provide visas as part of the
reward. After some back-and-forth, Sherman summed up the issue: “But if we
really provided the fine print on the Web site the way you would in a securities
offering, we would have to asterisk and say whether or not we help you avoid
death is subject to our sole determination as to whether you are in danger[;] and
whether or not we can let you live in the United States, even if we think that is
necessary for your protection, is subject to the determination of other agencies.”79
The most obvious maximized rewards package would combine a cash award
with the guarantee of a new identity and permanent residency in another location. The RAND report on the Chieu Hoi program found that one of the major
deficiencies of the program was a failure to “aid [defectors’] reintegration into
South Vietnam.”80 While informants today are relocated in some instances, a potential informant may not know this, or may not want to entrust his safety to the
bureaucratic vagaries of the rewards system. Thus, the State Department should
advertise the possibility of visa packages, citizenship, and similar benefits.
Further, the broader the incentive package, the more psychological needs it
will fulfill. For instance, money and moving expenses may satisfy an informant’s
physiological and safety needs, but accepting them obliterates the fulfilling of
needs that his family and community currently perform. Moving the family with
the informant satisfies a portion of the informant’s needs, but fails to address
needs that the community satisfies (a sense of belonging, self-esteem, respect,
etc.). A maximized reward would protect the informant and his immediate family, plus his extended family, his close friends, or both. For example, rather than
paying a ten-million-dollar reward and moving five people, the rewards package
might pay five million dollars and move a dozen people. The greater the chance
that an informant can live safely with his family and friends, the greater the
chance the informant will consider coming forward.
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Implications for the Commander
While commanders on the ground have no control over the structure or administration of DOS’s RFJ program, they should be aware of the program’s existence—
and its limitations. Commanders may well find themselves in circumstances in
which they are recommending a reward from RFJ. Further, DoD regulations
require coordination between DOS and the combatant commanders on rewards
programs.81
Combatant command staffs should structure their rewards programs to allow for minimized-profile rewards. Commanders on the ground should think of
ways to minimize rewards’ profiles while considering the various negative aspects
of the rewards-for-information programs. Finally, all users of the DoD rewards
program should track rewards given and information provided rigorously so the
effectiveness of a program can be measured objectively.
Rewards programs plainly have a role in a counterterrorism fight. The British
program in Malaya provides a powerful example of a dynamic rewards program,
one carefully constructed to target the motivation of the targeted individuals.
Several factors contributed to the success of the British program, foremost a keen
understanding of the motivational and cultural components of the program and a
willingness to adapt the program continually to changing circumstances.
The U.S. rewards programs have tremendous potential. They are firmly established, well organized, and well funded. It is also clear that rewards can yield
information leading to the capture of terrorists. Where programs focus on “success” rather than effectiveness, however, their full potential is left unrealized.
All rewards programs would benefit from objective evaluations and functional
definitions of success that take into account the benefits and costs of a given
program. The work that psychologists have produced since the 1970s provides a
useful model from which to construct a better rewards program—or, at a minimum, a good place to begin the conversation on how best to employ rewards to
catch more terrorists.
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STRATEGIC CULTURE IS NOT A SILVER BULLET

Antulio J. Echevarria II

Frank Hoffman’s review essay “Strategic Culture and Ways of War: Elusive Fiction
or Essential Concept?,” which appeared in the Spring 2017 issue of the Naval War
College Review, has mischaracterized my argument regarding strategic culture
and, more generally, has misrepresented my book Reconsidering the American
Way of War. I therefore would like to clarify both—my position on American
strategic culture and the purpose of my book—for
Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II is the editor of the
this journal’s readers. Frank Hoffman and I have
U.S. Army War College quarterly, Parameters. He
holds a doctorate in modern history from Prince agreed on many issues over the years, and I apton University, and is the author of five books—
preciate the time he put into generating a detailed
After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before
review essay; yet we clearly have our differences.
the Great War (University Press of Kansas, 2001),
On the question of strategic culture, I certainly
Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford University Press, 2007), Imagining Future War: The West’s
do believe that culture is important and that we
Technological Revolution and Visions of Wars to
should try to understand it—ours and others’. But
Come, 1880–1914 (Praeger, 2007), Reconsidering
the American Way of War (Georgetown University
there are huge risks in doing so, and buyers need
Press, 2014), and Military Strategy: A Very Short
to be aware of them before they buy. Since Jack
Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2017)—as
well as numerous articles and monographs on stra- Snyder introduced the concept in 1977, the study
tegic thinking, military theory, and military history. of strategic culture has grown into an almostHe is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the
desperate search for a silver bullet, a cure-all: if
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and
we could just fix American strategic culture, we
the U.S. Army War College. He also has completed
a NATO Fulbright Fellowship, and was a visiting could cure U.S. strategic thinking. But the concept
research fellow at Oxford University in 2011–12.
has taken on a life of its own—and not a good
Echevarria also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military
Studies at the U.S. Army War College. He currently one. The concept’s proponents have failed to exis working on a book about the nature of America’s
ercise discipline when defining it, and they have
modern wars for Cambridge University Press.
employed it too enthusiastically, without a critical
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2017, Vol. 70, No. 4
eye or a healthy dose of skepticism. Buyers need to
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know there are ample historical examples to prove almost any theory of strategic
culture—as well as its opposite.
In their enthusiasm to find a cure for U.S. strategic thinking, the concept’s
proponents merely have paid lip service to the difficulty of defining it, then have
moved swiftly on to advancing their own theories. Most of these definitions are
arbitrary, not based on rigorous inductive analysis. This problem is a critical
one for any social science, because if a concept cannot be defined inductively,
it cannot be studied scientifically. Unfortunately, the terms culture and strategic
culture have become all but ubiquitous, encompassing virtually any conceivable
variable that possibly could influence a key leader’s decision. Worse, the concept
has become highly politicized. It is now a political catchall for every policy aim or
military approach one party does not like, particularly when a war is under way,
and at the same time it serves as a means to advance each party’s own agendas.
Consequently, no generalizable conclusion nor observation can be drawn
from the many studies of strategic culture that have proliferated over the years.
In short, the field is in disarray precisely because most scholars are self-defining
strategic culture, which means there is no conceptual foundation on which to
build knowledge.
While this state of affairs is an academic’s dream, it is a policy and military
practitioner’s nightmare. Academics earn their credentials and build their reputations by developing unique or contending interpretations—by challenging the
status quo. But practitioners need more than unique theories, because they must
bear the heavy burden of responsibility: they must decide whether to put lives
and treasure at risk, and they are held accountable when things go wrong. This
is not to say that academics are irresponsible; the good ones are not. But even
the good ones never have to order people into harm’s way; that means academics
can afford to be experimental in their thinking and to advance ideas that are not
quite ready for prime time. Practitioners, on the other hand, can benefit from
the intellectual stimulus that such cutting-edge ideas afford. But when it comes
to choosing courses of action that might have to be sold to Congress and to the
public, they need concepts that have a reasonably solid foundation, especially
when the stakes are high. Sadly, that is not the case with strategic culture. My
argument in Reconsidering the American Way of War is simply that no scholar
yet has made a truly compelling case for an American strategic culture, and thus
it remains too nebulous and unreliable for the realities that policy and military
practitioners typically face.
I am all for self-critical analysis, and I have written on that topic a great deal
over the years. Critical thinking is the practitioner’s best ally. But to solve a problem we first must understand what it is. In this case, it is not clear that we do.
The problem is that the American way of war has had many more successes than
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/23
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failures. The differential in favor of successes is quite significant and it applies to
all kinds of wars—large, small, and in between. That needs to be explained. But
existing theories of strategic culture cannot do so. The problems inherent in the
concept obscure not only what is wrong with U.S. strategic thinking but how to
fix it.
With regard to the overall purpose of Reconsidering the American Way of
War, I endeavored to make that clear in the book’s introduction, but perhaps I
should have been more explicit. In contrast to Russell Weigley’s 1973 classic The
American Way of War, which focused mainly on our strategic theories and ideas,
my aim was to look for patterns in the way we actually practiced war. The history
of ideas has fallen out of vogue for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is
the gap that always exists between what people say they are doing or going to do
and what they actually do. I decided to close this gap, at least in part, between
Weigley’s American Way of War as a history of ideas and the many narrative
histories we already have that tell us what happened. In a sense, I played Marx to
Weigley’s Hegel in an effort to identify any consistent patterns in our approach to
doing, rather than merely thinking about, war.
Accordingly, the book’s chapters are short. It was unnecessary to describe every battle or engagement in detail; such descriptions already exist in hundreds, if
not thousands, of other works. The readers of this journal likely know where to
find them. Some of our largest and longest wars have been characterized by the
application of strategic patterns that represented no significant changes; hence,
there was no need to drag out the discussions of those conflicts. The book includes details only insofar as they affected the general pattern (or patterns) that
drove a conflict. Moreover, the chapters are designed for a staff college or war
college curriculum that likely would include other readings. I regret not including maps in the book, as they would have made the patterns more obvious to the
reader, but the publisher vetoed that idea because it would have driven the cost
of the book too high. However, the West Point military atlases serve the purpose
and are available free online.
My analysis of U.S. military practice uncovered six basic patterns of military
strategy in our wars: annihilation, attrition, exhaustion, decapitation, coercion,
and deterrence. Interestingly, instead of overwhelming kinetic force, as Hoffman
and others argue, the strategic pattern that emerges most frequently in our way
of war is decapitation—the idea of replacing a leader whom we do not like with
one we do, through kinetic or nonkinetic means or some combination of the two.
There are various concrete reasons for the recurrence of this pattern, which I discuss in the book and thus will not repeat here. But, once again, this observation
points to the gap between what we say we do strategically and what we actually
do, or attempt to do, in practice.
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To sum up, my argument is not that we do not have a strategic culture, or that
culture itself is not important; my point is that strategic culture is not the silver
bullet its proponents want it to be. Whatever American strategic culture is, was,
or might be, it is too elusive to pin down. Nor can we compare it to its British
or Russian counterpart to identify what is uniquely American about our way of
war versus what has been imported from elsewhere, or which aspects really are
driven by the conditions and requirements of warfare—modern industrial-age
warfare and its reliance on wholesale attrition, for instance—rather than a general
culture. To be sure, Americans do have a way of battle, as I have said elsewhere.
It is also true that the evolution of operational art over the twentieth century has
hampered the U.S. military’s ability to think strategically. But these conditions
were not always true. I am working on a book now that will offer one defensible
explanation for how and why our major failures and successes occurred. I would
be very pleased to have it reviewed in this journal.
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the case for hard power

Dov S. Zakheim

The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power & the Necessity of Military Force, by Eliot A. Cohen. New York: Basic Books, 2016.
285 pages. $27.99.

Eliot Cohen’s The Big Stick is a well-crafted paean to muscular interventionism.
Its central argument is that only the United States can ensure international stability; that it can do so only if it continues to maintain the military superiority that
has enabled it to dominate international affairs since the Second World War; and
that to be credible it must be both ready and willing to employ force even when
its more narrowly defined national interests are not being challenged. The book
is neither a neoconservative nor a liberal-interventionist tract. Yet it is noteworthy that these are the only two political ideologies that essentially escape Cohen’s
critical pen.
Cohen argues that America, and only America, can preserve global order. He
recognizes that Americans are war weary; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are
well into their second decades, with no end in sight. Yet he asserts that, just as
withdrawal from either country would harm American interests seriously—he
notes that President Obama belatedly came to the same conclusion—so too
would American reluctance to go to war whenever and wherever the international order again comes under serious threat. For that
Dov S. Zakheim was Under Secretary of Defense
reason he rightly has very little good to say about
(Comptroller) from 2001 to 2004 and Deputy Under
neo-isolationism, or, to be more precise, a return
Secretary of Defense (Planning and Resources) from
1985 to 1987.
to America’s strategic posture prior to its entry into
the First World War. It is no longer enough, he
© 2017 by Dov S. Zakheim
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2017, Vol. 70, No. 4
posits, to focus solely on narrow self-interests and
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self-defense, even if leavened by participation in the global market and membership in the United Nations. There simply are no good alternatives to American
leadership. The kind of global order that a China or a Russia might impose, assuming that it has the ability to impose any order at all, would undermine the
values that Americans and the citizens of their allies hold most dear.
In making his case against not only neo-isolationism but the downgrading of
the centrality of force in American security policy, Cohen critiques five variations
of arguments to support a modern-day version of the posture first articulated
by George Washington in his Farewell Address. Cohen is highly skeptical of the
case put forth by Steven A. Pinker, among others, that the world is becoming a
more peaceful place and America no longer need act as the world’s policeman.
Cohen rightly points out that the trends that underlie Pinker’s calculations are
belied by the horrific number of deaths in the two world wars, in particular.
Moreover, Cohen argues that a significant reason for the decline in the number
and magnitude of wars since the end of the Second World War is the dominant,
and generally benign, influence of the United States on the international security
environment. Statecraft matters: the choices politicians make can and do mean
the difference between war and peace. As he puts it, “the deliberate action of one
state above all—the United States—has had something to do with the relative
peacefulness of the world after 1945. . . . [I]t follows that an American decision
to stop acting that way could yield a far nastier twenty-first century than the one
Pinker expects” (p. 10).
A prominent critic of the Trump administration during its first months in
office, Cohen also assails the notion—dear to both the Clinton and Obama administrations (especially the latter)—that it was the employment of soft power
that most effectively furthered American interests worldwide. Soft power is the
concept that Harvard University professor Joseph Nye developed to describe the
noncoercive ability to shape the preferences of others through the attractiveness
of culture, political values, and foreign policies. Cohen does not reject the notion
of soft power entirely, but his argument is that without the availability, and at crucial times the employment, of credible hard power, soft power cannot be relied on
to protect America’s interests and those of its allies or others whom it might wish
to support. He focuses on the limits of sanctions, and offers examples to underscore his contention that soft power is not enough. Sanctions may have brought
Iran to the negotiating table, but they did not put a halt to its nuclear program.
Nor have sanctions stopped Russia from annexing Crimea or supporting Ukrainian separatists. Sanctions are indiscriminate, and often penalize a state’s innocent populace more than its guilty leaders. Once sanctions are removed—as they
were, for example, under the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
better known as the Iran nuclear deal—they are almost impossible to restore.
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Cohen acknowledges that sanctions are an important tool of foreign policy,
and at times are highly effective, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia being
prime examples. Given the limitations of sanctions, however, Cohen feels that
hard power needs to be mustered to assure the United States that its policy goals
will be met; in the case of Iran, he seems to call for a blockade of that country’s
shipborne commerce. He fails to examine what the Iranian reaction might be—
the very second- and third-order consequences that worry him when discussing
sanctions—or whether a blockade would involve the United States in yet another
Middle Eastern war. Nor does he outline how hard power might be applied to
prize Crimea from Vladimir Putin’s clutches.
Cohen has little time for those who argue that America should not act as the
world’s policeman simply because of its “irreducible strategic incompetence”
(p. 19). He examines several variants of their position, all of which derive from
the assertion that America’s wars since the Second World War have not been
particularly successful. For example, some argue that America’s bureaucratic
“pathologies” prevent it from exploiting American military power to its greatest
effect, while others go further and assert that American intervention is more
destructive than salutary.
Cohen rightly notes that inaction can be as dangerous as action. Moreover, not
all American wars have been failures: both the Korean War, which literally saved
South Korea, and the 1991 Gulf War are very much examples to the contrary.
Cohen goes further, however. Even the Vietnam War was not, in Cohen’s view, a
complete failure, since, as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew put it, the war “bought time
for the rest of southeast Asia.” Cohen may go too far in seeking a silver lining for
the Iraq War. Perhaps, as he asserts, “the story is not yet fully written” (p. 21). Still,
it is a bit much to argue for the value of removing a dictator with nuclear ambitions when those ambitions were not remotely realized, and in the face of both
ongoing chaos in Iraq and Iran’s increasing domination of Iraq, to a degree that
would have been impossible had Saddam remained in power.
Cohen quickly puts paid to the argument, enunciated by President Obama,
that the United States should concentrate on “nation building at home.” He notes
that defense spending as a percentage of gross national product was considerably
lower during the Obama era than during most of the Cold War, which nevertheless witnessed major domestic initiatives ranging from Medicare and Medicaid to
the Clean Air Act. The Trump administration actually agrees with its predecessor
that one cannot acquire both guns and butter on a massive scale, but its budget
assigns a higher priority to increased defense spending at the expense of numerous domestic programs. Cohen’s advocacy of higher spending for both military
and nonmilitary programs reflects a cherished view common to all interventionists, whether of the neocon or the liberal variety. It is a policy that was enunciated
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forcefully by the liberal Democratic senator Henry M. Jackson, a consistently
strong supporter of the Vietnam War, whose acolytes include interventionists
such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Frank Gaffney, and Elliott Abrams.
Cohen reserves his most trenchant critique for so-called realists. He ascribes
to realists the view that “the world having resolved itself [after the Second World
War and the Cold War] into a more familiar pattern of competing powers, the
United States has far less need to meddle in matters abroad” (p. 11). Just as Cohen
cites Nye as the father of soft-power theory, so he cites John Mearsheimer as the
archetypal “realist.” But whereas Nye truly did conceive of the concept with which
he is associated, Mearsheimer hardly represents all, or even most, realists. After
all, Mearsheimer considers interventionist foreign policy elites to be, as Cohen
puts it, “the chief threat to the United States”—a position that actually mirrors the
“irreducible strategic incompetence” school of thought.
More characteristic of the realist position are the views, and the actions while
in office, of President George H. W. Bush, his Secretary of State James Baker, and
Brent Scowcroft, his assistant to the president for national security affairs (known
as the national security adviser). That team, which many consider to have constituted the most competent national security leadership since the Second World
War, was hardheaded enough to play at most a limited role as the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact collapsed, and, for that matter, with regard to intervening
on behalf of the Kurdish and Shia uprisings in the aftermath of the First Gulf
War. Yet it did not hesitate to mass and deploy over a half million troops to push
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, or, on a far lesser scale, to invade Panama and
spirit that country’s military dictator Manuel Noriega to Miami, where he was
sentenced to forty years in prison. Realists, pace Cohen, do believe in intervention, only that it should be far more selective than what interventionists, whether
of the neocon or liberal “responsibility to protect” variety, would prefer.
Cohen himself is inconsistent when writing about the Bush team’s policies: in
one place (p. 5) he states that the 1991 war was an example of “ample quantities”
of hard power; elsewhere (p. 32) he writes that the United States went to war
“with the strong belief that it knew the lessons of Vietnam—make wars short,
violent, conventional and end cleanly,” implying that otherwise Bush would not
have employed hard power to save Kuwait. Yet Bush and his advisers had no way
of knowing how long the war would last; in fact, they seriously overestimated
the capabilities of Iraq’s forces. They also assumed that Hussein might resort to
chemical weapons; they went ahead and attacked anyway. When Cohen then
notes that the result of that war was an “escalating military action against a still
defiant Iraq through the 1990s,” he neglects to point out that the Air Force’s
operations over both northern and southern Iraq resulted in no losses and with
monetary costs (not to mention human costs) that were a tiny fraction of those
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incurred during the 2003 war and its ongoing aftermath. Moreover, it is Cohen
himself who argues that a key element of hard power is the ongoing deployment
of forces after fighting has died down, if not ended—which is exactly what Operations NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH were all about.
Cohen also asserts that realists consider hydrogen bombs to be “the great
equalizer of international politics” and, in effect, welcome nuclear proliferation.
This too is a mischaracterization of all but the most extreme positions on this issue. Certainly the George H. W. Bush team did not take that position, nor do the
vast majority of realist thinkers.
In Cohen’s view, “the most fundamental principle of contemporary realism[—]
. . . that all states are alike, that they have interests, and will use power to protect
and further those interests” (p. 12)—is true only to a point. He argues that “even
a slight knowledge of history” would demonstrate that Hitler was not Bismarck,
and that the reichsführer was prepared to go to far greater murderous lengths
than the Iron Chancellor ever would have contemplated. Yet this argument is
beside the point: it is the very nature of realism to recognize a threat for what it
is. The British and French in the 1930s refused to recognize the threat that Hitler
posed, not because they were realists, but because they were appeasers.
Finally, Cohen argues that “realists have trouble taking sub-state or transstate actors seriously” and fail to appreciate the intangibles, such as the power of
faith and ideology. Moreover, when he calls realists “coolly detached secularists
themselves . . . [who] find it difficult to take seriously talk of caliphates or hidden imams” (p. 13), he appears to be referring to the so-called realism of Barack
Obama, who is not, as it happens, devoid of religious instincts. Indeed, many
neoconservatives as well as liberal interventionists are themselves highly secular
and do not have the faintest idea regarding the religious motivation of people in
other parts of the world, be they substate actors or government officials.
Cohen’s critique of realists, many of whom, such as Scowcroft, opposed the
intervention in Iraq, does not mean that he views the Iraq War as an unmitigated
success. Still, even as he bemoans the American missteps in addressing the aftermath of the 2003 war, he seems to grasp at any opportunity to downplay the
effects of those missteps. Thus he posits that “behind the intent to overthrow the
regime was a desire not so much to remake the Arab world altogether, but to inflict a blow that would shock it” (p. 35). It is not at all clear that this was the case.
For some officials, the intent was indeed to remake the Arab world. For others, it
was to create a liberal democracy in Iraq, which proved to be nothing more than
a pipe dream. Cohen also argues that the cost of the war was far less than some
have estimated. He is probably correct; but nonetheless the opportunity cost of a
war that consumed at least half a trillion dollars was massive.
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Finally, while Cohen admits that waterboarding and similar techniques were
politically counterproductive, he argues that they “probably” yielded useful information. He is correct if referring to a case in which a prisoner had actionable
intelligence about a so-called ticking bomb. Yet former military officers ranging
from Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis to Senator John McCain, himself a former
prisoner of war, insist that more-benign techniques would have been far more
successful and would not have violated international law—the latter a point that
Cohen does not address at all.
Ultimately, Cohen acknowledges that the Iraq War was “a mistake,” one that
cost America dearly in terms of its alliance relationships. But, having argued so
strenuously against the war’s critics, his admission seems nothing more than a
grudging concession to reality.
Turning to America’s diminishing military arsenal, Cohen argues vigorously
for a major naval and long-range aviation buildup, which would be the most effective way to deter China in particular. He also calls for accelerated modernization of the American strategic nuclear arsenal, on the grounds that nuclear weapons actually could be used. China, Iran, North Korea, and others are expanding
their arsenals; presumably they have not ruled out employing these weapons
during, or even at the start of, a conflict with an adversary.
Cohen also joins the growing call for significant reform of the Department
of Defense acquisition system. And he argues for maintaining, and therefore
funding, America’s network of overseas bases, which not only reassure allies but
ensure that conventional conflicts will not touch American shores. None of these
programmatic efforts, he argues, should come at the expense of America’s unconventional forces, which will continue to be a necessary instrument for fighting
nonstate actors such as jihadists, as well as for training friendly but less developed
forces. Indeed, his chapters on the threats that China, Russia, Iran, and jihadists
pose provide the meat of his argument for hard power and the justification for
both his policy and programmatic prescriptions.
Cohen stresses the importance of space and cyberspace, which, together with
the oceans, he terms “the commons,” all of which America is best positioned to
defend. And he strongly advocates investments to protect American interests in
all three of those domains. He also calls for American intervention in what he
labels ungoverned space, meaning states that have collapsed or are on the verge
of doing so. He recognizes that America cannot intervene in every civil war, but
seems more willing to have Washington engage in such conflicts if they take place
in the Middle East than in sub-Saharan Africa.
Cohen’s final chapter is a critique of Caspar Weinberger’s oft-repeated principles regarding the use of military force, which first were enunciated in 1984.
He challenges Weinberger’s assertion that the United States should not commit
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forces to overseas combat unless they are protecting America’s vital interests or
those of its allies. He notes that American interventions in Grenada, Bosnia,
and elsewhere hardly affected those vital interests. Indeed, it can be argued that
America should not have intervened in Bosnia, just as it did not intervene in
the far worse situations in Cambodia and Rwanda, where, since genocide was
involved, the moral imperative for intervention was much stronger. But Weinberger presided over the invasion of Grenada because American citizens were
being held hostage by a regime supported by Communist Cuba; surely, protection
of the country’s citizens is an American interest. Perhaps Weinberger’s definition
should now include “friends and partners” as well as allies, but the principle of
national interest, broadly defined—as it was with respect to Grenada—is still
sound, unless, as Cohen appears to postulate, the bar for American military intervention overseas should be considerably lower.
Cohen challenges Weinberger’s second condition for intervention, which calls
for “the clear intention of winning.” Cohen asserts that the term winning is not
as clear as Weinberger indicates. But Weinberger’s point was that the intention
should be to win; if not, what exactly should be the reason for committing American blood and treasure to an overseas adventure?
Weinberger’s third point was that America should commit forces to combat
only if the political and military objectives are clearly defined, and if there is a
clear understanding of how those forces are to achieve those objectives. In this
case, Cohen is correct that there is no way to predict the outcome of the use of
force. Still, there should be a clear sense of why those forces are being committed,
even if the outcome is uncertain. Indeed, it is arguable that Weinberger was fully
aware of the difficulty of predicting outcomes; it is evident in his fourth maxim,
that the relationship between American objectives and the forces committed to
achieving them must be reassessed continually and adjusted if necessary.
Cohen claims that Weinberger’s fifth principle, that the United States should
not commit forces to battle without “some reasonable assurance” of popular and
congressional support, “assumes too much. It is often the case that the American
people lend their support to successful enterprises and turn away from unsuccessful ones” (p. 215). Cohen misunderstands Weinberger’s intent; “reasonable
assurance” is not a guarantee. Weinberger’s point was that if there was significant
doubt that congressional and popular support would last throughout the lifetime
of the military intervention, one should question whether to launch it in the first
place.
Finally, Cohen asserts that Weinberger’s principle that committing U.S. forces
to combat should be a last resort “falls apart upon close inspection” because “one
always has the option of giving the enemy what it wants.” It is true that appeasement is an option, but Weinberger, who was hardly an appeaser, clearly did not
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see it as a viable one. Moreover, Cohen implies that the use of military force
should not be a last resort, yet throughout his volume he advocates the importance of diplomacy, which the United States presumably should employ prior
to committing forces overseas. In sum, it is not Weinberger’s principles, which
reflect the views of most realists, that are not viable; they fall apart only if one
adopts Cohen’s interventionist philosophy.
Cohen outlines six principles of his own, none of which really contradicts
Weinberger’s. His first principle is “understand your war for what it is, not what
you wish it to be”; that is, avoid rigid comparisons with previous conflicts. He is
correct, of course, but nowhere did Weinberger advocate “fighting the last war,”
or any previous kind of war, for that matter. Cohen’s second principle calls for
adaptability as a conflict progresses and its nature changes. In so doing he is echoing Weinberger’s admonition that the relationship between wartime objectives
and the forces committed to conflict calls for continual reassessment.
Cohen’s third principle is that the nation must be prepared for a long war even
if its objective is a short one. Weinberger’s emphasis on the importance of clearly
defined military objectives while stressing the need for reassessing the link between forces and objectives would appear to indicate, in agreement with Cohen,
that if a war must be fought for a longer period than originally anticipated to meet
national objectives, then forces must be committed to that longer-term effort.
Weinberger’s six principles did not address Cohen’s fourth: “while engaging
in today’s fight, prepare for tomorrow’s challenge.” However, Weinberger certainly would have agreed with Cohen; the former actually coauthored (with Peter
Schweizer) an entire volume on that very subject, entitled The Next War (Regnery,
1996). Weinberger identified possible future conflict scenarios with China, North
Korea, Iran, and Russia (all of which Cohen discusses at length) and even Japan(!)
(which Cohen does not). Interestingly, the book’s introduction was written by
Margaret Thatcher, who as prime minister led her country in a successful war
that no one anticipated, the 1982 Falklands conflict, and who herself identified
yet another potential threat that Cohen addresses, that of Islamic extremists.
Weinberger also would have agreed with Cohen’s fifth principle: “adroit
strategy matters; perseverance usually matters more.” The former Secretary of
Defense simply put it differently when he asserted that “if we decide to put troops
in a combat situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning.” Winning may well mean something different in the twenty-first
century than in Weinberger’s day, but if that is not the objective, why expect the
nation to persevere?
Indeed, Cohen himself refers to winning in his final principle: “a president
can launch a war; to win it, he or she must sustain congressional and popular
support.” Weinberger’s principle on this account was not really all that different:
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he simply stated that a president should not commit forces to combat “without
reasonable assurance” of popular and congressional support. As already noted,
“reasonable assurance” is not a cast-iron guarantee. It calls for constant monitoring to validate that assurance—exactly as Cohen requires.
That Cohen’s disagreements with Weinberger may be less substantive than he
feels they are should not detract from the value of his own set of principles. Indeed, the breadth of Cohen’s book is striking, and his analyses are always cogent.
Finally, agree with him or not, Cohen makes one of the strongest cases on record
for a robust interventionist policy. If for no other reason, his book should be
required reading for analysts, strategists, and policy makers when they evaluate
options for strengthening what is perceived widely as America’s currently diminished influence on the world stage.
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options for national security policy practitioners’ advice for
the new administration

Sam J. Tangredi

Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration,
edited by Richard D. Hooker Jr. Washington, DC: National
Defense Univ. Press, 2016. Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/. 381
pages.

Charting a Course is a compendium of analyses and recommendations from the
scholar-fellows of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), the primary
research center of National Defense University (NDU), along with a few individuals from NDU colleges. It is the result of a yearlong project to address defense
and foreign policy issues in a manner useful to an incoming presidential administration. It aims to make new officeholders aware of the facts and nuances the
popular media often overlook. As might be expected, most of the INSS fellows are
also practitioners with considerable government experience. Thus, the volume is
more than a theory-based academic report; it incorporates a healthy dose of the
art of the practical. It is also honest, the editor and authors admitting up front
that “[w]e see no silver bullets, no elegant solutions to the complex problems we
face” (p. xiii). Rather, it focuses on insights and options.
Editor Richard Hooker, director of INSS, leads off with the expected introduction to the book’s seventeen chapters, but it raises some interesting issues that
the reader needs to keep in mind while reading the rest of the book. Particularly
noteworthy is the question whether we can continue to treat the reemerging great
powers of Russia and China as “simultaneously benign partners and aggressive
adversaries” (p. ix). Hooker suggests that this divergent approach—seeking political or economic cooperation from nations that refuse to accept global norms—
makes it hard to develop a coherent strategy or
Dr. Sam J. Tangredi is professor of national, naval,
and maritime strategy in the Center for Naval Warrespond to their actions in a consistent manner.
fare Studies of the Naval War College. His career in
On a broader level, Hooker’s individual work,
the U.S. Navy included command at sea and numerous assignments in strategic planning and interna- “American Grand Strategy” (chapter 1), seeks to
tional relations. In addition to over one hundred refute the charge that the United States does not
journal articles, he has published five books; the
have a grand strategy. While admitting that no formost recent are Anti-access Warfare: Countering
A2/AD Strategies (Naval Institute Press, 2013) and, mal grand strategy document exists, he maintains
as editor, The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Coop- that the core interests of the United States and
eration (Naval Institute Press, 2015).
its means of securing them have been consistent
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2017, Vol. 70, No. 4
throughout America’s history as a world power.
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However, his definition of the term is essentially military and practical: “the
use of all instruments of national power to secure the state” (p. 1). Others might
wonder where messianic efforts to promote global democracy—which historians
such as Walter A. MacDougall (in Promised Land, Crusader State) charge have
been the dominant U.S. foreign policy since the 1880s—fit into Hooker’s construct; but they do not. Hooker proceeds in a highly rational manner, assessing
potential actions in terms of ends, ways, and means, as befits someone with experience on the National Security Council (NSC) staff. But if only political decision
making—and its end results—were that rational!
The following sixteen chapters break nicely into the two categories of functional (future conflict, defense policy, defense budget, national security reform,
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber policy) and regional (AsiaPacific, NATO/Europe, Russia, Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Latin America,
central Asia, and the high north / Arctic). The “swim lanes” are therefore well
established, eliminating both the overlaps and gaps that are typical in edited
volumes of individual contributions. Overall, the book is well organized and
superior, in terms of balance, to many other academic compendiums.
It is impossible in limited space to review every chapter; most have important
takeaway ideas that could provoke many an enlightened discussion. But necessity
focuses the spotlight onto those with the most original and powerful insights.
Chapter 2, “The Future of Conflict” by Thomas X. Hammes, has a fine discussion of nonstate military actors, hybrid warfare, and the proliferation of technologies, about which he has written in the past. But it also suggests that the “return of
mass to the battlefield” and the “return of mobilization” will be features of future
wars, two elements that strategists have discounted recently. In Hammes’s construction, mobilization refers more to industrial production than to manpower.
Obviously, the wars he envisions will not be the short ones that many senior
military leaders seem to expect.
Frank G. Hoffman’s “U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy” (chapter 3) is similarly
well written. He too advises decision makers to “prepare for longer and harder
wars” and emphasizes “versatility” in force design, with capabilities that are useful “across the broadest possible spectrum of conflict.” However, he takes the
contrarian viewpoint even further by advising the Department of Defense (DoD)
to “reestablish a ‘win two modern MTW’ [major theater war] force construct”
and shift resources to the U.S. Army so it can apply decisive force on the future
battlefield. Such has not been the policy of the past two decades, and many think
the construct “unaffordable.”
Michael J. Meese approaches his quantitative measures in “The American
Defense Budget 2017–2020” (chapter 4) from the same perspective that former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen expressed: “[t]he single
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biggest threat to national security is our debt” (p. 62). Given all other expenditures, Meese sees no way that an increase in the defense budget can be financed.
However, he would like the administration to recognize that DoD already has
made greater efforts to cut personnel costs (witness the changes to the retirement
system) and health care than any other government agency, and Congress needs
to make similar cuts in entitlement programs. He also notes that there are too
many flag and general officers for the size of the current force.
Christopher J. Lamb’s “National Security Reform” (chapter 5) is a summary of
his previous writings advocating specific steps to reform national security decision making, particularly the NSC system. The problem, as Lamb describes it,
is that “[a]s the security environment grows increasingly complex and dynamic,
the current system remains unable to coordinate multiple elements of power” (p.
83). Lamb sees the need for three steps in particular: (1) legislation that allows
the president to empower “mission managers” to lead interagency missions, (2)
a concerted effort by the president to create collaborative attitudes and behaviors
among cabinet officials, and (3) adoption of a new model of an assistant to the
president for national security affairs (known as the national security adviser
[NSA]). The first two recommendations are necessary to ensure that mission
managers (who would be subject to Senate confirmation) get the resources to
actually carry out policy, not just draft it.
The new-model NSA would manage and deconflict the mission managers,
while also being an honest broker concerning cabinet equities. But the mission
managers would be responsible for the results, not the “omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent” NSA that many expect today, but that “does not exist
and never has.” (Sorry, Dr. Kissinger.) Lamb uses the example of General James
Jones, USMC (Ret.), as NSA. Jones was praised for his collaboration and process
management, but was criticized for not working “himself into a state of utter exhaustion” by dominating policy debates, putting cabinet members in their places,
and shadowing the president continuously. Lamb maintains that it is the process,
not the person, that can deliver success. (Sorry again, Dr. Kissinger.)
Among the regional chapters, James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders lay
out a concise statement of U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific (chapter 9),
with the maintenance of rules-based norms of international behavior (such as
in the South China Sea) being the most difficult to achieve. However, they point
out a factor often overlooked in all the media and business hype about China’s
inexorable economic growth: “The relationship with Beijing will be challenging,
but Chinese internal economic and political problems are likely to give U.S. policymakers more leverage” (p. 198). Perhaps it is time to wish for an Asian “color
revolution”?
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While not as contrarian toward current policies, the chapters on NATO (by
Charles L. Barry and Julian Lindley-French) and Russia (by Peter B. Zwack) do
suggest that NATO must both deter and reassure Russia, and that expansion
beyond the current membership probably would give Putin and his successors
an excuse to divert Russian attention from the country’s declining economic condition. However, the alleged U.S. promise not to expand NATO made to then–
Russian president Boris Yeltsin cannot be found in writing and cannot be verified, despite what current Russian president Vladimir Putin believes.
In his chapter on South Asia, Thomas F. Lynch III points to an “escalating
proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan,” something that certainly
has not received a lot of press in the United States (beyond that concerning the
Kabul parliament building and Salma Dam [the “Afghan-India Friendship
Dam”]) (p. 271). Lynch includes intelligence activities the two nations have conducted in Afghanistan as but one piece of his overall discussion of competition
throughout Asia and India-Pakistan tensions in particular. One hopes that he or
other scholars will research this proxy war in greater detail.
Although not the most detailed discussion, that in chapter 12, Denise Natali’s
“The Middle East,” has one of the most direct recommendations concerning U.S.
decision making: “the United States should not attempt to fix failed states. Nor
should it seek to resolve protracted conflicts without the necessary requisites
in place, namely political conditions and regional actors committed to making
necessary compromises” (p. 258). Instead, the United States “should selectively
engage and support traditional partners who can serve as strategic anchor points
in the region” (p. 249). The first irony of these recommendations is that the
George W. Bush administration came into office with the same view (or at least
the president did), but did an about-face after 9/11, attempting to use the invasion
of Iraq to redirect the Middle East toward (at least somewhat) democratic governance. The second irony is that our pre–President Carter foreign policy was to
rely on Saudi Arabia and Iran as the “strategic anchor points in the region.” Iran is
now hostile and near-nuclear and Saudi Arabia is a kingdom forged by force that
seems to promote religious extremism. Israel is, of course, a democratic pillar.
But reading Natali’s chapter makes one think the United States should just step
away from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process until the actors are “committed
to making necessary compromises”—another contrarian recommendation (and
one with which former president Carter certainly would not concur).
After lauding the stronger chapters, it is appropriate to identify the problematic. Chapter 8, “Cyber Policy,” is one of the longest chapters, but also the most
contradictory and—to anyone concerned about the potential dominance of government bureaucracy over the private sector—the scariest. The authors begin by
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creating an excellent model of the relationships among technology (“the range of
the possible”), law (“the limits of what is permissible”), and government policy
(“the realm of the preferable”) (p. 151). But, as in the rest of the chapter, the authors’ enthusiasm becomes a runaway engine, and they proclaim their model to
be a “common operating picture” when it is only a conceptual model.
The authors excoriate the federal government for its “industrial age” organization of departments and agencies that results in a “pile-up of ‘cross-cutting’
issues—particularly those generated by the disruptive information/digital age,”
and they recommend a bewildering array of “issue-specific fusion centers” run
by “supervisory czars.” While similar in concept to Lamb’s proposal, it diverges
in scope, with potentially sixty-five centers for cyber issues alone (if I read their
diagram correctly) (p. 152). Where we would get the people and funding is unexamined. Worse, they appear to contradict themselves, suggesting the creation
of a Department of Cyber, with U.S. Cyber Command located under it instead of
DoD. They justify this as “[f]ollowing the U.S. Coast Guard precedent of having
one of the Armed Forces report to an agency other than DOD” (p. 155). Obviously, U.S. Cyber Command is not its own armed force, and it exists primarily
to support the other combatant commanders—hard to do if you are funded and
directed by a nondefense agency.
The authors conflate information (data, television, film, music, etc.) with information technology / cyber, and there seems no aspect of cyber in which they
do not want the government involved: reviewing, requiring, investing in, establishing connections with nonstate actors, tapping private-sector research, etc. It is
as if government, not the private sector, is the driver of information technology,
rather than but one of its consumers. Some of the recommended actions border
on the patronizing: “[c]onduct outreach to address public fears that AI [artificial
intelligence] may cause loss of jobs or that autonomous machines may threaten
public safety” (p. 164). At this point in AI’s development, who can say that it will
not cause the loss of jobs or threaten public safety? Part of the chapter’s seeming breathlessness is caused by the authors’ desire to reinforce their insistence
that cyber is a war-fighting domain “fully as significant as the land, sea, air, and
space domains.” But is not cyber a tool, an enabler that facilitates action within
the physical domains? Have we not become dependent on cyber voluntarily?
The authors conclude with a campaign promise–like statement: “The potential
opportunities found within the domain of information and cyberspace are seemingly limitless” (p. 168). That overweening attitude is what makes their chapter
(and recommendations) so scary.
While not as problematic, chapter 7, “Combating Terrorism,” is the shortest
chapter and comes across as weak. Perhaps that is because terrorism is discussed
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in the regional chapters as well. However, the chapter does have a good treatment of the rivalry between the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al
Qaeda that points to the fact that local terrorist groups ally with the most successful umbrella organization. The definition of successful seems determined by
which organization currently gets the most media coverage. There is a notably
brief suggestion that the attack in San Bernardino, California, was connected to
ISIL; however, that incident is not mentioned again, whereas other attacks are
given more detail. One wonders whether that simply reflects the Obama administration’s reluctance to tie the San Bernardino attack to Islamic terrorism, lest it
give a hoodlum an excuse to attack a mosque.
The author provides a good discussion on the threat of veteran Islamist foreign
fighters from the various Middle Eastern wars returning to commit terrorist acts
in their home countries, but then makes the following curious statement: “Some
countries, such as Russia, have decided to revoke the citizenship of their foreign
fighters. But it is not in the interest of the United States to allow these fighters to
remain in Syria or relocate to another conflict” (p. 143). But where do we want
them to go? Not San Bernardino. The solution—which is not one—is that “[t]he
issue of returnees should receive more diplomatic emphasis, forethought, and
planning,” and United Nations help is suggested (p. 143). Guantánamo or its
equivalent is not discussed.
In summary, Charting a Course—including those chapters not reviewed—is an
excellent and up-to-date summary of the national security issues that President
Trump’s administration will face, written by the most practical group of experts
one might assemble. Whether one does or does not agree with the recommendations, most are argued logically and boldly. As the new DoD officials wait to
be confirmed, they should read this book before they are inundated by policy
papers. So should all other students and practitioners of national security affairs.
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ROUGH WATERS
Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US
Military, by Derek S. Reveron. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2016. 256 pages.
$98.95.

Exporting Security will surprise even the
most learned defense experts in its framing of the extraordinary changes to U.S.
military force employment today. Faced
with new threats, or security deficits,
from “subnational, transnational, and
regional challenges to global security”
(p. xi), today’s national leadership has
directed defense forces to take on a new
and more meaningful peacetime role.
This revision of Dr. Reveron’s 2010 book
on security cooperation and the changing face of today’s military will reshape
views of the armed forces’ role in
national security by highlighting its new
focus on developing partnerships. These
changes are additive. Defending our
nation and our way of life through the
maintenance of superior war-fighting
capabilities is still primary, but the
national approach to addressing the gaps
between stability and conflict is remarkably different and requires close scrutiny.
The term security cooperation has been
in use for less than twenty years, apparently first used when Congress renamed
the Defense Security Assistance Agency
the Defense Security Cooperation

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb 1

Agency in 1998. Yet in that short span
the practice has evolved quietly into
“a key pillar of military strategy” (p.
4), one that thus far has stirred limited
academic or government dialogue.
That is changing, and Reveron skillfully lays out the context within which
this dialogue should be conducted.
Exporting Security explains the popularity of security cooperation among
presidential administrations through
well-targeted examples of recent armed
forces engagement, chosen to illustrate
specific purposes. Security deficits have
root causes. In some cases, security
cooperation activities are designed
to address these causes, while others
are intended to help partner nations
develop the capacity to address both
cause and deficit. In almost every case,
security cooperation activities additionally serve to build trust. Trust—and
common security deficits—form the
foundation on which desired defense
partnerships and coalitions are built.
Reveron invests considerable effort in
examining the government’s rationale
for developing security partnerships.
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Pursuing global stability today requires
more than just unilateral Defense
Department actions to address security
deficits that may be “simultaneously
military, economic, social, and political”
in nature (p. 8). Security cooperation
provides the United States with tools
to shape partnerships so as to build
coalitions, gain access, strengthen national governance, build partner nation
security capacity and confidence, deter
bad actors, and fulfill alliance responsibilities; however, Reveron emphasizes
that security cooperation efforts, more
often than not, fail to achieve these
objectives. Nonetheless, he contends that
the value of the successes outweighs the
cost of the failures; but the U.S. taxpayer
deserves a better return on investment.

engagement. Military activities in
support of maritime domain awareness,
counterinsurgency efforts, combating
terrorism, antipiracy campaigns, disaster
relief, medical/dental deployments,
education in good governance, and
similar efforts garner most of the book’s
attention. These efforts with partner
nations form the cooperative basis for
addressing today’s security deficits, and
successes in these arenas are win-win
scenarios. But today’s changing focus
also brings a new approach to coalition
war fighting—with similar preventive
effect, one hopes—through initiatives
such as increased international officer presence on U.S. military staffs,
cooperative deployments, and high-end
foreign military sales acquisition. Added
attention to these influences on coalition
war-fighting capabilities would have
made the book’s message more complete.

A full chapter is committed to explaining sources of resistance to the military’s
changing role. Some officials express
concern about the military’s growing
influence in shaping foreign policy
through peacetime engagement, while
others perceive these activities as
taking resources and attention from the
military’s primary war-fighting role.
Elaborating on these concerns, Reveron
examines government interagency
dynamics related to foreign policy implementation, especially those between
the State and Defense Departments.
Is Defense, with its new authorities,
becoming too autonomous, at the cost
of State’s role in leading foreign policy?
Regardless of the answer, the recent
proliferation of Title 10 (Defense Department) programs literally has forced
the agencies to find more-productive
ways to plan and integrate their efforts.
This is a dynamic that Exporting Security
might have addressed in greater detail.

Combatant-command and U.S. Security Cooperation Office (SCO) staffs
scattered globally deserve more attention. Combatant-command staffs are
charged with synchronizing engagement
activities to develop effective theater
campaign plans. The proliferation of security assistance programs, partnerships,
and engagement activities conceived
to address security deficits makes it
increasingly difficult for staffs to succeed
in these efforts. For the same reasons,
SCO staffs are challenged to orchestrate
security cooperation efforts effectively in
each country. Failure to equip properly these components of the security
cooperation community—which operate
outside the Washington beltway, and
therefore with less visibility—puts
their ability to accomplish partnership
development objectives at risk.

Reveron consistently emphasizes the
preventive intent behind cooperative

Exporting Security “offers a framework
to understand the change and to
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illustrate how the military is changing
from a force of confrontation to one of
cooperation” (p. 224). But this strategic
pillar is still a work in progress, as
the United States seeks out the most
effective formulas for achieving national
objectives via security cooperation.
Congressionally approved security
assistance programs will be shaped more
effectively. Interagency policy and planning will be refined. Better assessment,
monitoring, and evaluation methods will
be implemented. Military services will
learn to execute engagement activities
that simultaneously sharpen warfighting skills and build partner capacity.
The underrepresented tool to accelerate
this progress is insightful academic and
government dialogue. Dr. Reveron has
laid a solid foundation on which this
dialogue should build. Then perhaps the
taxpayer can look forward to a better return on security cooperation investment.
MICHAEL MCCRABB

How Everything Became War and the Military
Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon, by
Rosa Brooks. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016.
448 pages. $29.95.

This is a history of modern war,
particularly America’s war against
terrorists since the attacks of September
11, 2001. Rosa Brooks analyzes the
forces and principles underlying
modern conflict, including history,
international relations, international law,
political-military relations, and domestic
politics. She has produced a fascinating,
realistic, and at times humorous look
at our struggles to make sense of it all.
The book begins with a Pentagon
meeting whose purpose is to decide
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whether and when to launch a drone
attack on an Al Qaeda operative. Brooks
takes the reader on a journey that
ultimately addresses two simple but
important questions: Is war or peace
the norm, and what rules apply?
Brooks reviews conflict in Rwanda in
1994, Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in
1999, parts of a continuum stretching
until today. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, sovereign states have formed
the basis of international relations, but
recently civil wars and revolution have
spilled across state borders, upsetting
international law and order. Many
of these states, such as Sierra Leone,
Somalia, and Afghanistan, never
enjoyed a firm footing in statehood.
Interstate conflicts with fixed beginnings and ends, such as the two world
wars, are distant memories. Modern
war is both boundless and endless.
Using historical examples, Brooks argues
persuasively that war is the norm, peace
the exception. Our concept of peace
arose only around the middle of the
nineteenth century. In 1863, the Lieber
Code codified law-of-war traditions for
Union troops in the American Civil War.
In 1864, the International Committee
of the Red Cross was founded to ease
the burdens of war. Our international
institutions are predicated on the belief
that we can limit war in space and
time while maintaining our humanity.
Our current “war” against terrorists,
however, does not fit this paradigm.
Use of “enhanced interrogations” and
targeted drone attacks, and even our
definition of our enemy, push our
notions of law into uncharted territory.
How do common notions of human
rights fare in this environment? Brooks
revisits this idea throughout. Do
states have a responsibility to protect

149

8/7/17 11:58 AM

144

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 23

their citizens? Do other states have a
responsibility to intervene when citizens’
states do not? Do human rights trump
sovereignty? For over two decades, we
have failed to answer these questions.
If the “international community”
has no answer, how can we expect
fighters—a young soldier battling
Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan or
a drone pilot sitting in an operations
center tracking a suspected terrorist in
Yemen—to answer them? The received
law of war was not designed for this.
Efforts to fit modern war into this
structure create more problems in
turn, undermining both domestic
and international law. The rule of
law, Brooks argues, is critical to all
societies and to international order.
One solution she suggests is to update
our laws and international structures,
as challenging as that task might be.
We should think of war and peace as
poles on a spectrum, and envision that
we move closer to one or the other over
time. We should reject rigid definitions
of war as an all-or-nothing concept.
Brooks argues that endless war
undermines American institutions as
well as the rule of law. The Department
of Defense has assumed missions
that it is ill equipped by culture and
training to perform—such as nation
building and civil reconstruction—at
the expense of other agencies that
traditionally have carried out American
public policy and diplomacy overseas,
such as the State Department. Brooks
submits that, for policy implementation,
the military has become a one-stop
shopping center—like Walmart.
Brooks’s tale also chronicles a
personal journey. As the child of
antiwar activists, then throughout her
career as a law professor, human rights
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lawyer, State Department lawyer, and
Defense Department official, she has
experienced and here relates her close
encounters with most of the subjects
about which she writes, in part owing
to her marriage to an Army Special
Forces officer. Anyone who has served
in the Pentagon in any capacity will
get a chuckle or two from Brooks’s
tales of her time in this unique place.
This book is informative, enlightening,
and entertaining. As director of national
security legal studies at the Army War
College from 2000 to 2006, I struggled
to answer the same questions Brooks
addresses in her book. How Everything
Became War and the Military Became
Everything should be required reading
for anyone interested in military strategy
and national security, or anyone who
wonders how we got where we are today
and how we might find a better way.
THOMAS W. MCSHANE

Rough Waters: Sovereignty and the American Merchant Flag, by Rodney P. Carlisle, with Bradford
Smith. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2017. 304 pages. $31.95.

Rough Waters is a historical review of
the use and significance of the port of
registry (which yields a “flag state”)
of merchant vessels. Author Rodney
Carlisle has revisited his prior work
Sovereignty for Sale: The Origins and
Evolution of the Panamanian and
Liberian Flags of Convenience (Naval
Institute Press, 1982, out of print)
and augmented it with his other prior
periodical work to provide a deeper
history of the use of merchant ship flags.
Generally speaking, Rough Waters is
well researched—with the profound
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exception of the defamatory analysis
of and allegations about the Liberian
registry during the period 2001–2003.
The source of most of this misinformation is provocative allegations deriving
from a commercial lawsuit, as well as an
inaccurate reference to a UN report. The
lawsuit was withdrawn and the allegations were never substantiated, as they
were and remain patently false. Furthermore, the author’s incorrect and loosely
referenced opinion that the Marshall
Islands flag constitutes a de facto second
U.S. registry cannot go unmentioned.
Contrary to the statement that the
Marshall Islands flag registry has been
structured along the Delaware domestic
model to aid U.S. strategic interests,
the reality is that the Marshall Islands
registry was formed by copying Liberian
law and constitutes an impropriety
constructed for commercial purpose and
private financial gain. For these reasons,
this reviewer is unable to recommend
Rough Waters, or to endorse it as an
accurate review of the impact of foreign
flags on the American merchant fleet.
Rough Waters attempts to address the
role of foreign flags in the decline of the
American merchant marine. Despite
providing some evidence to the contrary,
the author articulates a one-sided thesis
that foreign flags predominantly are
used for sinister or nefarious purposes.
He further suggests that commercial
interests, in their taking advantage
of less-developed nations, were the
predominant cause of the collapse
of the U.S.-flag fleet. Curiously, the
book chronicles, yet fails to highlight,
that one of the most prevalent flags of
convenience throughout history was the
British flag—and the greatest facilitator
of alternative registration of U.S.-owned
ships was the U.S. government.
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Rough Waters describes in interesting
detail the intentional use of nonnational
flags as a means to mislead, to dissuade,
and often to evade pursuit by navies and
other authorities. Whether it was the
slave trade, the Southern or Northern
fleets on either side of the U.S. Civil War,
rum-running during U.S. Prohibition,
or U.S. involvement in World War I and
the early half of World War II, the lack
of technology during these eras meant
that identification of a ship’s nationality depended on visually sighting the
flag flying on its stern. This made use
of the flag ripe for manipulation.
While some of these practices indeed
were nefarious, others served legitimate
purposes, and the U.S. government
encouraged them. During the Civil
War, ships changed flag because the
Northern and Southern governments
could not protect them. In the 1870s,
building ships in the United States was
expensive, so shipowners sought to
construct and register ships abroad—a
situation that continues today. In the
lead-up to both world wars, the U.S.
State Department and the U.S. Shipping
Board facilitated transfer of the majority of U.S. ships to the Panamanian
flag. Despite the assertion in Rough
Waters that use of Panama’s flag was
immoral, the political landscape and
the rise of fascism in Europe made use
of a foreign flag a political necessity.
Of particular interest to Review readers
may be elements of Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s theories on sea power. Rough
Waters illustrates the practical impossibility of even the world’s greatest
navy protecting domestically registered
commercial ships in all the far reaches of
the earth. History provides only a very
few examples of the U.S. Navy coming
directly to the aid of a merchant ship. In
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each of those cases, logistical convenience and a specific political interest
were the determining factors for intervention. If a merchant vessel possesses
strategic interest, its flag has never prevented the U.S. Navy from taking action.
Currently, almost 75 percent of the
world’s global trading merchant fleet
is registered with ten flag states. Of
these ten, only those of Greece and the
People’s Republic of China are considered “national flags.” The remaining
64 percent of these commercial ships
are registered in Panama, Liberia, the
Marshall Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Malta, the Bahamas, or Cyprus. Rough
Waters fails to consider or identify the
impacts of shifts in global trade and
trade economics, technology, and ship
ownership, construction, financing,
and crewing, which are the realities
that underlie the choice of a flag state.
Very few ships are owned by “pure”
U.S. companies, and the global use
of global flags did not cause the collapse of the U.S. merchant marine.
SCOTT BERGERON

Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military
Deception Planners, by Barton Whaley. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016. 256 pages.
$39.95.

This is a quirky yet ultimately enjoyable
book. The association of the author,
Barton Whaley, with the U.S. intelligence
services dates back to the Korean War.
He earned his undergraduate degree
from Berkeley and his PhD from MIT.
Over the course of his career Whaley
worked with or for the U.S. Army,
the Naval Postgraduate School, and
the director of national intelligence.
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A. Denis Clift, president of the National Intelligence University, referred to
Whaley as “the undisputed dean of U.S.
denial and deception experts.” Whaley
died in 2013, leaving behind several
completed volumes and a legacy as a
man with a passion for and an encyclopedic knowledge of military deception.
A central assumption of Practise to
Deceive is that the only tool that has a
hope of “dispelling the fog of war” is
intelligence—but it is the task of the
deception planner to keep that fog
thick. When deception planners do
their job right, the enemy must deal
with uncertainty, and surprise can
be achieved. This is not exactly new
ground. Many students of history, as
well as most current members of the
national security enterprise, are aware,
at least to some degree, of famous
deception operations. These range from
the Trojan horse of Odysseus to the
deployment of the imaginary First U.S.
Army Group to southeast England in
the months before D-day 1944. Whaley
reminds us that deception plans do not
just appear; they are the brainchildren
of talented individuals—the deception
planners. Practise to Deceive neglects
neither deception plans nor deception
operations, but its primary intent is to
shed light on those planners and how
they think. As it turns out, that is a
pretty tall order. In addition, Whaley
tells readers they should walk away
with an awareness of the threats that
enemy deception efforts pose and how
we can improve our own efforts.
Unfortunately, the book’s structure
does not lead the reader to a
rapid understanding of the mind of
the deception planner. Indeed, most
readers, particularly those unfamiliar
with the subject, will be well served to
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read the executive summary first to
get some understanding of the nature
of deception in all its many aspects.
The book also contains a discussion of
the personality type of the successful
deception planner. Readers will not be
surprised to learn that such persons
differ greatly from successful military
commanders. Those commanders
are vital, however, as they possess the
power to approve the deception plan,
must play an active role in deception
planning to increase the odds of success
and victory, and often serve as a bridge
between the freewheeling planner and
the more rigid military hierarchy. A
short introduction and part 1, written
in Whaley’s own voice, lay out his ideas
about the commander, the deception
planner, and the deception plan.
Part 2, the heart of the book, consists
of eighty-eight individual case studies
of deception operations. Arranged
thematically, the cases range chronologically from the biblical period to
the modern day, and in scope from
brief tactical encounters to drawn-out
strategic operations on a massive scale.
The cases themselves are something
of a hodgepodge. Some, such as the
decision by Sir Garnet Wolseley to
approach Egyptian defenses at Tel el
Kebir at night, are only a few paragraphs
in length. Others are painfully sparse
on information, such as the case study
that consists merely of an acknowledgment that Admiral William F. “Bull”
Halsey had a “dirty tricks department.”
In contrast, other case studies are very
detailed with regard to personalities and
actions. Among these is an excellent
look at Operation BOLO, designed by the
legendary Colonel Robin Olds, USAF,
who used electronic deception to lure in
North Vietnamese MiGs with Air Force
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Phantoms. The action is described in detail, as is the personality of Colonel Olds.
As with Olds, Whaley is not shy about
discussing the personal character and attributes of many of the officers featured
in the case studies. Douglas MacArthur
is acknowledged for mastering the
Machiavellian art of “divide and conquer” among his subordinates. General
Orde Wingate and T. E. Lawrence both
are identified as “duplicitous.” Several
individuals are examined at different
points in their careers, allowing the
reader to appreciate their approach to
deception operations over time. These
include the actor Douglas Fairbanks
Jr. when serving as a USN lieutenant
commander during 1944 in Italy. Also
covered are Fidel Castro, First Lord of
the Admiralty Winston Churchill, and
Ian Fleming’s older brother, Peter.
Part 3 of Practise to Deceive lays out a
rather detailed approach to planning a
deception operation and a discussion
of the major factors to be considered.
These include such topics as policy
constraints, the relationship of commanders to their staffs, and various
cultural factors. Two actual examples of
deception plans are provided: the first is
the deception plan the Germans created
to support Operation BARBAROSSA; the
second is a British tactical-level plan that
Peter Fleming authored to support operations against the Japanese in Burma.
It is easy to see how, in the hands of a
lesser author and editor, Practise to Deceive could lose an audience rapidly. But
Whaley’s passion for deception shines
throughout the book, and over time
the author’s dry and ready wit becomes
more and more pronounced, to good
effect. Readers who, on the basis of prior
experience, expect compilations of many
case studies to be dull and plodding
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examples of the writer’s art will be pleasantly surprised, for thought-provoking
and fascinating assertions abound. For
example, Whaley believes that some
societies are more deceptive than others,
“but only during any given slice of time.”
Deception is also, according to Whaley,
a mind game that can be learned,
although certain types of people,
including magicians and practical jokers,
may find the game easier to master.
Despite taking the reader on a
rather fast-paced ride over centuries
of deception efforts, Whaley makes
several points with care. The first is that
deception operations are not guaranteed
success. Two failures cited are the Bay of
Pigs invasion, for which Whaley holds
CIA veteran Richard Bissell responsible,
and the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue
mission, with Jody Powell coming in
for censure. The second point is that
deception operations are not important
in and of themselves; they are only as
important as the degree to which they
support the commander’s operational
plan and allow the attainment of desired
objectives. As we face a future in
which deception operations can be
expected to flourish, Whaley’s cautionary note is well worth remembering.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the
Emerging US-China Rivalry, by Lyle J. Goldstein.
Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2015.
400 pages. $29.95.

Numerous Western observers—expert
and otherwise—have opined about the
implications of the rise of China. A
small number address the implications
for hundreds of millions of people
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who have moved from subsistence
living into the middle classes. A few
more address the consequences for the
world’s economy, environment, or rule
of law. But most focus on an emerging
rivalry with the United States and the
possibility it will lead to superpower
conflict. Of these, Naval War College
professor Lyle Goldstein is virtually
alone in mapping out specific plans
to avoid friction, de-escalate tensions,
and cultivate peaceful coexistence; the
others offer “realist” solutions designed
to isolate, deter, or defeat China.
Dr. Goldstein—the founding director
of the College’s China Maritime Studies
Institute, and fluent in Mandarin—
brings the right tools to the task of
analyzing the United States–China
rivalry and setting a course toward
peaceful coexistence. A political
scientist with strong appreciation for the
influence of history on strategy, he has
read widely in Chinese and English to
understand how academics and leaders
in each country view their nation’s
experience, interests, and destiny. By
sorting out these perspectives, Goldstein
works like a mediator to chart the
narrow and winding pathways to trust
and cooperation. He dedicates nine
chapters to distinct issues that divide the
United States and China, categorized by
region (for instance, Japan or the South
China Sea) or by sector (the economy or
the environment). After describing the
overall picture, each chapter examines
interpretations in the West and then in
China, offering particularly valuable
insights into the perspectives of Chinese
military and strategic thought leaders.
Having toured the strategic horizon
and explained the relevant attitudes
and interests, the author then lays out
“cooperation spirals”—plans whereby

154

8/7/17 11:58 AM

Naval War College: Autumn 2017 Full Issue

each side can take concrete, sequential
steps to reduce the threat they are
perceived to pose and to increase opportunities for cooperation. These plans
generally start out small, then grow in
ambition. Many focus on measures that
reduce the appearance of an aggressive
U.S. militarized posture—for example,
standing down AFRICOM or reducing
the number of troops stationed on
Okinawa. In recognition of the fact
that the United States can afford some
rebalancing, subsequent steps include
expanding China’s military commitments—for instance, to a joint antipiracy
force for Aden or a trip-wire force based
in North Korea. Meeting China halfway
is not just a slogan. Goldstein understands that the Chinese (indeed, much
of the world) view America’s history as
one of nearly continuous aggression,
and they need to see retrenchment
before they will trust the United
States not to threaten their regime.
Written in 2014 and published in
2015, the book is still highly topical
and informative about Chinese-U.S.
relations, and the concept of cooperation
spirals remains appealing. Readers
will note, however, that we live in
interesting times. The Philippines’
position has undergone two dramatic
shifts, first in prevailing in the South
China Sea arbitration and then with
the election of Rodrigo Duterte and the
subsequent warming toward China.
Likewise, the new U.S. president, Donald
Trump, canceled the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, announced a withdrawal
from the Paris Climate Accord, and is
taking a much more aggressive attitude
toward Iran—each of which moots
one of Goldstein’s cooperation spirals.
Finally, China’s trillion-dollar commitment to the Belt and Road project
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likewise signals a shift in ambition
and interests. So, while Goldstein’s
insights and his concept for reconciliation remain powerful, policy makers
today will need a new set of plans.
This remains an important book for
anyone seeking to understand U.S.Chinese relations, particularly those
seeking peaceful solutions so as to
avoid the so-called Thucydides trap.
MARK R. SHULMAN

Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the
World’s Oceans, by James Stavridis. New York:
Penguin, 2017. 384 pages. $28.

Admiral James Stavridis’s maritime opus,
Sea Power, is a tour de force that ranges
across the global commons of the world’s
vast sea-lanes and both near-littoral
and distant shores. With four decades
of distinguished maritime service in the
U.S. Navy, the admiral (now retired) is
uniquely qualified to evaluate current
geopolitical maritime realities. Stavridis
brings that strategic perspective to
his historical contextualization of
how and why oceans have impacted
seafaring and landlocked civilizations
and nation-states differentially.
Stavridis is a prolific author, having first
been published, early in his naval officer
career, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. As someone who has embodied
that institution’s motto to “dare to
write, think, and speak to advance the
understanding of sea power,” he now
fittingly serves as chair of the institute.
As he does in that role, in Sea Power
Stavridis continues to lead and shape
the intellectual conversation surrounding sea power and the sea services.
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These contributions to scholarly maritime and policy discourse run deep—but
they are not silent. The lessons that Sea
Power offers should echo around the
globe, like pulses of sonar, ready to be
received and analyzed by an internationally dispersed community of naval
and military strategists in allied and
competitor nation-states. In particular,
the admiral’s clear-eyed warnings and
policy prescriptions regarding China,
Russia, North Korea, Iran, and ISIS are
sure to make waves on distant shores.

autobiographical anecdotes draw from
his fascinating, globe-spanning naval
career that began with service as a surface warfare officer and culminated with
a stint as Supreme Allied Commander
Europe—the first Navy admiral in history to hold this command. The reader
is treated to frequent, self-deprecating
life lessons in leadership, including a
vignette illustrating how a carton of
cigarettes may have determined whether
he ran his ship (and future) aground in
Egyptian waters earlier in his career.

Sea Power is the most recent link in a
chain of American maritime strategy
that connects back to Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s seminal treatises of the 1890s.
Stavridis revisits Mahan’s underappreciated work The Problem of Asia: Its Effect
upon International Politics through a
twenty-first-century lens—its discussion
of a persistent geopolitical choke point
resonates today. In fact, Stavridis invokes
Mahan to articulate an updated case
for an American naval supremacy and
strength that—when closely aligned
with the efforts of allied nations—can
ensure the U.S. Navy’s ability to defend
the homeland, project power, deter
aggression, and maintain open sea-lanes
for global commerce, communications, and freedom of navigation.

Dedicated “to all the sailors at sea,”
Sea Power, like the works of Mahan, is
destined to become required reading
for midshipmen at the U.S. Naval
Academy and the officer candidates in
Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
programs before they embark on careers
in the U.S. Navy. It is no accident that
this admiral has been a mentor to many
men and women who have served
with him in the U.S. Navy “wherever
the wind and waves have taken them,”
buoyed by the wise counsel and
leadership lessons evident in Sea Power.

Notwithstanding Sea Power’s ambitious
subtitle—The History and Geopolitics of
the World’s Oceans—the book should be
comfortably navigable by a broad range
of readers, even those less familiar with
naval history or maritime strategy. As
he did in his earlier book The Accidental
Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at
NATO (Naval Institute Press, 2014),
the author writes with a dry wit and
an engaging manner, highlighted
by numerous historical insights and
cultural references. Moreover, Stavridis’s
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PHILIP M. BILDEN

Outsourcing War: The Just War Tradition in the
Age of Military Privatization, by Amy Eckert.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2016. 183 pages.
$39.95.

In what proves to be both an insightful and informative book, this latest
publication on the just war tradition
integrates the disciplines of applied
ethics, international politics, and
military strategy. As associate professor
of political science at Metropolitan
State University of Denver, Amy Eckert
draws attention to the development of
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private military companies (PMCs) as
nonstate actors in support of warfare. In
this provocative work, Eckert sets out to
detail the phenomenon of the privatization of the military as a paradigm shift
in recent years and its repercussions for
strategic programming. Eckert contextualizes the growth of PMCs within
the evolving history of just war theory
and presents the ethical justification for
war as a dynamic core of principles that
have been reconceptualized and applied
in different time frames. Accordingly,
Eckert proposes a series of qualifications
to the current use of PMCs through a
reformulation of just war principles.
Eckert notes the rapid expansion of
PMCs, contrasting the First Gulf War,
during which the ratio of contractors
to military personnel was one to
fifty, with the later U.S.-led Iraq and
Afghanistan campaigns, in which PMC
contractors outnumbered military
members altogether. The end of the
Cold War, the reluctance of nations to
subsidize large militaries, the lack of
public support for foreign endeavors,
and the trend toward a market ideology
that seeks the cost-effective savings
that private corporations can provide
explain in part the rapid increase of
PMCs within the state’s arsenal of
logistical and operational support.
The advantages of PMCs, as Eckert
outlines, include executive privilege, by
which governments generally can hire
PMCs without congressional oversight,
public debate, or headlines publicizing
casualties or losses; the economic
savings of military outsourcing, which
proponents argue is conducive to fiscal
responsibility and a corporate search
for the lowest costs in a competitive
global market; and deniability, because,
while a government may not be involved
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in kinetic conflict officially, it can
deploy PMCs covertly to accomplish
national security objectives. PMCs,
observes Eckert, offer “maximum
freedom with minimal responsibility.”
However, Eckert highlights a number
of disadvantages of PMCs. Owing to
the private/public divide, corporate
contractors have very little accountability to the states that hire them.
Travesties such as the Abu Ghraib
scandal reflect ethical and legal violations outside the reach of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. High-profile
PMC failures, such as the Blackwater
incidents in Iraq (2005–2007), can
become embarrassing liabilities for
the governments that hire PMCs. The
government lacks control once the PMC
contracts are signed. And PMCs—like
any other private company—act out
of a profit motivation, and are directly
obligated to their corporate shareholders, not the military chain of command.
Consequently, Eckert reformulates
the jus ad bellum (law of going to war)
requirements in ways that address the
role of PMCs. For instance, when a state
deliberates whether to wage a war, policy
makers must evaluate the criterion of
proportionality. That is, even for a war
with a just cause, the potential gains
must outweigh the costs. Eckert argues
that, in contrast with their contemporary
practice, states that hire PMCs must
include the deaths of PMC personnel
in past conflicts in their public records,
then extrapolate from the public records
potential contractor fatalities as a factor
in their calculations of whether, in a
projected pursuit of war, the gains will
outweigh the losses. Equally dramatic in
effect, Eckert recommends that for jus in
bello (the law of conducting war) PMC
employees have the status of “civilian
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combatants,” with both the protections
and restraints implied, and that PMCs,
along with the state governments, have
a shared responsibility to conduct the
war in a way that is consistent with
command and control accountability.
Outsourcing War is a compelling analysis
of the reemergence of nonstate actors
in the implementation of warfare.
With scholarly credibility and political
savvy, Eckert displays an understanding of both the past and the present
as the just war tradition impacts the
future development of PMCs, offering
reasonable solutions to the current
problems posed by the outsourcing of
war. In applying the jus ad bellum and
jus in bello modifications to the status
and conduct of PMCs, Eckert’s central
assertion in Outsourcing War makes us
wonder whether these modifications
negate the very reasons for using
PMCs in the first place. This question
raises even further the critical issue of
whether it is more important to alter
PMC practices to align with just war
principles or to alter just war principles
to align with PMC practices. Eckert
seems to advocate a middle course that
balances the time-honored principles
of the just war tradition with the
reality of contemporary PMC practices
through responsible applications, and
that balance is one for policy makers,
academics, and warfighters to debate
in the outsourcing of war to PMCs.
EDWARD ERWIN

Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the
Great Campaigns, by John T. Kuehn. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015. 249 pages. $60.
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John Kuehn’s objective is to analyze the
Napoleonic Wars “along principally
operational lines” (p. xi). Kuehn claims
that, of the three levels of war, “the
one that is least understood and
written about resides in that always
uncomfortable middle ground, the
operational level” (p. x). He explains
that he chose the period of the French
Wars (1792–1815) because they lend
themselves “particularly well to an
operational-level analysis” (p. ix). His
goal is to provide “something of an
impressionistic result that suggests the
operational-level approach adopted here
illustrates effectively the more esoteric
concept of operational art—how military
genius, as best defined by Clausewitz,
operated in space and time in the uncertain environment at the operational
level during the era of a veritable ‘God of
War’” (p. xi). In particular, Kuehn, who
holds the General William Stofft Chair
for Historical Research at the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College,
maintains that “an operational examination of Napoleonic campaigns has value
because so many of their characteristics
resemble current American military
thought and practice” (p. 9).
The book begins with an interesting
discussion of the evolution of the
operational art as a level of war to be
studied. Kuehn provides definitions
and an explanation of his methodology,
which is to analyze Napoleonic operations through the frameworks provided
by the Soviet school and by James
Schneider, formerly of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College.
Successive chapters generally follow the
chronology of the coalition wars that
France fought between 1792 and 1815.
Chapter 3, which covers the War of the
Second Coalition, examines Russian and
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French operations in Italy and Switzerland but does not include Napoleon’s
second Italian campaign. Chapter 4 is
devoted to an interesting study of the
naval war between Great Britain and
France, in particular the operational
art of Admiral Horatio Nelson, which
is well done. Kuehn concludes his book
with a very short epilogue that covers
Napoleon’s last campaigns in 1814 and
1815. No bibliography is included.
Professor Kuehn makes it very clear that
his conclusions are not based on archival
research or a fresh look at the primary
sources: “[M]ost of the sources used for
this book are secondary and may appear
dated with respect to their interpretations. They are used to get basic facts,
which at the operational level of war
are largely established” (p. xi). His notes
demonstrate a heavy dependence on David Chandler, John Elting, Steven Ross,
Christopher Duffy, Rory Muir, Gunther
Rothenberg, and Charles Oman. One
curious omission is the works on 1806,
1807, 1809, 1813, and 1814 by the earlynineteenth-century British staff officer
Francis Loraine Petre, who provides
much better operational studies than
does Chandler. Moreover, only a handful
of references were drawn from recent
scholarship by Roger Knight and Alexander Mikaberidze. Completely missing
from Kuehn’s notes are Huw Davies’s
groundbreaking 2012 work Wellington’s
Wars: The Making of a Military Genius,
which might have persuaded Kuehn that
his interpretation of Wellington’s way of
war needed some revision, and John H.
Gill’s three volumes on 1809, Thunder
on the Danube. Conversely, Kuehn
consulted Gneisenau’s life of Blücher,
which must be used with extreme
caution because at times it borders
on fiction. For example, the Krümper
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system did not produce 150,000
trained men in three years (p. 175).
The problem with Professor Kuehn’s
research is that the “basic facts” these
dated works provide are the material
from which he draws his conclusions,
and they are not always accurate.
Moreover, the work is replete with
generalizations and oversimplifications
that likewise are not always accurate.
For example, Yorck did not conduct
“extensive negotiations” with Clausewitz
in December 1813 (p. 174) but with the
Russian general Diebitsch; Germany did
not explode in revolt in early 1813 (p.
179); and the “ubiquitous Czernicheff
and his Cossacks” were not responsible
for the destruction of Girard’s division
on August 27, 1813 (p. 195)—that was
the work of Prussian general Hirschfeld’s
mainly Landwehr (militia) brigade of
twelve thousand men, supported by
Czernicheff ’s five Cossack regiments,
at the battle of Hagelberg. Blücher’s
army in 1815 was not “a veritable
Prussian Grande Armée” (p. 209), as
it lacked any reserves or specialized
units at the army level, and 75 percent
of one of its four corps consisted of
newly raised Landwehr, while another
corps was 50 percent Landwehr.
This reviewer had hoped that with
ABC-CLIO’s acquisition of Praeger
some quality-control measures would
be introduced to the latter’s publishing
process; sadly, this has not been the case.
Although no fault of his, Kuehn’s book is
in dire need of professional copyediting.
Misspellings, omissions and commissions in punctuation and capitalization,
missing diacritical marks and nobiliary
particles, redundant vocabulary, and
less-than-clear sentences mar this book.
Kuehn is not entirely blameless. Minor
yet irritating errors such as “the army of
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Prussia created by Frederick the Great
and his father Frederick William II” (p.
16) undermine the author’s credibility.
Austria’s Hofkriegsrat was not “also
known as the Aulic Council” (p. 24);
they were very different entities.
Maps are an issue as well. The maps in
this book would have been considered
archaic fifty years ago; today they are
abominable and practically illegible—
a magnifying glass might be of some
assistance. Any operational study
depends on good maps to help the
reader understand the course of the
campaigns, but this reviewer gave up
on trying to use this book’s maps.
It is difficult to state where this book
fits in the massive literature on the
Napoleonic Wars. This study can be seen
as an extension of Robert M. Epstein’s
1994 work Napoleon’s Last Victory and
the Emergence of Modern War. Kuehn
does accomplish his stated goal of
describing the Napoleonic “campaigns,
armies, and leaders using the lens of
operational art” (p. 10). However, the
descriptions of the campaigns are not
detailed enough for any but a Napoleonic Wars expert to grasp the points that
Kuehn is trying to make. He admits that
some will object to his use of twentiethcentury military theory to explain
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
events (p. xi). Kuehn does have moments
of brilliance, especially in the chapters
on the evolution of the operational art
and the naval duel, as well as the short
paragraphs he employs to summarize
his chapters, but in the end an analysis
based on outdated scholarship provides
a weak foundation that jeopardizes
the stability of the entire structure.
MICHAEL V. LEGGIERE
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Hunters and Killers, by Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman. Vol. 2, Anti-submarine Warfare
from 1943. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2016. 272 pages. $49.95.

Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 is
the second volume in a comprehensive
history of the impact of the submarine
on maritime warfare. Engaging their
significant expertise in the history of
naval warfare and military technology
research and development, authors
Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman chronicle the development and
employment of the submarine as a
weapon of war at sea and the resulting response by navies to counter
the effectiveness of the submarine
through antisubmarine warfare (ASW).
This book examines submarine and
antisubmarine technology, tactics, and
doctrine chronologically, commencing
with World War II submarine operations
in the Atlantic and Pacific and culminating with twenty-first-century ASW
concepts and contemporary issues.
This history captures the asymmetry
between the submarine and antisubmarine warfare as these two forms of
maritime warfare competed for tactical
and operational superiority. The book
discusses contributions the science and
technology community made to ASW,
as well as the actions of operational
and tactical innovators. The scientists
and innovators collectively developed
ASW capabilities that reignited further
competition between the submarine
and the ASW operator. The book’s
chronological approach studies the
pace and trajectory of evolutionary and
revolutionary changes in submarine
operations and antisubmarine warfare by
explaining the tactical and operational
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challenges facing submarines and ASW
forces. The authors then describe and
assess the subsequent reactions of navies
to mitigate or eliminate each advantage.
The book stimulates the reader to assess
retrospectively the inflection points at
which the hunters became the hunted.
Of particular value is the authors’
examination of antisubmarine warfare
across the broad spectrum of ASW
methods, technology, doctrine, and
tactics. Anti-submarine Warfare from
1943 includes study of the contributions
to antisubmarine warfare made by
ships, submarines, and aircraft, but also
the maturing science and technologies
that enabled other forms of ASW. For
example, the book explains the development and employment of acoustic
systems by describing the development
and use of active and passive shipborne,
air, and fixed sonar systems. In addition,
the authors examine the impact on ASW
of nonacoustic methods, illuminating
the important contributions made by
espionage, cryptographic systems and
communication intercepts, electromagnetic effects, infrared and laser
systems, and subsurface wake detection.
In the first four chapters of Antisubmarine Warfare from 1943, the
authors evaluate submarine warfare
and antisubmarine warfare during
World War II in the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. Numerous engagements
are detailed describing the tactical
contributions of World War II ASW
ships, aircraft, and submarines to U.S.
and Allied efforts to wrest the advantage
away from the Axis submarine force.
The book captures the multidomain approach to the period’s ASW operations.
Not surprisingly in a study of antisubmarine warfare after World War II, five
chapters of the book identify and analyze
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Cold War influences on submarine
operations and antisubmarine warfare.
This history captures the nature and
intensity of the U.S.-USSR Cold War
ASW competition. That competition is
placed in the context of national military
strategies, technological developments,
operational doctrines, and tactics. These
chapters reflect on submarine and
antisubmarine warfare during a long
period of not-quite-war, but definitely
not peace, in the security environment.
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 is a
holistic study of antisubmarine warfare
that provides an opportunity to think
critically about history’s most impactful
developments in submarine warfare
and ASW operations. Readers might
expect the authors to engage their expert
knowledge of ASW history to assess
which events or developments in antisubmarine warfare were most impactful
in the competitive and dynamic relationship between the submarine and ASW
forces, but the authors allow readers to
develop their own assessments and judge
the short-term and enduring significance of ASW technological and tactical
initiatives and developments over the
history of antisubmarine warfare.
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943
will be of great interest to readers with
tactical and technical ASW experience.
For an ASW expert, the book offers the
opportunity to reflect on previously
obtained knowledge and experience and
holistically reflect on antisubmarine
warfare and submarine operations across
the broad spectrum of ASW concepts.
For the ASW novice, this book provides
historical perspective on and context
for decades of ASW developments. An
appealing feature of this book is that
the authors eliminate the incredibly
detailed technical parameters that can
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dominate any discussion or assessment
of ASW operations. For the reader
seeking that type of detail, the book’s
extensive footnotes and bibliography
are valuable sources for research on
several types of technical information, tactics, and historical events.
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943
stimulates the reader to think critically
about the trends and inflection points
in the lethal relationship between the
submarine and ASW operations.
SEAN SULLIVAN

Honor before Glory: The Epic World War II Story
of the Japanese-American GIs Who Rescued the
Lost Battalion, by Scott McGaugh. Boston: Da
Capo, 2016. 304 pages. $25.99.

What is as stirring as a tale of a “lost
battalion”? The story elements are
simple. A hard-fighting group of
American soldiers gets out in front
of advancing troops and eventually is
surrounded by the enemy. A prolonged
fight ensues as the battalion fights
for its life, while other U.S. and allied
forces mount repeated attempts to find
and then rescue the lost battalion.
Perhaps the most famous of all U.S. lost
battalions was a force of slightly more
than 550 men, primarily from the 308th
Battalion of the 77th Division, during
the Meuse-Argonne offensive of October
1918. Low on food, water, and other supplies, the battalion withstood repeated
German attacks for six days. When
finally “rescued,” the battalion had
only 194 men. On relief of the 308th,
the battalion’s commander, a bespectacled major from Wisconsin named
Charles Whittlesey, was promoted
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immediately and soon after received
the Congressional Medal of Honor.
In World War II, the title of “the lost
battalion” was worn by the 1st Battalion,
141st Infantry Regiment of the Army’s
36th Infantry Division. The 141st was
a Texas National Guard outfit and, like
the 308th twenty-six years earlier, it had
its brush with fame during a wet and
cold October in France. On October 23,
1944, the 141st was ordered to advance
into the Vosges Mountains. Members
of the 141st were assured that a “strong
force” would follow them. The terrain
was steep and heavily forested, with but
a single logging road. The Germans,
with their usual tenacity and competent
generalship, conducted a tenacious
defense over ground they knew well.
The battalion made good progress on
the 23rd, advancing four miles along
the logging road, and the advance
continued the next day; the battalion
reached its objective after covering
six more miles. Shortly afterward the
Germans conducted a heavy artillery
bombardment. An effort was made to
reinforce the battalion with light tanks
and artillery, but it failed owing to the
dense forest. By dusk, the 1st Battalion
was surrounded—cut off from resupply,
medical aid, and reinforcements. If not
relieved, destruction by or surrender
to the Germans appeared inevitable.
Major General John Dahlquist, commanding the 36th Division, set about
organizing a relief. He chose the 442nd
Regimental Combat Team to serve as
his primary assault force. Although
the 442nd troops had just been taken
off the line for some well-deserved
rest and resupply, their reputation as
highly competent assault troops was
a major factor in Dahlquist’s decision.
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Colonel Charles Pence, commanding
the 442nd, was not surprised by the
selection. Word of the 1st Battalion’s
difficulty had spread quickly, and Pence
already had ordered planning to begin.
The men of the 442nd, although
annoyed at having to leave their rest
areas almost as soon as they arrived,
got the job done. During five days of
intense fighting the unit advanced,
through terrible terrain and against good
defenses. The 141st’s situation remained
precarious, with only intermittently
successful airdrops and propagandaleaflet shells used to resupply the troops.
Senior leaders grew increasingly
frustrated and personality clashes more
frequent, especially when General
Dahlquist, fearing he would be relieved
for failure in command, became more
and more micromanagerial in directing
the rescue effort. On October 30, lead
elements of the 442nd made contact
with the surviving members of the 141st.
According to one scholar, the 442nd lost
fifty-four men killed in action and 156
wounded in reaching the lost battalion;
211 soldiers of the 1/141 were rescued.
If this were all there was to the story, it
still would be worth the telling; however,
there is more. The 442nd was a nisei
outfit. Its ranks were filled with Japanese
Americans from Hawaii and elsewhere
in the United States. Many of the latter
had left internment camps to fight
for the country that had forced their
families from their homes and placed
them under armed guard and behind
barbed wire. Yet the 442nd was the
most decorated unit of its size in the
U.S. Army. (Sadly, McGaugh reminds
the reader, superior service would not
be enough to protect at least some
members of the 442nd from unyielding
race prejudice even after the war.)
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McGaugh—a former newsman, the
author of more than half a dozen books,
and the current marketing director of
the Midway Museum—knows a good
war story when he sees one. Honor before
Glory is a battle study, a tale of shared
hardship and forged bonds similar to
Stephen Ambrose’s Band of Brothers. The
work also may be read as a broader story
of nisei soldiers, who were subjected to
pernicious racism, institutional bias, and
belated attempts to right past wrongs.
With so many potential avenues to
explore, it should not be a surprise that
Honor before Glory sprawls. Although
all the aforementioned elements are
touched on, none are developed as
fully as they might be. To some degree,
there was nothing McGaugh could do
about this. The problem with writing
the next Band of Brothers is that there
are not that many “brothers” left.
Ambrose’s book was published in 1992,
McGaugh’s in 2016; in the intervening
twenty-four years, the survivors of the
Second World War have continued to
dwindle in numbers, and neither the
442nd nor the 141st has been spared
in this regard. For a group memoir to
be successful, there needs to be some
undefined, yet real, critical mass of
memories. The remaining voices of the
442nd continue to tell an exceptional
story, but there were only fifty or so
oral interviews from the men of the
442nd, and considerably fewer from
their counterparts in the 141st. To his
credit, McGaugh tried to find German
voices to add to the story, but time has
taken a toll on former enemies as well.
Honor before Glory also could use some
improvement as a battle study, beginning with more and higher-quality maps
and illustrations. For all its difficulty,
the relief of the 1/141 was a small battle.
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Although McGaugh provides a glossary
of names and an order of battle, more is
needed, including a detailed time line.
McGaugh also would have been well
served by including more information
on German movements and actions. Of
course, it may have been that the men
of the 716th Volksgrenadier Division
and other German units did not feel
the same sense of urgency to capture
the battalion as U.S. commanders felt
to save it, and simply did less than U.S.
forces. More information regarding the
quality of German troops and the types
of equipment each side carried would
be welcome. However, again to be fair
to McGaugh, given the passage of time,
the loss of records, and the inherent
difficulty of identifying exact locations
on a seventy-year-old battleground,
answering these challenges is not easy.
The story of the nisei is too big for
this book, even when the focus is
narrowed to only the nisei in the 442nd,
but McGaugh makes the most of the
opportunity. He reminds the reader that
the nisei went through basic training in
Louisiana and other southern locales
where race prejudice was palpable. In
discussions of the 442nd’s exemplary
combat record, a frequently encountered
explanation is that the men of the 442nd
felt they had something to prove—they
wanted to lay down irrefutable
evidence that they were as good as or
better than any other U.S. soldiers.
McGaugh offers two alternate or
supplementary explanations to this more
common one. The first—and more
disturbing—is that the 442nd gained
more combat decorations and awards for
heroism because it deliberately was used
in dangerous situations and missions—
and this was because the men, being
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nisei, were seen as expendable. Some of
the survivors of the 442nd voice this theory with conviction, but similar claims
are likely to issue from any unit that
had fought hard, then was pulled out of
a rest area to fight some more. Having
allowed this notion to see the light of
day, McGaugh just leaves it, without
refutation, confirmation, or even a
personal opinion, requiring readers to
make up their own minds. The other
possible explanation is more intriguing.
McGaugh suggests that the nisei may
have fought so well because they were
nisei. Concepts of honor and duty were
part of their identity. Many owned and
some wore the senninbari, the “belt of
1,000 stitches” that female relatives made
to protect their loved ones from harm.
Perhaps the men of the 442nd fought so
well because they had been brought up
amid a blend of powerful social/civic
expectations and community values
that owed as much to Japan as to the
United States. Unfortunately, having
brought up this possible explanation
for the demonstrated valor of the
nisei, McGaugh again simply leaves
the reader to individual speculation.
In the final portion of the book,
McGaugh illuminates yet another way
in which the nisei were undervalued
by the nation they served. Dozens of
nisei soldiers were nominated for the
Medal of Honor during the war; only
two of the awards were approved. In
1997, the Army reviewed the original
nominations, and the review board
subsequently recommended that
twenty-two of the nisei soldiers be
awarded the Medal of Honor, as their
immediate commanders had intended.
McGaugh provides descriptions of the
combat actions of three of these men,
and those accounts leave little doubt
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that in these three cases, at the very
least, the upgraded award was justified.
Being identified as “the lost battalion”
rankled survivors of the 141st, who
claimed they were neither lost nor
rescued. The first claim is true: the
battalion’s location was known from
beginning to end. The second claim is
harder to adjudicate. As the five days
wore on, food, ammunition, medical
supplies, and other necessities dwindled
to dangerous levels, and the battalion
was judged unable to effect its own
extraction. McGaugh makes a compelling case that this was indeed a rescue.
At the end of the day, despite minor
flaws, Honor before Glory is a book
worth reading. The story of the nation’s
nisei families and their soldier sons’
battle experiences remains well worth
telling as an example of extraordinary
patriotism and courage in the face
of reprehensible actions taken out
of pain, prejudice, and fear.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War
Theory in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans, and Adam Henschke.
New York: Routledge, 2015. 418 pages. $245.

In an anthology of provocative and
insightful essays both comprehensive
and diverse in nature, the editors of
this work on just war theory make a
significant contribution to the genre
of applied ethics. Allhoff, Evans, and
Henschke enlist professors, retired
military officers, journalists, theologians,
and computer scientists as essayists to
examine the efficacy and applicability of
the just war tradition vis-à-vis the latest
developments in technology, culture,
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and politics. Although the writing style
is accessible to the novice who wants
to understand better the essentials
of just war theory, this collection of
essays provides the scholar-warrior and
professor with substantive research and
the latest modifications to a theory that
has been tried and trusted for millennia.
The editors incorporate a wide range
of theorists, including both those who
reject the just war tradition as obsolete,
given the evolution of warfare, and
those who support just war criteria as
reliable principles for the conduct of
warfare in the twenty-first century.
In this exciting forum of ideas, opponents and proponents of just war theory
introduce concepts worthy of serious
consideration. While the book resembles
a recent installment of the Star Wars
movies in its probing of the morals of
unmanned drones, lethal autonomous
robots, cyberspace nonkinetics, and
more, the writers call on the great philosophers of the past to help address the
latest trends and projections of national
security measures. Under the category
“Theories of War,” contributors critique
and defend the criteria to justify the
commencement of war (jus ad bellum),
the criteria by which war is conducted
(jus in bello), and the criteria by which
war is concluded with postconflict
stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance (jus post bellum).
The editors do not stack the deck to bias
the reader toward or against just war
theory, and this illustrates the distinct
virtue of this scholarly undertaking: its
diversity of themes and perspectives.
Whether it is Jeff McMahan’s argument
that the soldier has an epistemic responsibility to ascertain whether the war in
which he or she fights is just, or Richard
Werner’s psychological thesis that most
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wars are justified as in-group exceptionalism and collective self-deception, or
Jeff Whitman’s insistence that just war
theory in its criteria toward war and in
war minimizes the suffering of combat,
the editors expose the reader to age-old
debates and new-age innovations. For
instance, what are the moral implications of the child-soldier who constitutes
a lethal force but in some ways is still
not accountable as an adult warrior?
How does just war theory interface with
the increasing use of private military
contractors within the world’s armed
services, as combatants or civilians?
Are robotic warriors morally culpable,
or are their software programmers?
Can scientists produce research papers
on the positives of the latest medical
breakthrough without also considering
the multiuse of viruses for human harm?
Can nonkinetic information attacks on,
say, banks constitute acts of aggression
that warrant a kinetic response of
self-defense? Are torture and indefinite
imprisonment acceptable as an ethics of
exceptionalism for terrorists? All these
questions and more acquaint scholar and
student alike with the burgeoning moral
dilemmas of war in the last decade.
Poised between the idealism of pacifism
on the one hand and the cynicism of
realism on the other, theorists on all
sides of the debate directly state or
indirectly insinuate the value of just
war theory. Critics suggest just war
theory’s value by making improvements
that presuppose its core principles as
foundational standards from which

to upgrade. Just war advocates and
revisionists apply the necessary criteria
to the changing landscape of war,
maintaining that the principles are
flexible enough to embrace the latest
invention, yet firm enough to respect the
collective wisdom of bygone centuries.
The just war tradition is not a static
canon of dogmatic tenets, but rather
a dynamic canon of robust precepts
that are adaptable but faithful to the
central concepts of justice. After all,
policy makers and warfighters, in
contemplating the tremendous costs of
war and peace, cannot easily turn a deaf
ear to great thinkers such as Aristotle,
Cicero, and Aquinas, to name only a few.
Indeed, to deny the validity of the just
war tradition would be to countermand
the Geneva Conventions, international
humanitarian law, and the UN Charter,
all of which are predicated in some way
on the insights of those ancient and
ageless core premises known as just war
theory. As long as philosophers and
ethicists deliberate the values of justice
and peace pertaining to statecraft, just
war ideas will be relevant, and so will
any compendium of essays that explore
the topics of jus pax (the law of peace).
Illuminating and profound in scope, the
Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War is
one of the best additions to the just war
dialogue in many years and promises
to inform the scholar-warrior on the
most challenging issues of our day.
EDWARD ERWIN

OUR REVIEWERS

Scott Bergeron is the chief executive officer of the Liberian registry, the U.S.-based manager of the
world’s second-largest ship registry, and is responsible for ensuring the regulatory compliance of
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over 4,200 commercial ships representing 150 million gross tons. Mr. Bergeron has seagoing experience with the U.S. Merchant Marine and gained practical knowledge of vessel ownership and
technical management throughout his career.
Philip Bilden is a philanthropist and national security advocate. He graduated magna cum laude
with a bachelor of science in foreign service from Georgetown University, where he also received
the President’s Cup as the top graduate of Georgetown’s Army ROTC brigade. He is an MBA
graduate of Harvard Business School.
Edward Erwin serves as command chaplain of Naval Air Station Sigonella, Sicily, Italy. He holds a
doctorate in theology and ethics from Duke University.
Michael V. Leggiere is professor of history and deputy director of the Military History Center at
the University of North Texas. He is the award-winning author of five books on Napoleon and his
wars.
Michael McCrabb is the strategic planner for the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance
Field Activity in Pensacola, Florida. He is a retired naval officer who graduated from the U.S.
Naval Academy in 1978 and the U.S. Naval Staff College in 1991.
Thomas McShane is a retired U.S. Army colonel who was an Army judge advocate general (JAG).
He served in Operation DESERT STORM and in Europe during the Kosovo campaign. He taught at
the Army JAG School, at the Army War College, and, following his retirement, at the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Gordon, Georgia, where he was an associate professor and
campus director. He has published articles in Parameters, Military Review, and Army Lawyer.
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College. He is a retired
naval officer and holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
Mark R. Shulman teaches and writes on international law and history topics, with a special focus
on great-power relations.
Sean Sullivan is an associate professor at the Naval War College and a retired U.S. naval officer
who served for more than a decade at sea in surface combatants, destroyer and amphibious squadrons, and the Third Fleet, participating in the planning and execution of U.S., allied, and coalition
antisubmarine warfare operations, exercises, and training events.
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-

T

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

he Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) encourages sailors at all ranks and grade levels to seek to enhance their professionalism by reading books of consequence. The CNO has identified more than
150 titles for consideration in such professional-development efforts.
We begin with a question: What is the true measure of a sailor’s identity? We
often wrap ourselves in the defining terms of rates, designators, skills, and rank.
Of course, these are important—they give structure to a system that manages talent and promotes individuals on the basis of performance and ability, establish
incentives and organize pay scales, and create a unique culture that both pervades
our institutional identity and transcends history. This is the identity of the Navy
as a whole, not of the individual, and rightly the focus is on the organization, the
unit, and the collective nature of sailors deploying together in harm’s way.
Another question should be asked, however, especially when considering the
old adage that the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts. Is the measure
of an individual really a matter of collar devices, chevrons, or warfare devices?
Or is it the individual’s qualities—innate or learned—that engender a sense of
purpose, or simply place weighted value on the characteristics that sailors should
reflect—the core values, if you will? Together, sailors adopting the Navy’s core
values make the organization stronger. These values are primarily personal, but
they are intertwined with the core attributes delineated in the CNO’s “Design for
Maintaining Maritime Superiority.”
Cohesion of a fighting force depends on having trust and confidence in each
other and in the chain of command. Sailors are called on to serve the ship and
each other, especially in combat, and trust in one’s shipmates must be based
on shared principles and a core identity. As stated in the Design, “Four core
attributes of our professional identity will help to serve as guiding criteria for
our decisions and actions. If we abide by,” or internalize, “these attributes”—
integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness—“our values should be clearly
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evident in our actions.” Deckplate education provides skill development through
hardscrabble work and the satisfaction of knowing a job has been done well. A
classroom, even if that classroom is a berthing space or barracks room, provides
space for intellectual growth that supplements and strengthens the person and
the organization.
The CNO-PRP provides a list of books that discuss core attributes of a professional identity. Books on leadership, management, philosophy, ethics, learning,
perseverance, and teamwork—all terms familiar to sailors—blend stories of success and failure that shape the world in which we live and the nation and Navy we
serve. Reading others’ stories, theories, and philosophies entertains and educates,
but it also allows us to grapple with ideas that are not our own. We learn by fusing the lessons of history with our own knowledge, beliefs, and values. The core
attributes are foundational in our professional lives, but we must dedicate time
and effort to reflecting on why they are important. In doing so, we permanently
embed these attributes in the foundation of our Navy for the current and future
generations of sailors.
Thankfully, we have some resources to guide us.

• Integrity—upright and honorable conduct—requires conscious decisions in
tough situations. Consistent adherence to our core values defines who we
are as individuals and builds trust among people. In the CNO-PRP, Joseph J.
Ellis’s book His Excellency: George Washington and The Road to Character by
David Brooks offer testimony on the worth of personal integrity.
• Accountability—holding each other to objective standards—keeps us focused
on the mission. Often we bemoan the repetition of general quarters and
man-overboard drills, but when the time comes we must be able to stand
shoulder to shoulder, with the understanding that everyone knows how to
do the job. General Stanley McChrystal’s Team of Teams and Simon Sinek’s
Leaders Eat Last are powerful tomes that argue that we are better in groups
than as individuals acting alone.
• Initiative—approaching situations with open minds and ownership—promotes a willingness to challenge the status quo, but always with the mission
in mind. “Ship, shipmate, self.” Leadership on the Line by Ronald A. Heifetz
and Marty Linsky and The Rules of the Game by Andrew Gordon illustrate
the importance of accountability.
• Books such as The Conquering Tide by Ian W. Toll and Matterhorn by Karl
Marlantes illustrate the importance of toughness. Resilience in combat and
an ability to carry the fight to the enemy despite overwhelming odds are
hallmarks of our service. We “Don’t give up the ship.”

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb 2

169

8/7/17 11:58 AM

164

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 23

These examples found under the Core Attributes section of the CNO-PRP
website are complemented by many other titles, many available in e-book or
audiobook format. We encourage all sailors to visit the website or social media
pages of the CNO-PRP and the Navy General Library Program. The resources are
free of charge to sailors and are an essential part of the self-education so critical
to the future of our Navy.

CAPTAIN TIMOTHY URBAN, USN, DEPUTY PROGRAM MANAGER, CNO-PRP
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